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Institutions
Thomas K. Ogorzalek
The contemporary “Red-Blue” political alignment is characterized by a national divide between
cities and rural areas. This urbanicity divide is stronger than it has ever been in our modern his-
tory, but it began with the development of an urban political order that changed the Democratic
party during the New Deal era. These cities, despite being the site of serious, multidimensional
conflicts at home, have been remarkably cohesive in the way they represent themselves in national
politics, forming “city delegations” whose members attend to more than their own district’s con-
cerns. These city delegations tend to cohesively represent a “city” interest that often coincides
with what we think of as liberalism.
Using evidence from Congress, where cities represented themselves within the nation, and a
unique dataset measuring the urbanicity of House districts over time, this dissertation evaluates
the strength of this urban political order and argues that city delegation cohesion, which is a basic
strategic tool if cities are to address their urgent governance needs through action at higher levels
of government, is fostered by local institutions developed to provide local political order. Impor-
tantly, these integrative institutions also helped foster the development of civil rights liberalism
by linking constituencies composed largely of groups that were not natural allies on such issues.
This development in turn contributed to the departure of the Southern Democratic bloc, and to
our contemporary political environment.
This combination—of diversity and liberalism, supported by institutions that make allies of
constituencies that might easily be rivals—has significant implications for an America character-
ized by deep social difference and political fragmentation.
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about how to think about politics in cities. I am thankful for the attention and constructive com-
ments given by those generous enough with their resources and time to invite me to present prim-
itive versions of this project without condemning it to the dustbin. These include participants
in the Saguaro/Manchester SCHMI Summer Workshop (especially Jane Green, Robert Putnam,
Tom Sander, Ed Fieldhouse, Louise Kennedy Converse, and Jenny Birchall); conference discussant
McGee Young; political science departments at Syracuse University (especially Tom Keck, Kristi
Andersen, and Shana Gardarian), Northwestern University (especially Dan Galvin, Tony Chen,
Ben Page, and Jim Farr), and the Kennedy School (especially Moshik Temkin, Jennifer Hochschild,
Alberto Abadie, and Ryan Enos). Their advice and tips improved the project in many ways.
At Columbia, I have become aware of the possibilities for working deeply within a field but
also of the importance of maintaining a breadth of interests that can only flourish in a welcom-
ing, friendly community of scholars. I owe the University and the wider community there a great
debt. It is impossible to overstate how lucky I feel to have had the opportunity to interact and
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work closely with such a group of talented and generous colleagues and mentors, who have all
influenced my work and perspective. Justin Phillips has been a constantly available resource, will-
ing to nudge me away from flights of fancy but always encouraging of new ideas and a perfect
advisor for a new student trying to gain his feet in the academy. John Huber took many chances
on me, including letting me borrow his computer for three years; upon return I am afraid it will be
far less useful than the theoretical, technical, and professional insights I gained from working with
him during that time. Bob Shapiro, though busier than anyone else, was also the most available
for a word of advice or help, even on the simplest matters, without judgment. He is the kind of
colleague we should all be. Rob Lieberman, in addition to writing the essay and collecting the
cities list that gave birth to the ideas I try to explore here, has been an enthusiastic and welcome
presence throughout my time at Columbia, brimming with ideas himself and engaging when we
discussed my own. Meredith Sadin and Kate Krimmel have always been available for an encour-
aging word, a conversation to work through a puzzle, or simply a therapeutic loop through the
park. Paul Frymer has helped me keep a level head, but encouraged the risk-taking that comes
less naturally to an aging academic like me. Dorian Warren has been an invaluable friend and col-
league at Columbia, always generous with time, advice, and attention on any subject, and a perfect
companion at the only fancy Manhattan dinners I’ve had in the last eight years. Ira Katznelson,
beyond the inspiration I have always drawn from his writing and thinking, has been a wonderful
advisor and mentor. His wit, insight, work ethic, and genuine care for others have been constant,
and his support, in so many ways, has kept me in the game, and he will always be my model
not only of professional and scholarly life, but of urbanity itself. Would that all students were so
lucky.
I could not have had the intuition for this project if New York City (especially Brooklyn, yes)
hadn’t become a cherished friend during this time. Walking through the streets, reading the signs,
listening on the subway, running in the park, I learned a perspective on life unavailable anywhere
else. I thank Kara Zuaro for making me move here, Tom Herman for getting me acclimated, Joe
Napolitano for making me think deeply and for providing a place to schvitz out in the country,
K-Ro for making sure I saw all sides of the town, and Brooklyn Heights for giving me a first home
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with inspirational views and a nice place to read outside.
I could not have finished this project, or any other, without the love and support over the
years from my family. My grandmothers Peg Wade and Florence Ogorzalek, in different ways,
are important inspirations for this particular project, and for my broader affection for the urban
interlude and city life of a certain character. Their lifetime of work and love, and the stories and
outlook they have passed along, help make sense of the world.
My brothers, Kevin, Daniel, and Jim, have always been my most stalwart friends; I am the
oldest, so I’ve only recently overcome that hubris and discovered that I have been learning from
them forever, and should have done so more consciously all along. I appreciate their love, humor,
and unwavering fraternity over our whole lives, and hope I can return it.
My parents, Ken and Sharon, instilled in me a love of learning, reading, and travel from before
I could do anything else. To them I owe my sometimes trivial successes, love of maps, history, and
of new places. They are the reason I get restless to see something new, but also stop to read historic
roadside markers, and get to know how places used to be. More importantly, they have always
encouraged me to pursue this path, but never pressured me to do anything but “have fun.” The
value of hard work, but not for one’s self, that they promote by example is one I aspire to. I owe
them more than I can ever repay, and I hope I make them proud.
And I could not have done much of anything these past few years without the love and sup-
port of my partner, Quinn Mulroy. In work, she has been a constant source of moral support,
a challenging interlocutor, a diligent and focusing editor, and a role model in careful work. So
much more importantly, she has been my companion in life’s adventures, the best friend I’ve al-
ways needed, and for that I am so happy and grateful.
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In the summer of 1964, rural representatives were on the defensive. Over the previous half-
decade, landmark Supreme Court cases including Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims had enshrined
the principle of “one person, one vote.” Throughout the 20th century, representation at the state
and national level had been distorted, privileging townships or territory over population. Repre-
sentative institutions did not reflect the metropolitan reality of American life. Malapportionment
was particularly egregious in the South and West, and in state legislatures, but it existed in all re-
gions and in national congressional districts as well. The principle used to defend such inequities
was representation by place: the idea that each county, or township, should be represented in
a legislature on a roughly equal basis (the same principle guides representation in the U.S. Sen-
ate), even though the industrial revolution had prompted population explosion in cities and away
from the countryside. As a result, it was not unusual for rural voters to have about twenty times
as much representation per capita as city voters.1 In essence, a 20th century polity was being rep-
resented by 18th or 19th century legislatures. The Warren Court waded into this explicitly political
“thicket” and took steps to remedy this imbalance. The result would be a significant shift in rep-
resentational power away from the countryside and toward cities and suburban areas.
The ruralists did not take the mandated changes to the system of representation lying down,
and presented their case against equal apportionment forcefully, even recommending a constitu-
tional amendment. Former Representative John Vorys (R-OH) attempted to explain the justice
of malapportionment favoring rural areas over the city. After a long career as a legislator in the
House and in both chambers of the Ohio legislature, Vorys observed that “Those of us who have
served in the state legislature know of the power that is more than numerical that goes with the
organization of the big cities.” To buttress this claim, he quoted at length from a 1930 treatise on
“The History and Theory of Lawmaking by Representative Government” by his former House
colleague Robert Luce (R-MA), who wrote that
the great increase of effective force which comes from the election of a large number
of representatives of one city—representatives who represent, not, in fact, their separate
1Snyder and Ansolabehere (2008), p. 30. More broadly, the authors chronicle the historical roots of malapportion-
ment, the political and judicial prologue to the voting equality decisions of the early 1960s, and the effects of subsequent
changes in representation.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: AN EVEN PLAYING FIELD? 4
districts, but the whole city, representatives who are responsible to the same public opinion, and,
in fact represent but one combined interest of the citizens of the city—the great accumulation
of power created by that combination so far outweighed the effective power of a great
number of scattered representatives of widely divided centers of population, small
centers of population, that a difference in the ratio. . . went but a small way toward
equalization.2
Ruralists, worried not only about the supposed corruption of the cities, but also about the po-
tential power of cohesive city blocs, were arguing that malapportionment was an important pre-
emptive remedy against better organized, more united urban forces. To the modern ear, the worry
that cities, in August of 1964, would be too united to be defeated in legislative combat seems cu-
rious. If anything, this is an era famous for urban fracture and often violent conflict. Harlem,
Rochester, and Jersey City had already had riots that summer; Elizabeth, Chicago, and Philadel-
phia would have their own later that month. This was a moment of particularly dramatic division,
but cities have always been the sites of deep pluralism, where the limits of toleration and political
order have been tested, and where the broader community’s interests are not naturally apparent,
because so many individuals’ interests conflict and clash.3 Why did places with such obvious
divisions inspire such concern that, without an institutional advantage, rural interests would be
unfairly overwhelmed?
Also in the room that day was someone from exactly the kind of urban organization that Vorys
and his rural allies feared. Speaking on behalf of the U.S. Conference of Mayors and the City of
Chicago was Richard J. Daley. From his positions as head of the Cook County Central Democratic
Committee and Mayor of Chicago, Daley was the kind of boss that reformers and ruralists railed
about. Discipline, loyalty, and unity were the fundamental principles of the Chicago organization,
from the precinct to City Hall to Springfield to Capitol Hill.4 No stranger to state politics himself
2Emphasis added. “Apportionment of State Legislatures,” Subcom No. 5, House Committee on Judiciary. Aug. 6,
1964, HRG-1964-HJH-0043, p. 504-505. Perhaps Vorys was fortunate that Luce was not there to read the quote himself,
having died in 1946. The passage is clearly taken out of context, for Luce (a Boston Republican with evident affection
for cities) would probably not have wanted his work to be used in service of such a cause. On the page previous to the
one quoted by Vorys, Luce writes that “the most powerful motive [for the continuation of malapportionment] has been
jealousy, suspicion, and fear of the cities,” and later argues that the cohesive power of the cities was overrated in the
case of Massachusetts. Luce (1930), pp.364-367
3Katznelson (2009)
4Snowiss (1966)
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(he had previously served in the state legislature as a loyal lieutenant of Anton Cermak and the
Kelly-Nash machine), Daley saw to it that “members of Cook County’s uniformly Democratic del-
egation to the state legislature took their marching orders” from city hall on the issues of the day.
As a result of this devout (or blind) loyalty, Chicago’s Democrats were able to punch above their
weight in a statehouse where they were typically outnumbered.5
Though the specific subject that day was state politics, the reapportionment revolution had
similar implications for national politics as well, as the logic of the Supreme Court decisions was
shortly applied to both legislative levels. Urban-rural conflict had always simmered, and some-
times bubbled over, in American politics, but the 1960s was an inflection point, in which an urban
political order took positions that widened the political gap between city and countryside that
had opened up decades before. A closer look at Daley’s position that day, given the context of the
1960s and his role as the powerful political boss of the most important Democratic city, illuminates
important themes about the place of cities in American politics in a moment of dramatic social and
political change.
Citing the heightened governance demands of cities, Daley said that rural areas should not be
“given special and disproportionate weight in the legislature because they have special problems.
For years, the problems of cities and suburbs—metro areas—and their needs for government aid
have been at least as great as those of rural areas.”6 Since the onset of industrialization and urban-
ization, the recurrent and urgent governance problems of American cities had not become easier
to solve. Rather, the increasing vulnerability of cities within the national political economy had be-
come apparent, and the “special problems” of rural areas paled dramatically in comparison to the
continuous economic upheaval, intermittent violence, and great potential for social ills inherent in
large, dense, heterogeneous communities. Increasingly, cities were themselves on the defensive,
and they sought external aid to shore up finances, deliver services, and keep the social peace. Re-
moving institutional roadblocks that kept cities from state-level success was an important priority.
Daley continued:
5These marching orders were communicated via “idiot lists” of positions to be takenBiles (1995), p.61
6HRG-1964-HJH-0043, p. 473
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Legislative bodies must mirror the views of the citizens within the jurisdiction. This
does not justify policy-making bodies being set up in such a way that minority interests
of any type are represented in any way other than as justified by their relative numbers.
They remain a minority interest until such time as they convince a majority of the
people that their view is the one that should prevail.
The minority Daley was referring to here was rural populations, who despite their dwindling
numbers held preponderant institutional power in legislatures. But large cities did not constitute
a majority of legislative seats, either, so the urban position was also a minority one. More, their
positions on important issues of the day often put them at the end of the ideological spectrum.
This was especially true on issues related to the role of the state in the economy: the most inter-
ventionist perspective was formulated and led by this urban bloc.
Nonethless, despite their strategic situation of nonpivotal positioning, and even though hand-
icapped by malapportionment, city representatives had found a way to lead a majority coalition
and remake national politics. For a generation, they had at many important moments managed to
persuade representatives of other kinds of places that theirs was the view that “should prevail” in
many areas. Urban liberals had set many of the terms of debate since the beginning of the New
Deal, forging what would turn out to be an “urban interlude,” an exceptional period in American
history in which city forces seem to have been unusually successful in shaping the national state
and policy.7 These urbanites, who were mainly Democrats and would find a more natural home in
that party over time, combined early in the New Deal to forge an urban political order that was the
driving force behind much of what we call liberalism today.8 Never before in national politics had
such a distinctively urban bloc taken shape within a single party, and never before had city issues
risen to make up such a large share of the national agenda. In a tenuous alliance with the largely
7Lieberman (2009), Ethington and Levitus (2009)
8Plotke (1996) defines a political order as “a durable mode of organizing and exercising political power at the na-
tional level, with distinct institutions, policies, and discourses.” I use the term similarly, but in this text I focus on a
specifically urban political order, which includes many of Plotke’s distinctive forces (such as labor unions, whose num-
bers came mainly from cities) but emphasizes the conditions of city life and governance that predispose leaders to the
set of political commitments known (and explicitly defined by Plotke) as progressive liberalism. This urban order is not
quite as powerful an assemblage of persons and political forces as Plotke’s Democratic order, which is closer concep-
tually to a “regime,” influential enough to dominate politics for a period of time. The urban political order consisted
of cities, their members, their representatives, and their advocates, which won some battles but obviously lost others
all along the way. In this, my use of the urban “political order” is more akin to the “institutional orders” in Smith and
King (2005), which exist concurrently with competing and opposed orders.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: AN EVEN PLAYING FIELD? 7
rural and underdeveloped South, which extracted its own share of federal largess, cities worked
to create policies that would alleviate some of the pressure of continual fiscal and social crises
at home, which were brought on by such massive external forces as global economic collapse,
wartime austerity, immigration, state-imposed budget requirements, economic restructuring, and
the automobile, among others. It is perhaps ironic, then, that in arguing for fairer apportionment
in state legislatures, Daley and his urban allies had already had some (always limited and incom-
plete, but significant) success getting “sympathetic understanding” for “the problems of the urban
citizen and community” in national politics.
By 1964, however, this sympathy seemed to be vanishing. Almost from the beginning of the
New Deal, a conservative coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats had been a regular
feature of national politics, throwing a roadblock in the way of urban Democrats’ plans not only to
advance civil rights for African Americans (an unacceptable outcome for Southerners), but also to
expand national urban policies and continue the national pro-growth initiatives that had sustained
industrial cities through the past three decades.9 Daley’s testimony reveals the urban Democrats’
response to the reapportionment mandate in the light of their troublesome coalition dynamics.
Judicial Committee Chair Emanuel Celler, a longtime Brooklyn Democrat, observed that suburbs
might find common cause with the cities:
Celler: [Maybe if] the suburban areas would have greater representation. . . they might
be able to see because of being closer proximity to Chicago the needs of Chicago and
might join up with Chicago and therefore give Chicago what it deserves?
Daley: I think that would be a fair assumption. Not only that, we overlook other
facts. There are metropolitan areas downstate who have the same problem. There
are metropolitan areas that account for 76 percent of the population. . . Champaign, Ur-
bana, Davenport, Rock Island, Moline, Peoria, Springfield, East St. Louis.
This exchange by two pillars of the urban political order, one a congressman and the other a
mayor, touched on the new alignment that would take shape as the South drifted away. Here
again, the historical moment of this hearing is important, because the 1960 census revealed that
9Mollenkopf (1983), Ch. 2, Katznelson and Mulroy (2012)
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the large cities that had been the heart of the liberal alliance in Congress were no longer growing.
The future lay in the rapidly expanding suburbs, which have since absorbed a full majority of the
nation’s population. Throughout the New Deal era, the areas outside large cities had been strictly
Republican territory, between largely Democratic cities and mixed rural constituencies. But it was
the suburbs that had the most to gain from the apportionment revolution. Since 1964, there has
been a “maturation” of national partisan conflict along the urban-rural continuum: the cities have
remained Democratic (and some have become moreso), suburban constituencies became less uni-
formly Republican, and rural areas shifted toward the Republicans, though many smaller cities
remain Democratic, as Daley had hoped. No longer do cities leapfrog their suburbs to find allies;
their bedfellows are far less strange, in terms of the kinds of places they come from—the “next-
most” urban instead of the least urban. The vision of politics that Daley hoped for was based
on interests putatively shared by densely settled communities; today’s politics, characterized by
greater ideological coherence and polarization, was the result.
Finally, from his place in the Democratic Party, linking local and national organizations, a wide
range of terrifically diverse social groups with a stable city political order, Daley was situated at
an historic crossroads. As the urban interlude gave way to an era of suburban demographic ex-
plosion, Daley was the country’s most powerful mayor and one of the most powerful Democrats
in the country. He was both of these things because he was the head of a strong local party orga-
nization, in which loyalty was a primary value and in which political order was prioritized over
more coherent ideological programs, often to the dismay of liberals and other reformers.
The traditional party’s style of politics was becoming almost as anachronistic as the feudal
system of representation he had come to attack. They had been the dominant institutional form
in 19th-century city governance, but in most places they had long since passed their prime by the
1960s, and the places where they were still strong were losing people. Population shifts, insti-
tutional reforms, and social change had sapped their strength and contributed to their demise.10
What the traditional parties had done well was integrate politics across the face of the city, as-
sembling many fractious groups and constituencies and serving as an institution that integrated
10Bridges (1984), Mayhew (1986), Erie (1988)
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politics both horizontally (linking constituencies across the city) and vertically (linking actors at
different levels of government). This integration provided order and authority where the possibil-
ities for each were quite uncertain. Without such binding institutions, Vorys may have had little
to worry about—the subdivisions of a city would have little in common and no more organization
than any other collection of districts.
This is a study about city representation in national politics, and the development of a cohe-
sive liberal bloc, with roots in cities that anchor one pole of our current national partisan align-
ment characterized by a significant and increasing urban-rural divide. Key to this story is a puzzle
presented by the very conditions that make cities interesting places to study or govern: how do
cities—many cities—remain unified in politics, when they are the sites of so many kinds of dif-
ference and sets of conflicting interests? Without a “natural” basis for political unity, and under
conditions that are believed to undermine liberal policies of many kinds, how can we explain the
emergence and strengthening of “Blue America,” a political alignment that is “doubly liberal” on
issues pertaining to the economy and culture?
This ability to consistently unite representatives of many heterogeneous constituencies, many
of whom did not get along for many reasons, in support of a “city interest” (which often corre-
sponded with the “liberal” position) was what worried Vorys and his rural allies, and is a major
theme of this study. A significant part of the explanation relates to city institutions that foster po-
litical cohesion in the face of social division, and allow for political conflict to be resolved locally
and for a unified representation of the city in higher levels of government.
1.1 City Organization and National Party
Cohesion within and across cities has been a key tool in the promotion and defense of urban
prerogatives in national politics, but the organizations that often fostered this cohesion were not
always obviously liberal. In fact, the traditional party organizations (and the corruption they of-
ten spawned) are sometimes thought of as obstacles to progressive or liberal politics, but their full
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story is more complicated. Many of the most ardent programmatic liberals, including govern-
ment reformers, intellectuals, union leaders, and African American activists, were indeed often
at loggerheads with the traditional organizations and their leaders, especially on local issues. As
the local center of power, these parties had little interest in radically changing the game, so were
often reluctant to adopt institutional reforms or to consider issues of justice or equality paramount
in their political calculations. Sustained by a politics of material exchange, and what their critics
described as a “self-regarding” ethos, they were also notorious fonts of corruption. The strongest
machines were autonomous organizations, able to play the electoral game so well that their re-
election became detached from responsiveness to their constitutents.11 On racial issues especially,
many of these organizations seemed particularly unresponsive to the needs of African Americans,
whose life circumstances rarely improved much under machine rule.12 From this perspective, get-
ting a lecture on the principles of representative democracy from a leader as notoriously autocratic
as Richard J. Daley would seem a surreal experience.
While the machines were assailed from the left, they were also often attacked from the right,
and here is where the complexity of the traditional party organization hits home. Because while
they are notorious for their venality and for their ideological “flexibility,” the urban machine
tradition—its personnel and its mass base—shared much in common with more self-consciously
liberal urbanites when it came to national politics. When the time came for counting votes in
national politics, urban “liberals” and their more “traditional” local rivals often became indistin-
guishable. Both groups’ shared concerns for their urban constituents and communities, and their
vision for America’s urban future, made them allies in a nascent urban political order, which took
shape as the core political change of the New Deal.
Regional rivalries also melted away at the national level. Before the urban interlude, city lead-
ers had been focused on local issues and wary of both outside intervention and other cities. His-
torians of the urban political order have noted that “united action by the nation’s cities to induce
the Federal Government to assist cities was still unknown in 1932,” but this changed quickly as
the common experiences of the Depression and hostility from rural-dominated state legislatures
11Trounstine (2008)
12Pinderhughes (1987)
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guided cities to take up a stake in national politics as allies.13 Over the next three decades, this po-
litical order, anchored by the traditional party organizations of the major cities such as New York
and Chicago, pursued policies that would help manage problems at home, including labor regu-
lation that benefited industrial workers and unions, aid that cities needed more than other kinds
of places, and relief from the foulest of racist practices for African Americans. Even as they were
weakening—perhaps because they were weakening—these anachronistic political institutions and
their leaders managed to reshape American politics, and played a key role in establishing the con-
tent and style of what we call liberalism today.14
These very same policies undermined the cities’ national alliance with the South. From even
before the beginning of the New Deal, a fraught relationship between the least compatible polit-
ical forces in the country had been held together by a national-level accord. Though urban and
Southern Democrats both enjoyed the benefits of majority status in the national coalition, they
were in true agreement on very little. This alliance was held together in part by a pattern of pol-
icymaking that created large-scale interventions by the national government but protected many
local prerogatives in policy implementation. Urbanites especially wanted these interventions, but
they provided desired goods to all coalition members (in disproportionally large amounts to rural
Democratic constituencies), tempered by local or partial administration of the programs, which
the South relied upon to protect its white supremacist order.15 By the 1960s, this alliance was
hanging by a thread, and the South continued to respond defiantly to civil rights legislation, inch-
ing away from the party they had solidly supported since Reconstruction. While race was an issue
that divided Americans in all kinds of communities, the representatives of large cities—whose home
districts were the site of violent and destructive racial conflict throughout this era, especially in
the 1960s—were not divided. They remained united on race, despite the division in their streets
and city halls, despite the temptation to keep winning the dominant national majorities of the
past generations, and despite the fact that very few of them had many constituents who were not
white. This urban unity, especially strong among representatives of the very cities where tradi-
13Gelfand (1975), p.28
14Buenker (1973), Ch.6
15Bateman and Taylor (2007), Lieberman (2001), Katznelson (2005)
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tional party organizations were often seen as enemies of racial egalitarianism, would lead to our
contemporary politics. The sources and demonstration of cohesive liberalism are the subject of
the next four chapters; for the moment, I briefly turn to a snapshot of the “Red-Blue” divide that
was its outcome.
1.2 City Mouse, Country Mouse: Seeing Red and Blue More Clearly
In 1964, Daley and Vorys were talking about state politics, where urban-rural conflict has often
been most obvious. But the national urban-rural divide was growing as well. While today it is a
clear reality, there has not always been a relationship between place-type and national partisan-
ship. Back to Jefferson and Hamilton, and probably before, a thematic city-country rivalry has
always been present, but—probably because the population was predominantly agrarian socially
and decentralized politically—neither city nor country went distinctively toward one party or the
other, and no major party relied much on cities for their national success. This changed early in
the New Deal, as cities across the country tilted decisively toward the Democrats, playing a cru-
cial role in Roosevelt’s electoral successes and building a cohesive bloc-of-blocs in Congress. But
this change was not just about shifting power away from the party of Hoover; it had important
substantive implications for national policy as well. Faced with a variety of governance chal-
lenges associated with modernity—and made obvious by the hard times of the Depression—cities
reached beyond their borders for the first time to reshape American politics, introducing a distinc-
tively urban agenda, the modern American version of liberalism, to national politics.
Political scientists attentive to geography have seen a strengthening relationship between place
and partisanship in the electorate, leading to the conclusion that the population has increasingly
“sorted” itself along partisan lines since the 1970s.16 These studies evaluate county-level shifts in
partisanship, and do not look specifically at an urban-rural divide. Attending to place character,
16Bishop (2008), Tam Cho, Gimpel and Hui (2008), but see Abrams and Fiorina (2012) for a counterpoint. Using data
from lower levels of aggregation, Chen and Rodden (1992) illustrate that this partisan spatial sorting is asymmetrical,
with Democrats more heavily concentrated in cities than Republicans are in outlying areas.
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Nall (2010) finds that the divide between many cities and their suburbs grew after the onset of
widespread highway construction, which made suburban development easier.17 These findings
are an important part of the story, but if we go back further and track the development of the
urban-rural divide in national politics, there is more to the narrative.18
Today, the place character cleavage is more important than ever before in national politics,
contributing to our current state of political polarization. More than at any time in recent his-
tory, an individual or representative’s position on one important issue gives us information about
their position on other, seemingly unconnected, controversies of the day.19 This polarization is the
undercurrent of the “Red and Blue America” narrative that pervades much political discussion.
These issue positions and partisan identities have also become more related to place character.
The urban-rural cleavage is apparent at several levels, and a significant portion of this Red-Blue
polarization is related to place character and the urban-rural continuum: the more urban the unit
of analysis, the more likely it is to tilt toward the Democratic Party. This is probably not a con-
troversial idea for close observers, but the national narrative often focuses on states, as reflected
in the presidential electoral-college maps of the past three cycles.20 At that level, we can see this
divide impressionistically from the series of Red-Blue maps that have been on display after the
past three presidential elections.
For instance, Figure 1.1 displays the well-known map from the 2008 Presidential election,
which resembles the map from the previous two electoral cycles, with some changes at the mar-
gins. The industrial Northeast and Midwest were joined by the West Coast, which also has large
central-city populations. Stopping at the state level, pundits often settle on regional cultural tropes
and stereotypes (think Starbucks vs. Wal-Mart, sails vs. outboard motors) in explaining the lines
17By “place character,” I refer to where a place falls on an urban-suburban-rural continuum, in terms of built envi-
ronment, density and heterogeneity of population and use, and the size of the local polity. I alternatively use the term
urbanicity, defined below and developed in the next chapter, to refer to roughly the same thing. Others have used
“cityness” or “urbanity” instead, to refer to similar concepts. See Sassen (2005), and the American National Elections
Study. Sassen’s “cityness” is too related to an ineffable individual kind of cosmopolitanism, and the more conventional
“urbanity” is also weighted with normative implications because of the putative desirability of being “urbane.” Martin
(1976) operationalizes “urbanicity” as a particular county-level measure of demography and development; I agree with
his underlying meaning but do not apply it in the same way or to the same units.
18This is the subject of Chapter 3.
19Shapiro and Bafumi (2009), McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006)
20See, for instance, Gelman (2008), which makes claims about how relationships differ across “Red and Blue” states.
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Figure 1.1: 2008 Red State, Blue State. 2008 State-level Presidential election winners, Obama in
blue, McCain in red. Source: Mark Newman et al, University of Michigan.
of political conflict. Region certainly plays an important role, a fact that is not at all unusual in
American history, but a closer look reveals a pattern: all of the consistently Blue states are home
to large cities (except some in New England). There is also a complimentary pattern within states
and across regions at the county level, as in Figure 1.2, which shows the unevennesss within both
Red and Blue states—within almost all states, urban areas were more strongly Democratic ar-
eas.21 Urban counties tended to be more Democratic, rural places tended to be more Republican,
and suburban places were somewhere in between: “purple.” This is of course perfectly compat-
ible with the state-level map above. After all, when we think of big cities, certainly the “Blue”
states contain most of the paradigmatic examples in America: New York, Chicago, Los Angeles,
Philadelphia, Detroit. But the trend was apparent within states as well. In Texas, Austin, Dallas,
and Houston were bluer than most of that state, while in blue states like California and New York
21These maps may be difficult to see in grayscale. Full color versions are available at http://www-
personal.umich.edu/∼mejn/election/2008/
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Figure 1.2: Red County, Blue County. County-level voting in the 2008 presidential election (Blue
for Obama, Red for McCain). Source: Mark Newman et al, University of Michigan.
the populous urban counties were bluer than the rest of those states.22 It is difficult to see clearly
from the county-level map, so Figure 1.3 plots county-level vote share for Obama against the nat-
ural log of county population density for twenty-five large states, with local fit lines to visualize
trends. While the baseline level of support for Obama varies widely by state, in almost every case,
densely populated counties voted for Obama much more than sparsely populated ones, often by
20 to 30 percent, as we can see by the fit lines sloping up, often sharply, on the right-hand side of
the graphs. 23
These aggregate data tell us about places, but not about individuals. 24 Digging beneath the
22Notable exceptions include rural areas with large African American, Latino, or Native American populations in the
Deep South, Southwest, and West; Vermont and Iowa, which are “unexpectedly” Democratic; and Phoenix’s Maricopa
County
23Again, this is consistent with the asymmetrical geography of ?. In some states the relationship is noisier than in
others, and the dots are not weighted by population: a few dots further to the right on this graph may carry the same
weight as a cloud on the left. Note that the trend is not monotonic in several Southern states. Gastner and Newman
(2004) find similar spatial relationships in other recent presidential elections elections.
24Trends and relationships at the aggregate level may mask individual-level processes. For instance, one of the
paradoxes of the Red-Blue divide has to do with the at-odds relationship between income and partisanship at different
levels of analysis. See Bartels (2006) and Gelman (2008).
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limits of aggregation, the urban-rural cleavage is even more vivid; it clearly operates at the indi-
vidual level as well. Figure 1.4 maps the local probability of voting for a John Kerry in particular
places using geocoded data from the 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey, which had a huge
number of respondents and is thus more geographically representative than the typical national
sample.25 The Red Country-Blue City divide is striking here, and these maps may more accurately
portray the political landscape than do the previous ones, which stopped at the aggregate level.
Here, blue clusters are almost exclusively around cities, and almost all large cities are blue (mean-
ing high levels of support for Kerry against Bush).26
Clearly understanding that the political geography of Red and Blue America is rooted not only
in region or state but in place character, and focusing on the urban-rural cleavage changes our per-
spective on important political developments of the past century. While country-city tension has
always been present in American politics, partisan conflict has never been as structured around
place character as it is today. To an unprecedented extent, the Democrats are the party of a nation-
wide city political order in the electorate and in the halls of national representative institutions.
At the same time, while major parties have often been dominated by rural interests, seldom has a
party been as weak in cities as Republicans are today. Among individual Americans, this partisan
difference is related to racial and class identities, and to attitudes toward politics and religion, but
it is not reducible to these traits.27 Urbanicity is an independent and powerful concept for helping
to explain the substance and style of contemporary political conflict in the United States.
25And which also included information about respondents’ ZIP codes.
26A notable exception is Arizona, where the urbanicity pattern present virtually everywhere else is reversed—
Phoenix is more Republican than its hinterland. Creating the same figure with white voters only (not pictured) reveals
that support for Obama among whites was similarly patterned across space, albeit generally at a lower level—again,
urbanicity is not equivalent to race, but it is mildly correlated, and race certainly remains important.
27For instance, if we use statistical methods to “control” for traits commonly associated with vote choice, such as
race, ideology, region, income, education level, age, sex, and religiosity, the average urbanite was ceteris paribus still 8 to
9 percent more likely to support Obama in 2008. (Author’s logit analysis of 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey)
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1.3 Cities and Polarization
The increasing strength of the place character divide has proceeded at the same time that the ide-
ologies associated with membership in the two major American parties have apparently become
more coherent. For much of the 20th century, national Democrats and Republicans were among
the strangest of political parties: in Congress they did not vote as cohesive blocs, and at times they
seemed to include wildly disparate elements. This is no longer the case. As has been widely re-
ported, national partisan politics has become polarized (or at least “sorted”). There are no longer
many major issue areas on which the parties are internally divided, or on which they overlap, as
was the case (most notably on race) during the middle of the 20th century.28 While the conflict
about the size of government used to be cross-cut by other issues—race, region, and “culture”
among them—today’s political elites have become consistently divided on a much wider range
of substantive issues. Democrats are all “doubly liberal” on the economic and cultural issues that
reach the agenda, while Republicans are all “doubly conservative.”
The sources of this polarization, and the mechanisms by which it spreads and is reproduced,
are a central area of inquiry for political scientists. Studies of partisan realignment help us re-
late the substance of contemporary polarization to the dramatic midcentury rift in the Democratic
Party, which was driven by issues related to race and civil rights.29 The substance and “teams”
of today’s heated partisan conflict are the modern elaboration of that split, with Republicans an-
chored by the South and Democrats anchored in large cities. To a great extent, the contempo-
rary alignment simply reflects the logic of that intraparty conflict, with factions divided now as
then over race, labor, and the proper shape of the state.30 The ways that seemingly unrelated or
new issues “line up,” however, seems a bit arbitrary until we examine the relationship between
urbanicity—the quality of being like a city—and these issues. Urban places require different things
from government, and foster different predispositions on the part of citizens and leaders, in such
28Though there remains significant debate on how polarized the electorate is, or how polarization spreads, or how far
apart the parties are, there is consensus within this subfield on the fact that there is little overlap between contemporary
Republicans and Democrats. See McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006), Shapiro and Bafumi (2009), Fiorina, Pope and
Abrams (2004)
29Carmines and Stimson (1989), Schickler, Pearson and Feinstein (2010)
30Katznelson and Kryder (1993), Sitkoff (1978), Mollenkopf (1983),Katznelson and Mulroy (2012)
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varied policy areas as market interventions for economic management, the treatment of groups in
space, or adjustment to new social norms and phenomena. Just as the partisan alignments have
come to reflect the place-character divide more than they used to, so too has the content and style
of national politics, but the cities have been “blue” since long before there were Blue Dogs. When
Daley spoke in 1964 of developing political alliances out of common interest with the suburbs
and smaller cities, his vision was of a party (with big-city politicos at the reins, no doubt) which
would support policies compatible with urbanicity. Today the Democrats are that party, though
the alliance may not be as powerful, all-encompassing, or supportive of city-friendly policies as
“the Boss” would have preferred.
1.4 Cities on the Hill: Motivation and Outline of the Project
To better understand a politics increasingly polarized by place character, it is helpful to contex-
tualize city representation in national politics. What does it mean for one pole of our national
alignment to be rooted in cities, the other in more sparsely populated places, and how does this
relate to the content and development of our current era of polarization? An understanding of
cities and their institutions can help clarify why our politics look the way they do, and how they
got that way.
Proponents of American exceptionalism often refer to the United States as a metaphorical “City
Upon a Hill,” in describing the country’s potentially exemplary place in world history. In this
study, however, I turn to a relatively exceptional period in American history, the urban interlude,
and examine the self-presentation of actual cities on “the Hill”—in Congress. While we often think
of cities as the object of powerful forces—things “happen to” cities—we should also remember that
cities can serve as a model for the world (and the nation), and impact politics at the national level.
Cities truly “cannot be hid,” and how cities present themselves, and how they deal with impor-
tant political issues, can shape broader conversations and political struggles. The urban interlude,
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from the early 1930s to the 1960s, was a time of unusual city strength in national politics.31 In this
study, I use evidence of how this urban vision was communicated to the nation through repre-
sentative institutions on Capitol Hill, as city representatives drove the New Deal political order,
characterized by a multidimensional progressive liberalism that orients one pole of American pol-
itics today. By turning an analytical spotlight on the relationship between the characteristics of
cities and the distinctive way in which these communities represent themselves in national poli-
tics, we can better understand the origins of the place character divide in contemporary American
politics, including changes which were based on a city alliance and which pre-date the massive
migration to the suburbs.
Cities have not always been politically distinctive in national politics, at least not in partisan
terms, and scholarly attention has focused with intermittent intensity on cities and their relation-
ship to the broader polity. Once, the city was perhaps the central object of study in American
political science, but this focus has waned, at least partially in response to the American popu-
lation’s shift to the suburbs and the perception that the stakes of city politics are not as high as
they once were.32 When political scientists have approached the city, they have typically engaged
with the internal processes of a city’s power struggles for insights about those particular places
or to make more general claims about politics. The vast majority of urban political studies adopt
this “methodological localism,” focusing on local causes and effects.33 This approach is useful for
gaining insights about how power and institutions interact within cities, but the place of Amer-
ican cities within a federal system—within states and within nation—means that local outcomes
are not the results of hermetically sealed processes, and “cannot be adequately understood as lo-
cally generated or self-contained.”34 To the contrary, the multilayered, overlapping jurisdictions
of the federal system mean that politics and policy are generated by interactions between levels,
and that local outcomes both influence and are influenced by supralocal factors.
31Lieberman (2009), Ethington and Levitus (2009)
32Dilworth (2009a)
33Brenner (2009)
34Brenner (2009), p.134. A recent edited volume, Dilworth (2009b), is a kind of collective manifesto for the reinvigo-
ration of the study of urban politics with a specific eye toward American political development. This study draws on
several of those essays for scholarly inspiration, hoping to contribute to an ongoing reinvigoration of research in this
direction.
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That outside forces have effects felt within cities is clear. As Bridges (1984) puts it, “politics
in cities is special because cities are not self-contained arenas of political activity. . . The depen-
dence and permeability of the urban polity mean that things happen not only in cities, but to
cities.”35 Studies of urban politics have often identified constraints on local options in these over-
arching institutions, and examined the things that “happen to” cities and influence local outcomes.
Structural economic factors are often identified as the most powerful outside forces, especially the
city-crippling forces of de-industrialization and suburbanization. The relationship between these
macroforces and the “urban crisis” of the 1960s and 1970s are well-chronicled.36 But technology
and modernization are not the only relevant forces. According to Paul Peterson (1981), federal-
ism and easy personal and capital mobility across jurisdictional lines create limits on the kinds of
policies that are sustainable at the local level, especially hamstringing local efforts at redistribu-
tion. On top of this logic of interjurisdictional competition, Hackworth (2007) heaps the power of
financial institutions such as bond rating agencies, which discipline local governments bound by
budgeting constraints and in need of steady credit on the municipal bond market. Even more ex-
plicit institutional limits on city policy possibilities, such as balanced budget requirements or tax
and expenditure limits (TELs) are often imposed at the state level.37 All of these factors contribute
to the fragile position of cities in an age of global capitalism, where location of production is flex-
ible, capital and residents mobile, and demand for city services often outstrips the local ability to
provide them. This is the paradox of city governance: cities are “high-maintenance” places, but
there are external constraints on the amount of maintenance they can do.
But if cities are affected by outside forces, they can also affect those apparently external out-
comes. As homes to tens of millions of people in a democratic polity, cities can and have had
significant influence in some electoral outcomes. As centers of commerce, industry, culture, and
ideas, they can also influence social norms, the economy, and political conversations in ways that
likely outstrip even their raw numeric strength. They are not merely buffeted by powerful forces;
35Bridges (1984), p.15 An important analogous point is central to the study of international relations, where states are
situated within a broader system, and outcomes frequently depend on the two-way interaction between that system
and its constituent parts.
36See, for instance, Rae (2003), Caraley (1976), and Sugrue (1996).
37These rules are sometimes imposed at the local level as well. TELs place constraints on the size of government,
though it is unclear how effective they ultimately are in practice. Kousser, McCubbins and Moule (2008).
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cities as communities may also affect the broader polity. Cities represent themselves in state and
national politics, and pursue the distinctive kinds of policies that are important for successful ur-
ban governance. By shining the spotlight elsewhere, beyond the city limits and into the halls of
national policymaking, this project seeks to explore the external effects of cities’ internal political
processes, which have been important factors in shaping the substance and contending forces of
contemporary politics.
1.4.1 The Urban Interlude: Nation as City
When we look to the halls of national power, we can see that a national political alliance made up
largely of city representatives was a key driver of political change in twentieth century America,
and that many of the policies they pursued were prompted by the paradox of city governance.38
But the influence of cities on national politics has clearly not been constant over time.39 The over-
all share of national population living in large cities grew rapidly in the early 20th century and has
declined slowly since the 1950s, as suburbs have grown quickly (fewer Americans live in purely
rural areas as well). Representation in Congress always lags at least slightly behind population
shifts, and cities were particularly and systematically underrepresented in all states until the court
cases that enshrined “one person, one vote,” a principle that finally arrived at the same moment
that the population of many industrial cities began to decline. Thus, in strictly numerical terms,
cities were never dominant.
But the political power of cities pre-dates that moment of representational parity. The key his-
torical moment in a narrative of city-driven political change is the “urban interlude,” the period
during which a city perspective was pre-eminent in national politics despite cities’ relative un-
derrepresentation. This period, from the early 1930s to the 1960s, entails a “metonymic moment
when the part came to speak for the whole; when a metropolitan vision became appealing to a
38Mollenkopf (1983)
39Lieberman (2009)
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huge majority of Americans.”40 In contrast to most of our nation’s history, when Jefferson’s pas-
toral vision embodied Americanism, and cities were considered inimical to democratic-republican
self-rule, the dominant political forces of this interlude were shaped by cities, and articulated a vi-
sion of American progress that was rooted in the urban experience.41 It was also the first time
that a national city alliance coalesced within one party, the Democrats. The Democratic Party was
the dominant national force during this era after a long time in the political wilderness; while the
Southern wing was its oldest core element and a major component, the New Deal alliance owed its
national ascendancy to large cities.42 The Democratic political order that took shape in the 1930s
was thus tempered by the continuation of the Southern Democracy, but the most significant policy
preoccupations of its national leadership were urban and progressive.43
Historians have often characterized the New Deal as eclectic and pragmatic, a “temperament”
more than a coherent ideological program.44 Compared with the more rigid political-economic
worldviews of the age, the New Deal program for crisis remediation certainly seems more plastic
and less systematic, but this does not mean it was without guiding principles. More recent treat-
ments have seen elements of a consistent vision in the multifaceted suite of New Deal programs.
For Plotke (1996), the ideology of the New Deal Democratic order was characterized by three
guiding commitments, which together constitute a “progressive liberalism” that underpinned the
sprawling suite of New Deal programs: a focus on the role of groups in political and economic life;
a positive view of the state in social and economic regulation; and governmental responsiveness
to the claims of the marginalized, potentially through expanding democratic political participa-
tion.45 These principles owe much to lessons that had been learned in urban politics over the
40Ethington and Levitus (2009), pp.155, 165; they refer to this period as the early “Metropolitan Era,” and I will at
times refer to it as the “urban interlude” to emphasize its exceptional status as a moment within national political
history, and the “Long New Deal,” emphasizing the strains of political and policy continuities within this era of mostly
Democratic control of national institutions. Several studies take stock of national-local interaction and the urban order’s
political advances and setbacks during this era, including Buenker (1973), Gelfand (1975), Mollenkopf (1983), Biles
(2011)
41Buenker (1973), Lieberman (2009)
42Especially in Presidential elections. See Eldersveld (1949)
43Mollenkopf (1983) states it thus: “The New Deal’s “core programs aimed at urban public works investment, urban
public employment, direct relief for the urban unemployed, and strengthening the labor market position of the urban
working class.” (p.60)
44Hofstadter (1948)
45p. 169. Similarly, Kennedy (2009) argues that the New Deal’s coherent contribution was a set of institutions that
provided security against the vagaries of markets for Americans. This is a manifestation of the second principle of
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previous decades.
Hofstadter and those who characterize the New Deal as unideological are correct in the sense
that it was not dogmatically derived from an complete theoretical worldview as were contempo-
rary, programmatic versions of Marxism, Fascism, laissez-faire capitalism, or white supremacy.
Instead, the New Deal order’s principles were seen by progressive liberals as a more pragmatic
response to the suite of challenges posed by modernity: heightened social and economic complex-
ity, the social and economic integration of the nation, urbanization, industrialization, and rapid
demographic shifts that brought diverse groups of individuals together into a shared social and
political space. The New Deal’s politics and policies included important elements of both “bread
and butter” liberalism of welfare provision and a “politics of amelioration,” in which inclusive
negotiations and the pursuit of compromise between groups with deep differences of perspec-
tive (often through mutual exchange) were privileged over abstract or absolute principles.46 The
Depression exposed the urgent shortcomings of less interventionist models of political economy,
especially in cities, so these commitments were posed as a solution to the basic problem of pro-
viding order and stability, an objective for which previous state institutional arrangements had
proved inadequate.47
The political commitments of progressive liberals were as much about a style and process of
governance and politics as its particular policy contents. In this, too, the new national order re-
sembled that of the large cities that supported the New Deal. This application of an urban style
at higher levels is apparent in two ways. First, for nearly a century before the urban interlude,
cities had dealt with the tumult of modernity largely on their own, often by developing new in-
stitutions, or adjusting old ones, to deal with new social realities. Recurrent, urgent crisis, more
common and costly in cities, made it necessary to develop sustainable routines and practices for
establishing political order—we might think of them as flexible institutions for governance. From
even well before the 1930s, such ideas and commitments were hallmarks of urban politics, and
progressive liberalism identified by Plotke. Mayhew (1986) also labels the non-Southern Rooseveltian reform wing of
the extended New Deal alliance “progressive-liberal.” Buenker (1973) traces the development of “liberalism,” finding
it in the progressive politics of local urban politics, especially among new-stock immigrant parties.
46Buenker (1973), Ch. 1, Ch. 6.
47Plotke (1996), Skowronek (1982)
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they came to be embraced by the largely urban non-Southern bloc of Democrats, but they were
never the commitments of the mostly rural Southern wing. The struggle within the party over
these principles, which was present from the start of the Long New Deal and recurred throughout
the marriage of strange bedfellows, presaged the structure of virtually all political conflict within
the U.S. today.
Second, the party used “urban” strategies to resolve intraparty conflict as well. Cities are the
sites of deep pluralism; in such places, the “consensus and community” that seems natural in
other kinds of places gives way to a “diverse and rather contentious aggregation of interests”
whose only shared interest is order and political victory.48 The same became obvious in the tenu-
ous New Deal alliance, which included a cacophony of political voices which were incoherent on
their face. Logrolling and the distribution of material goods became the party’s modus operandi,
just as traditional party organizations in cities had built their organization and dominance on reli-
able practices of material exchange and avoidance of unprofitably divisive issues; the maintenance
of such diverse coalitions is predicated upon “making no waves.”49 Mayhew (1966) characterizes
the Democratic Party of the midcentury as a party of “inclusive compromise,” with multiple in-
terested factions held together by the reciprocal distribution of material goods, especially in cities,
farm areas, and the South.50 Thus the major projects of the New Deal involved the distribution
of material goods, especially relief work administered through local officials, and the conceptu-
alization of politics as the exchange of goods and loyalty for the sake of political order. In this
approach to politics, a positive view of state activity, especially in policy areas where credit can
be easily taken by incumbents as a sign of a job well done (and make the case of being worthy
of return to office), is more important than rigorous programmatic coherence, or the worldview-
compatibility of allies. The New Deal distribution of goods was about papering over divisive
factional conflict with goods and sustaining a tenuous political alliance. This ability to find a way
around deep division to establish order is the heart of the traditional party, and it was the heart of
the New Deal as well.
48Bridges (1984), p.3, Katznelson (2009)
49Rakove (1975), Snowiss (1966), Wilson (1960), Mayhew (1986)
50Mayhew (1966), ch. 6
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1.4.2 Sources of Evidence: Time and Place
This study seeks out the effects of cities and city organizations in national politics. As such, it
is about the development of a national urban-rural cleavage, and the progressive-liberal policies
pursued by the political forces from the “urban” end of that continuum. It is also about insti-
tutional effects observed in places where they “should” not be present. Cities have no formal
recognition within national politics, especially in Congress, and extracameral events and actors
outside of a member’s district are typically not considered important in shaping representative
behavior. Yet cities, and the distinctive governing institutions developed to provide internal po-
litical order in them, nonetheless make themselves felt in national politics, often in the way that
John Vorys described—through unity of representation reflecting a citywide position. Subsequent
empirical chapters will draw on the historical congressional record, with most attention given to
the the urban interlude, when urban political commitments and style came to define a pole of na-
tional political conflict, to illustrate how the city political order in national politics has developed.
The House of Representatives, rather than the Senate, is the key source for analysis because
this chamber gives us a firmer grasp of the personnel actually representing cities. House districts
represent defined territories, often small enough to be located within or roughly coterminous with
cities. States are invariably “noisier” constituencies; while some Senators were clearly advocates
for urban progressivism on both dimensions of liberalism during this era, for reliable analysis the
House is a more appropriate place to look because it is clearer who is actually representing a city
(and, just as important, NOT representing other kinds of places) in the House based on district
territory. We can also analyze intrastate dynamics within the House, something which is impossi-
ble in the Senate.
The urban interlude is the focus of study because this was a key moment of powerful change
in American politics in several ways. Politically, the creation of a city political order within the
Democratic Party during this time set in motion the processes that have led us to our current
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national political division. By bringing two distinctively urban sets of issues rooted in the city
experience—statism and group pluralism—to the national agenda, this city bloc wound up set-
ting the terms of debate for the next 80 years, and the urban-rural divide has been maturing ever
since. The major glacial change of the intervening decades, the departure of the white South to
the Republican Party, was set in motion from the urban capture of the Democratic Party not in the
1960s, when the action of realignment is often spotted, but in the very creation of the New Deal
alliance (or even before) and its nationally new commitments to pluralism, state activism, and
new group mobilization. The white South was always opposed to these commitments, but it took
them decades to finally change allegiances.51 The intraparty discursive conflict on these issues,
and the divergence in roll call behavior, was present early in the New Deal.
Socially and culturally, the urban interlude is also a compelling place to look because it repre-
sented the peak of central cities as a proportion of the population. If ever there were a time for the
urban perspective to gain traction in national politics, this was it. On important issues, city rep-
resentatives pursued an “urbanizing” strategy, convincing others that there were city issues, and
that cities knew best how to resolve them, and their allies should defer to them on these issues.52
Finally, and just as important theoretically, this was a time before the conflation of cities with
other confounding factors, particularly race. Today, “urban” is often employed as a euphemism
for “not white,” with a particular application toward African Americans, often because racial and
ethnic minorities are disproportionately likely to live in central cities. During the urban interlude
cities were indeed places of heightened diversity (as they almost always are), but they were still
mostly white, and their politics were firmly in the hands of white elites. The influxes of African
Americans to large industrial cities over several decades did bring another group into these com-
munities, but the Great Migrations did not by themselves utterly transform city demography. A
variety of other social, economic, and political processes, stretching out over decades, contributed
to the change. Throughout the urban interlude, however, most large city districts included vir-
51And for the Republicans to create organizations in the South to receive them; this change was ironically sped up
by the reapportionment revolution that finally brought representational parity to more densely populated areas. See
Snyder and Ansolabehere (2008).
52This “urbanizing” strategy is identified by Burns et al. (2009) as one employed by city representatives on potentially
controversial issues in state legislatures, and I see a similar strategy among city representatives on civil rights issues
during the urban interlude.
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tually no African Americans, so it is difficult to attribute the development of racial liberalism to
simple responsiveness to constituents. Studying this time period helps “control” for race in some
of following analyses, particularly of the role of urbanicity and local institutions in patterning rep-
resentation on national civil rights issues during this period, as illustrated in Chapter 5.
1.4.3 Data and Method
In analyzing the development of the urban-rural divide and the development of dual liberalism
within the city wing of the Democratic Party during the urban interlude, I turn primarily to the
congressional record. My primary concern is the character of city representation in national poli-
tics, so the national legislature is an important place to look: it is the site in which cities contend
most directly with other kinds of constituencies, and of course where decisions about the course
of national policy are made. In general, I examine two pieces of this historical record. As in many
political science analyses, patterns of roll call voting are central to my story. While there have been
a few previous analyses of urban representatives’ behavior in Congress specific, the new data de-
veloped for this project on districts’ urbanicity and city of origin collected for this project makes
several original analyses possible, as well as clarifying replications of and addenda to some of
these previous studies.
First, as elaborated in Chapter 3 and Appendix 1, I have developed an original dataset that
identifies the place character of congressional districts over the full course of American history.
This dataset makes many historical analyses of the role of place character in shaping representa-
tion and partisanship possible for the first time.53 By analyzing city delegations (as well as the
whole bloc of representatives from cities) in these roll-call analyses, we can examine how the char-
acter of local institutions—not just whether a district is from a city, but what kind of city.
The second main primary source of data I draw upon comes from the other end of the leg-
islative process, the record of congressional hearings. Unlike roll call votes, the record of these
53Previous analyses in this area, such as Mayhew (1966), Wolman and Marnicki (2005), and Caraley (1976), restricted
themselves to analyses of subsets of years after 1950 (See Appendix 1).
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hearings includes more nuanced information than a roll call can reveal about how representatives
are thinking about these issues (or at least how they want to be perceived as thinking about them),
how they want others to think about these issues, what their priorities are, and what organized
groups in society share their views. Not every issue is discussed in hearings, of course, but many
major issues are.54 And while these hearings include scripted testimony by witnesses, they also
frequently include relatively frank, candid conversations between representatives and witnesses
and among representatives. Conflicts that may not be apparent in roll calls—because representa-
tives are pressured to conform to a party position or because intraparty compromise has adjusted
the content of a bill to reflect a majority-party accord that all factions can live with—may be ev-
ident in these conversations, revealing the “truer” preferences of representatives. From these
hearings, the subtler elements of city strategies can sometimes be gleaned: pressure to comply
with the institutionalized logroll of the Democrats’ inclusive exchange; arguments emphasizing
the urgency of certain urban issues, or the “urbanization” of obviously controversial civil rights
policies, and the direction of future alliances. From these two main sources, we can make a start at
understanding how urbanicity—through city representatives on the national stage—transformed
American politics during the urban interlude.55
1.4.4 Chapter Outline
In the next chapter, I theorize the relationship between urbanicity and governance, with a focus on
how the distinctive attributes of cities—density, size, and heterogeneity—prompt a set of policy
priorities, and foster the development of local institutions to sustain them, among those responsi-
ble for a community’s well-being. Among these priorities are statism and group pluralism. These
54For that matter, not every issue gets a roll call vote, either—sometimes committee agendas are more inclusive.
55In a better world, the machinations and political arrangements of the traditional party organizations where urban
liberalism was incubated and drew its strongest support would also be accessible as sources for the analysis of city
delegations. It is unfortunate that, as Buenker (1973) notes, “so few of the practitioners of urban liberalism left any
accounts of their activities. . . undoubtedly mindful of the dictum of the “sage” of (Boston’s) Ward 8, Martin Lomasney:
“Never write anything down when you can say it, never speak when you can nod your head.” (p.208) A continued
search for more data from these kinds of sources is a future priority for this project.
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governing commitments, especially the economic interventions, are difficult to sustain if enacted
only at the local level, so cities must also seek to affect supralocal policies. To do this effectively,
a collection of representatives from across a city (and across many cities), who are often rivals in
other contexts, must put aside their differences and behave cohesively in support of a citywide
interest at the higher level. This cohesion is fostered by institutions characteristic of city delega-
tions but not of other collections of representatives. These institutions of horizontal integration
bind heterogeneous constituencies together and play a key role in the “city delegation theory”
elaborated in this chapter, which highlights the role of local institutions in allowing the cities to
represent themselves as cohesive units rather than as collections of heterogeneous and separate
constituencies, just as John Vorys feared.
In Chapter 3, I zoom out to broadly describe the urban bloc in Congress and introduce a new
dataset developed for the purpose. The twentieth century has seen the birth of a distinct, national
urban political order, and then a shift from a “bimodal” coalition of urban and rural representa-
tives to one in which the relationship between urbanicity and partisanship is much more mono-
tonic. Building upon previous analyses, I evaluate the strength of the city bloc over time, using
measures of institutional strength within Congress. While the urban interlude of 1930-1950 was a
heyday for the city’s place in the national imagination, in some ways the urban political order is
more powerful, though also more vulnerable, today.
In Chapter 4, some of the observable implications of city delegation theory are tested. At the
national level, were the rural defenders of malapportionment correct in their concerns that cities
are more organized or cohesive in representation than we might expect? Is there a difference be-
tween cities with different kinds of local institutions? The answer to each question, this chapter
shows, is “yes.” Institutions of horizontal integration—IHIs, political institutions spanning mul-
tiple constituencies, which are present in cities but not in other areas, and which are stronger in
some cities than in others—foster cohesive representation among members of a city’s congres-
sional delegation even though its members often represent very different kinds of constituents.
Cities foster agreement among representatives. This is especially true in places with local tradi-
tions of strong parties. The unit of the city delegation is vital in the maintenance of a progressive,
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united urban political order, because it is a building “bloc” for such a political force. By over-
coming the challenges to political order presented by heterogeneity at home, cities can present a
cohesive face to the nation in pursuit of national urban policies.
Chapter 5 explores the role of urbanicity and local institutions of horizontal integration in the
re-emergence of second-dimension political conflict (over race), a political development that drove
the midcentury transformation of the “solid” South from a place at the heart of the Democratic
Party for nearly a century to the stronghold of doubly conservative Republicanism today. More
than simple sectional conflict drove the intraparty schism and rent the fabric of the Democratic
national alliance. Urbanicity and the characteristics of local party organization were important
factors in this partisan change. The insights of city delegation theory help explain how local party
organizations linking the diverse constituencies of the largest American cities had an important
role to play in fostering national racial liberalism, one that is often overlooked in studies of urban
racial politics.
Finally, the conclusion takes stock of the urban political order: the maturation of the place-
character divide in the contemporary “Blue” alignment, with its continually strange bedfellows,
and the prospects for a regeneration of urban metonymy.
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Chapter 2
Urbanicity and City delegations
“When [the American people] get piled upon one another in large cities, as in Europe,
they will become corrupt as Europe.”
-Thomas Jefferson1
“But why, then, does the city exist? What line separates the inside from the outside,
the rumble of wheels from the howl of wolves?”
-Italo Calvino, Invisible Cities
1Quoted in Gosnell (1937), p. vii
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Before exploring the role of cities in driving change in 20th century American politics, it is help-
ful to address what it is about cities that makes them distinctive communities within the nation.
These characteristics will present us with a puzzle about cities and their role in American politi-
cal development. In this chapter, I outline a theory that adds to our understanding of how cities
contributed to the changing structure of political conflict in the U.S. over the course of the 20th
century. This theory draws on the spatial and political characteristics of cities, and on the strategic
situation of the city bloc in national politics, laying the groundwork for the empirical analyses
in subsequent chapters. By turning an analytical spotlight on the relationship between the char-
acteristics of cities and the distinctive way in which these communities represent themselves in
national politics, we can better understand the origins of the place character divide in contempo-
rary American politics, including changes which were based on a city alliance and which pre-date
the massive migration to the suburbs.
2.1 What is a city?
Scholarly and popular interest in cities has seen a renaissance in recent years, as the world’s popu-
lation has shifted dramatically to the fast-growing cities of the developing world and as different
approaches toward urban form have gained traction in Western cities in the ebb of massive-scale
industrialization. Urbanicity—the condition of being like a city—certainly has many dimensions
that contribute to cities’ distinctiveness, but three characteristics seem particularly important from
a sociological and political perspective: density, heterogeneity, and size. Studies of urban places
tend to focus on density and heterogeneity.2 In their essence, cities are densely populated cen-
2A note on terms. “Urban” places are settlements characterized by relative density and heterogeneity. A “city” is a
political construction typically consisting of the largest (usually in terms of both population and geographical extent),
central jurisdiction in an urban space. Sometimes a city fills an urban space, but more often today an urban area extends
beyond city boundaries. In certain contexts, this distinction between “urban” and “city” is relevant: for some purposes,
the Census defines an urban space as any non-rural area (ie, a city and its suburbs, a metropolitan area). The Census
includes areas not in central cities in its category of urban or urbanized, which is also closely related to a “metropolitan”
area. In this study, the I employ “urban” and “city” to refer to the same kinds of communities and spaces, at one end of
an urban-suburban-rural continuum.
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ters of varied, relatively specialized economic and social activity.3 In a metropolitan area, the
downtown area of the central city tends to have the highest density, and density often diminishes
monotonically as one moves farther from that center.4 Density is important for economic activ-
ity: returns to scale associated with clusters of firms and labor can make production much more
efficient, but they can also have powerful side effects that spur further growth.5 Concentrations
of diverse bases of human capital foster interaction, innovation, and growth; these processes gen-
erate wealth and move society forward generally. In the broad scope of history, the process of
urbanization and the development of cities has been powered by commerce and industry, and
broad structural economic and geopolitical forces have been determining factors in cities’ ascen-
dency, decline, or resurgence.6
In a city, economic density and heterogeneity are accompanied by social density and hetero-
geneity, and the quest to better understand and control the social dynamics of cities was itself an
important motivation for the creation of modern American social science itself. This fascination
was clearest in the late 19th and early 20th century, an era in which millions of people moved to
American cities. These new arrivals came from many places, in the U.S. and abroad, and often
had little in common in terms of shared experiences or worldview, and many arrived from rural
places. Urban life, with its greater density, variety, and anonymity of human interaction, lends
itself more to the thin ties, specialization of individuals’ roles, and larger institutions character-
istic of civil society than to the thicker patterns of social interaction, less specialized or formally
codified institutions, and more rigid ties of smaller, more static communities.7 Cities were and
remain points of first contact, and heightened social density and unclear authority relations cre-
ate new challenges for order and the provision of the general welfare. Density makes all sorts
of interactions more frequent, and heterogeneity makes them more uncertain. Managing such a
3In thinking about a city, and what is distinctive about it, it may be helpful to think of density in terms of either
population (either resident or employment, or both), or some conception of “activity,” as in a high rate of economic or
social activity in terms of the number or volume of transactions. The two seem co-incident.
4Though today there are often locally dense nodes of such activity outside the center as well.
5Glaeser (2011)
6See, eg. Mumford (1961), Rae (2003), Sassen (2001)
7Tonnies (1887) famously names to these concepts gemeinschaft and gesellschaft, roughly understood as community
and society, respectively.
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society requires different strategies than smaller communities where people are better known to
each other and where informal codes and norms and shared background experiences might more
effectively provide social organization and control. New norms, practices, and institutions need
to be developed to make life in such places manageable.
Density and heterogeneity pose distinctive challenges and opportunities that often make cities
fascinating social laboratories. However, cities are also distinctive on another important—and
perhaps more definitionally fundamental—dimension that is related to but analytically separable
from those characteristics: size.8 Simply put, cities are large political communities.9 The size of a
city is determined by the boundary that defines it. The lines on a political map can have many
effects, but the key function of a city boundary as an institution is to include residents in a com-
mon local political community (or to exclude them from it). Within cities, political boundaries can
serve as “trenches,” reinforcing identities related to residence as important for organizing poli-
tics.10 Municipal boundaries, alternatively, can bind or divide members of the broader polity (and
their representatives) on the basis of membership in a local polity, and such divisions have con-
sequences not only for decisions made within the city, but also for representation of that social
space.11 Membership in the large community of New York City means people in Queens Village,
on the edge of New York City, may live in a neighborhood that looks much like the Long Island
suburb of Elmont across the street—and much less like neighborhoods in the south Bronx, mid-
town Manhattan, Annadale (on Staten Island), or Park Slope (in Brooklyn), neighborhoods very
different from each other in many ways—but residents of all five boroughs share membership in
8Economic and sociological approaches to urban studies tend to focus on density and heterogeneity. From this
perspective, the metropolitan area is often an appropriate unit of analysis: economic activity within the United States is
not tightly constrained by municipal boundaries, and the central city along with its suburbs often constitute something
close to a functional unit of economic activity. The Census, at times, assumes this perspective and defines “urban”
areas as a metropolitan area counties, and the Brookings Institution approaches urban policy issues through the lens of
a “Metropolitan Policy Program.” A similar perspective is in evidence when comparing cities around the world: the
New York metropolitan area, not just New York City, is often the frame of comparison for other supercities such as
London, Tokyo, or Mexico City, because of variation across countries in the forms and importance of local government.
9In some cases, size is the necessary condition for heterogeneity as well. Where residential or economic-functional
segregation is pronounced (often the case in American cities), only geographic inclusion makes these places particularly
heterogeneous.
10Katznelson (1982)
11Gainsborough (2001). Perhaps the apt metaphor for the city boundary is the moat or wall (as opposed to the trench
for an intracity boundary), which once more dramatically divided the city from its outlying areas, as in the Calvino
epigram above.
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the city, with people who came there from around the nation and world, and who do all sorts
of things for a living. If we imagine a parallel world, in which New York had not expanded to
incorporate the outer boroughs, but instead had fragmented even more, such that the units we
now call neighborhoods had continued as self-governing municipalities all their own, the politics
of those five counties would surely be quite different from those of New York City today.
Taken together, size, heterogeneity, and density constitute the core dimensions of urbanicity.
These concepts have specifically political implications as well as “merely” social and economic
ones. Urbanicity has had important effects on American politics in the twentieth century, as cities
grew, matured, spread across the nation, and gave way to the suburb as the typical political home
of most Americans. Cities have provided national and regional political leadership, they have
given birth to political movements, and served as “laboratories of democracy” just like states
have. The three characteristics of urbanicity have left their mark on how cities and their mem-
bers have taken part in national politics, predisposing residents and elites to a suite of political
commitments developed during the early twentieth century that came to be known as liberalism.
2.2 Urbanicity and two-dimensional liberalism
If size, density, and heterogeneity make cities distinctive communities, how might these attributes
manifest themselves or shape the politics of cities? This question is a central investigatory prompt
of urban political science, and many urban studies make their contributions by looking at how
these variables interact to contribute to political outcomes at the local level.12 Theoretically, the
characteristics of cities might have important effects that we could observe in a number of differ-
ent places, with perhaps contradictory expectations.
Most viscerally, city life may have an effect on individuals’ preferences. City people may want
different things out of government, and may consider a different style of political engagement
12For instance, among recent canonical works, Browning (2003), Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999), Kaufmann (2004),
Trounstine (2008), Hajnal (2007), Erie (1988), all examine dynamics and outcomes at the local level, focusing in particular
on intergroup relations in urban political space. Similarly, classic studies such as Dahl (1961), Banfield and Wilson
(1963), and Sayre and Kaufman (1965) all looked local, sometimes to make broader external claims by analogy.
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with others appropriate or desirable, compared to people not in cities. These distinctive individ-
ual preferences certainly aggregate into distinctive communities.13 But while cities are collections
of individual citizens, they are also more than that; they are communities whose situation within
society fosters “organic” city-wide interests that may differ at times from those of individual city
dwellers (taken separately or even in aggregate) for the sake of resolving governance crises and
the maintenance of the city’s continued “health.”14 City leaders, representatives in state and na-
tional government among them, are likely to be particularly sensitive to this organic interest (or at
least their perception of it), because their careers and livelihood often depend on the overall health
of the city; unlike the typical resident, they cannot usually decamp to another place and maintain
their same status as leader, so they will take steps to perceive and defend a city interest.15 This
“city” position is related to how cities represent themselves at higher levels of politics. Rather
than simply represent their districts, which are often very different from each other in important
ways, city representatives present a more organized, cohesive front in supralocal politics. This
cohesion reflects representation of a city interest, which is promoted by institutions that link city
constituencies together. In 1964, John Vorys lamented this fact, while Richard J. Daley no doubt
saw it as an important tool for defending the interests of his city and his political organization.
13The relationship between context and attitudes is a contentious subject, and has been for as long as scholars have
systematically investigated the study of individual behavior and preferences. Many of these studies suffer from a fairly
intractable problem: people can generally choose where to live in the United States, and so in studying a potential
association between preferences and residency, an analyst is faced with a difficult problem of determining the direction
of causation: cities may shape people’s preferences, or people may have preferences that affect their choice of residence.
14Peterson (1981) identifies the key organic interest of the city as the maintenance of a tax base, measurable by the
retention or attraction of above-median taxpayers. The organic interest of a city may be more nebulous and harder to
measure than that, but the point here is that the maintenance of community order may be derived from different prin-
ciples than a simple aggregation of individuals’ preferences or actions. The organic city interest is akin to Rousseau’s
“general will,” in its essential unknowability (as opposed to the aggregate “will of all,” which we might determine
from elections or deliberation (Rousseau (1762), Book II, Ch. 3). Peterson’s minimal operationalization can lead us
toward an organic interest in some areas, but not in others—for instance, the “proper” way to handle race relations is
not obvious from the pursuit of above-average taxpayers. The vast number of perspectives and interests present (or
invisible but relevant, from a normative standpoint) in contentious city politics mean that no solution to any problem
is likely to coincide with the preferences of all members of the community, or even a majority. Ultimately, I believe
this matter is not easily resolvable, but there may be significant overlap between the abstract “organic” interest and
the concrete “city position” or “accord” fostered by city institutions of horizontal integration and supported by a city
delegation in representative politics. This citywide accord is likely to reflect the interests of those elites who are most
reliant on the overall health of the city; in the worst case, they are purely corrupt, at the best case, they serve the cities
long-term interest as well as their own. At a minimum, the order provided by IHIs can be seen as at least a partial
primary good (when contrasted with the plausible alternative of open-ended disorder), even if the order and accord
are not satisfactory to all parties.
15Such leaders will likely be attuned to the “aggregate” interests of citizens (as well as their own particular interest)
as well, but city-wide concerns seem more salient at the elite level than at the mass level.
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In this section, I theorize a city position on the two primary dimensions of conflict in American
politics and argue that this city position (the city’s “organic” interest, though not necessarily the
aggregate preferences of city-dwellers, or of all subsets of a city’s dwellers) informs what we call
the liberal position on issues in these dimensions. Two areas of substantive disagreement seem to
have structured a great deal of political conflict in American national politics in the 20th century.
The first dimension related to conflict over the role of government in the economy, or statism,
while the second dimension has to do with race, region, and culture.16 Each dimension had a
liberal and conservative pole, and one of the central preoccupations of American political science
is how these two dimensions—once ostensibly separable—increasingly overlap or coincide, cre-
ating a situation of deepening political polarization in American politics today. Attention to place
character and space can help us understand this polarization better. The liberal position on each
of these dimensions is related to urbanicity and the management of urban politics and economy,
though the difference between “aggregate” and “organic” interests may be important in how cities
are governed and represented.
2.2.1 Cities and the First Dimension
The primary, typically dominant, dimension of political conflict has been about statism.17 After
all, much modern government activity at any level, at any time, even in a market society, is de-
voted to managing the economy; and how it should be done is a central source of contention. On
this first dimension, it seems clear that the urban “position” should generally be more support-
ive of state intervention in the economy because of the nature of participation in a large, dense,
heterogeneous market. Government interventions in the economy most often take three forms in
16Poole and Rosenthal (1998). The second dimension waxed and waned in importance over the 20th century, but was
particularly oblique to the first during the urban interlude, and eventually conflicts on that dimension were folded into
the first, such that the two dimensions are not analytically separable as they were before.
17The “dimensions” are measured by Poole and Rosenthal (1998), and captured in their DW-NOMINATE scores. Cur-
rent iterations of this research agenda are available in McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006) and at www.voteview.com,
where they refer to the substance of the first dimension as “the role of the government in the economy,” though the
precise content of this substantive judgement is fairly subjective and inductive, and may not apply to previous eras.
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the United States: regulation, public goods provision, and redistribution. Each of these types of
intervention has an intuitive relationship to urbanicity.
Economic regulation, the making and enforcement of rules about behavior, is more important
in a city for several reasons. First, production and commerce often generate negative externalities
such as pollution or congestion, which are more serious in a city than in other built environments
because they can accumulate more quickly and affect more people when they do. Regulation of
externality-generating processes can mitigate their effects. For instance, if there are no rules about
how one disposes of garbage in a rural space, it may be no big deal—nature will dispose of it (at
least the organic component) before it can accumulate. In a city, such anarchy leads to health crises
quite quickly. The same argument can be made about other kinds of pollution.
Second, because cities are more fluid and anonymous environments, with thinner ties between
members, regulation can also provide valuable information for economic actors, reassuring them
that the other participants in the marketplace have cleared at least some minimal bar for entry and
continued membership. The recent clear, obvious posting of health inspection grades in the win-
dows of New York City restaurants is an example of this; in a place with only a few restaurants,
where potential customers would know quickly which ones tended to make their patrons sick,
large letters would be less necessary. In a city with over 23,000 restaurants and rapid turnover, nei-
ther word of mouth nor personal experience can suffice.18 Effective regulation thus ameliorates
information problems that are more severe in cities. City residents, even those who are them-
selves regulated, may be more accepting of heightened regulation than their counterparts in less
dense places. For city leaders and policymakers who are concerned with creating and enforcing
such measures, regulation can also be done more efficiently in large communities than elsewhere,
because the size of the community may allow for more specialization and professionalization of
regulatory functions, and therefore more expertise among local city regulators.
The second major form of governmental intervention in the market is the provision of public
18In this case, regulation essentially serves to enhance the probability for cooperation in a “prisoner’s dilemma” in
which the diner and restaurant are the participants. The state takes steps to ensure the quality of the meal, and promises
to punish the diner if he defects by not paying the bill. This system can also benefit restaurants that would have been
conscientious in any case, as well as diners: an “A” in the window can serve as expert testimony that at the very least,
this establishment is not dangerous or negligent. Thus all restaurants have an incentive to be conscientious, and are
rewarded for it.
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goods.19 While some goods, like public safety, are obviously (and about equally) valuable across
all spatial contexts, some are more valuable in a city than in another setting.20 Goods that must
be located in a particular location and the use of which is related to proximity to that good are
more valuable in a densely populated area than in more sparsely populated place.21 For instance,
to the extent that people prefer to walk to a park in order to use it, having a park within walking
distance of lots of residences increases the value of that park. In a city like New York, where many
thousands of people can walk to Central Park in a few minutes, this is particularly clear. In a less
densely populated area, fewer people would live within walking distance, by definition, and the
use-value of the park would be less.22 Similar arguments can be made about museums or other
cultural institutions, and public transit infrastructure: these goods can be valued more, by more
people, in densely populated areas. This logic seems to play out in practice: large and dense com-
munities do tend to provide more public goods than other kinds of localities.23
Finally, government often actively adjusts economic outcomes through redistribution, often
among individual citizens directly. Among individuals, attitudes toward redistribution are likely
to be related to the character of redistribution (we usually think of redistribution as moving re-
sources from above the median to below, but other patterns are certainly possible and have dif-
ferent implications) and one’s place in the income distribution. For instance, a person at the less
affluent end of the income distribution might favor a progressive redistribution regime, as they
would likely gain a net benefit from it. A rich person would be more likely to oppose such a
regime, because they would experience a net cost from it. From this basic claim, Meltzer and
19Here, I am conceiving of public goods as both goods with broad benefits that are very hard to exclude non-paying
users from, like public safety or fire protection, but also goods like infrastructure, for which it would be easier but more
inefficient to limit use to paying users, like parks or highways; and also those goods which are technically private but
open to use by all and often constructed or subsidized by the state, such as public transportation.
20Though for some goods likely to be valued everywhere, it may be more important that the good be effectively
provided by the state in certain contexts. For instance, in a sparsely populated area, a murder is unlikely to cause a
costly riot. In a city, such reactions have often been the case, because of the much higher accumulation of value and
density of potential witnesses and property-destroyers.
21Bateman and Taylor (2007)
22Individuals, even those who do live within walking distance to the park, may also value the public good of the
park less because in a less-dense residential environment there are often many “private parks” directly behind people’s
homes. In such a context, people may quite reasonably be even less inclined to support or pursue provision of further
public parks.
23Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999)
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Richard (1981) predict that aggregate preferences for redistribution will be stronger in unequal
electorates. Cities—as a consequence of one kind of heterogeneity—tend to be more unequal than
other political communities, so on average demand for redistribution might be higher in cities
than in more economically homogeneous communities to the extent that preferences for redistri-
bution are based on local information.24
Density and heterogeneity heighten the demands for interventions to maintain important sta-
tus quos and for managing social conflict—to meet the demands of governing such “high main-
tenance” places.25 Thus for each of these important types of state intervention in the economy,
we expect the preferences of urbanites and their representatives to be to the “left” of people from
other kinds of communities, favoring statism more because of the characteristics of their com-
munities.26 An impressionistic survey of the historical record seems to bear this out. Conflict
over statism came early to cities, and the interventionists tended to win. In New York City, for
instance, the Democrats came to represent “a kind of primitive social welfare state” against pro-
ponents of “small, efficient government; individualism; and laissez-faire” by the 1850s, and that
argument would be “at the heart of local politics for the rest of the nineteenth century and well
into the twentieth,” and other cities’ experiences were similar.27 Primitive social welfare poli-
cies, regulation, and public goods provision were hallmarks of nineteenth century city parties and
governments.28 The Progressive movement of the early 20th century, especially its urban com-
ponent, promoted many forms of economic regulation and reforms, including the redistributive
income tax, and today large communities do tend to provide more public goods than other kinds
24Assessing preferences for redistribution across levels of government makes the story more complicated. Preferences
about “redistribution” may be formed at the local level if individuals’ information about their place in the income
distribution is local, but to the extent that income distributions differ across space, there may be counter-intuitive
results, such as a rich person in a very poor locality wanting less redistribution than a poor person in a wealthy place,
even though the latter may actually have more wealth or income. In practice, redistributive policies may not be in the
“organic” interest of the city if enacted locally; they may be unsustainable at the local level due to external constraints
described by Peterson (1981) and Hackworth (2007), among others. In this view, redistribution is more functionally
suited to higher levels of government. So we may not see heightened redistribution manifest at the local level, despite
local demand for it, but rather in the form of stronger support for redistributive policies at higher levels.
25To continue the metaphor of an organic city interest, we can think of cities as requiring greater inputs to maintain
homeostasis.
26This is not to imply that being urban and supporting statist interventions are equivalent; this is not the case, as
there are certainly many conservatives in cities and many liberals outside of them. But cities foster a predisposition
toward these interventions, especially among those tasked with maintaining the health of the city.
27Bridges (1984), p.20
28Erie (1988)
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of places.29
Cities face many constraints that make significant market interventions very difficult at the
local level, however. These constraints have intensified as social conditions have changed to ef-
fectively expand the geographic scope of many markets well beyond city boundaries. The logic of
interjurisdictional competition (and other constraints) predicts that significant interventions may
be unsustainable if applied only at the local level. Peterson (1981) makes this argument about re-
distribution specifically, but it applies to other kinds of market-intervention policies as well. High
levels of public-goods provision (at least those that are not self-financing, or the benefits of which
may not be apparent to the above-median taxpayer) should be similarly difficult to sustain. And
businesses may seek to relocate, if feasible, to laxer regulatory environments. Thus city leaders
are often faced with a dilemma: the conditions of urbanicity make market interventions impor-
tant for the maintenance of their economic and social communities, and perhaps for their political
careers, because the citizens may demand such interventions or at least the social conditions such
interventions sustain; but such interventions, if adopted unilaterally, may deter investment and
undermine the city’s resource base and the overall “health” of the city. This is a key area in which
the aggregate and organic interests of a city may be in subtle tension, if not in outright conflict,
as the dynamics of urbanicity may operate differently at the mass and elite levels—and at cross
purposes—in ways that are unlikely in other contexts.30 Even the most active and well-meaning
local government may be overwhelmed by governance challenges presented by powerful forces
well beyond local control.31
Those who seek such interventions may therefore do better to pursue supralocal policies—to
shape outcomes at higher levels. By pursuing policies that impose interventionist policies that
29Buenker (1973), Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999)
30For instance, we might expect very unequal cities to have high aggregate demand for redistribution, according to
Meltzer and Richard (1981). Their representatives, elected by the median voter(s), may agree in principle. But if city
hall unilaterally imposes a progressive income tax, while other nearby jurisdictions do not, high earners—who would
provide most of the revenue for the tax—can leave, dodging the tax, but still enjoying the other benefits of city life,
and the city will lose whatever other revenue they might have gained from those high taxpayers in other ways. This is
against the city’s organic interest. If the progressive tax is imposed at a higher level of government, such that it would
be very difficult or costly for the high taxpayers to move away, then the preferences of the voters (and officials) can be
met without undermining the organic health of the city. This is the heart of Peterson (1981)’s logic, and a site of tension
between aggregate and organic city interests.
31Rae (2003), p. xii
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support “high maintenance” places across all local polities (or that at least reduce the marginal
benefit of individuals’ relocation to non-city places), proponents of such interventions can soften
the effects of interjurisdictional competition. But cities do not exist in a vacuum, and they must
often contend with other kinds of communities where demand for statism is not as high in higher-
level jurisdictions, where cities seldom constitute a majority. Thus the city must pursue some strat-
egy at those higher levels. The most obvious strategy (and a baseline complement to other, more
sophisticated strategies) is to present a common, cohesive position in support of a city’s organic
interest, and to seek common cause with other cities faced with similar governance dilemmas. In
national politics, this has meant cohesive city delegations and the creation of an urban political
order composed of many cities facing similar problems and seeking similar aid and policy unifor-
mity from the national government. This political order took shape within the Democratic Party
over the course of the Long New Deal, as detailed in chapter 3. The portfolio of New Deal policies
(and a series of Supreme Court decisions ultimately ratifying them) transformed the relationship
between the United States government and markets, and also provided much of the substance of
political conflict ever since.
2.2.2 Cities and the Second Dimension
There is a clear logical connection between urbanicity and statism, with the main challenge being
how to provide the demanded interventions, in order to balance mass preferences with organic
interests in light of institutional constraints. The story gets more complicated, however, when we
consider the second major “dimension” of political conflict frequently identified in American pol-
itics, that having to with racial and cultural issues. On these issues, the implications of urbanicity
are less obvious at the individual level; rather, they are the subject of a half-century’s scholarly
controversy. More, because race is often so divisive, the aggregate and organic interests of the city
may be more directly in tension than on economic issues.
There is no consensus on the relationship between group diversity and intergroup relations,
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but two main theories have been in tension over the years. The first is contact theory, which holds
that exposure to (especially intimate contact with, in terms of getting to know individuals) per-
sons from groups different from one’s own will erode stereotypes and intergroup hostility based
on those stereotypes. Evidence supporting this school of thought has typically come from psy-
chology, and operates at the individual level.32 In political science, on the other hand, the bulk of
the evidence has supported the racial threat hypothesis, which holds that intergroup relations are
likely to get worse when levels of diversity are high or increasing. This more pessimistic theory
predicts that competition over material resources, status, or culture leads to heightened tension or
conflicts between groups, and negatively affects individuals’ affect toward those other groups.33
Each of these hypotheses have observable implications at the individual and aggregate levels
that can be tested empirically. Most basically, if individuals feel better about members of other
groups in diverse contexts, that would support the contact hypothesis. If they found group iden-
tities to be more salient, and harbor feelings of hostility or rivalry toward the other group, that
would support the threat hypothesis. At the aggregate level, we can imagine analogous impli-
cations, though we would have to be careful about traps related to ecological inference.34 For
instance, if we saw relatively strong support for anti-discrimination legislation in areas with rela-
tively high minority populations, that could be because such policies were getting moderate sup-
port from every group equally, or maybe only very strong support from the minorities themselves
and very weak support from local whites. Taking that closer look to see how the aggregate sup-
port was constituted would have important implications for how we judge the effects of diversity.
To the extent the racial threat hypothesis holds, we would expect American cities—the sites of
tremendous diversity, and frequent inflows of potentially threatening groups—to be hotbeds of in-
tergroup conflict. Historically, there are many important examples of just this expected outcome,
especially between whites and African Americans. Race riots and smaller scale racial violence
32Allport (1954) originates this perspective, but for a review of the literature, see Oliver (2010).
33Key (1949), Blalock (1967), Oliver (2010). A key methodological challenge in such studies is the problem of residen-
tial mobility and endogeneity: environments may change persons, or persons may relocate into environments that that
suit their preferences for diversity. This is mainly a challenge for those who find the racial contact hypothesis at work,
as it seems less likely that persons are moving in order to be closer to groups they do not like. Observational studies
that find evidence for threat, as in Oliver (2010), are less vulnerable to this fundamental inferential problem.
34Ecological inference is the often inapt practice of making individual-level judgements from aggregate-level data.
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were chronic realities in many cities over the entire 20th century, often sparked by personal vi-
olence across group lines.35 And most evidence from opinion surveys and mass behavior tends
to support the racial threat hypothesis that familiarity breeds contempt across group lines.36 One
corollary finding related to the threat hypothesis is the finding that diverse communities have
lower levels of social capital; even when people from different groups are not fighting outright,
they are not getting along and cooperating very well, either.37 At the individual and neighbor-
hood level, then, it seems that diversity makes people less likely to get along, and less likely to
forge the institutions that might provide a framework for strong civil society.
The implications for diversity may be different for elected officials and other elites than for
individuals, however. Circumstances in which high levels of diversity lead to heightened inter-
group conflict among citizens tend to conflict with the organic interest of maintaining social peace.
Whatever one feels about racial harmony or members of other groups, as long as physical entry
into a community is relatively easy (and as long as overt Apartheid-style repression by force is
ruled out), then finding a way for groups to get along—rather than “explode”—must be a priority
in governing a heterogeneous community. From the perspective of a city’s “health,” deep group
division will tend to be a negative.38 But how can the individual and aggregate tendency toward
conflict be overcome in the name of the organic interest in peace?
2.2.3 Diversity, Institutions, and Political Order
In an analysis of how group-based diversity affects political outcomes, we must examine how in-
stitutions process inputs from civil society (such as individuals’ opinions, claims made by groups,
and the interests of local associations) into outputs in the formal political system, a process which
35Sugrue (1996), Joyce (2003)
36Or at least more enmity than amity, though our understanding of these intergroup conflicts has become more
nuanced as scholars have explored the role of broader context of the particular contact or threat. See Oliver (2010), Enos
(2010), Hopkins (2010), Varshney (2002)
37Putnam (2007)
38There are many reasons social peace is preferable to heated division: humanitarian “preferences” that persons not
be injured or killed; desire for a feeling of mutual affection or respect with co-members of one’s community; respect
for private property; the promotion of commerce or other practices that are strengthened in circumstances of physical
security; aesthetic affection for particular historic buildings or districts, and so on.
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at the end of the day must distill infinitely plural interests into policies or representatives’ deci-
sions. When scholars have approached the relationship between diversity and liberalism at this
level, they have generated different accounts of how institutions “process” diversity or the arrival
of new groups. Because cities are typically more diverse than the nation or states in the U.S.,
many of these studies have used evidence from the local level. The rosiest picture is of a politics of
smooth group incorporation through electoral politics, in which new groups arrive in a polity and
are invited to join political organizations competing for an election-winning coalition.39 In certain
circumstances, this has been an important path to political inclusion and social incorporation.40
Such pluralist accounts of even-footed incorporation are undermined, however, by broad ev-
idence of non-responsiveness to new or minority groups for a variety of reasons.41 Group-based
electoral competition is almost a given in urban politics, and examples of particularly contentious
politics are easy to find in studies of urban politics.42 If politics is about racial “teams” compet-
ing for scarce status or goods, then a majority group might control all of those goods because it
includes the median voter; they may also change institutions to limit the participation or effective-
ness of minority groups.43 In places where no single group entails a majority, shifting coalitions
may join to share the goods, excluding those left out. Of course, it is rare that racial or ethnic
group-based conflict entails the entirety of politics in the U.S.; ideology, class, and other factors
are always important as well, so politicians may make appeals to minority groups in order to
break some stalemate on another dimension. To the extent that the implications of “racial threat”
holds in the electorate, however, appeals to minority groups may not result in net gains: if the
“threat” is sharp enough, appealing to one group may push members of rival groups out of an
existing coalition.44 Overall, diversity is typically conceived as a challenge rather than an asset.
Importantly, studies of political or policy outcomes (distinct from studies of “pre-political”
39Dahl (1961)
40The classic group is the Irish, as in Erie (1988), but see also Italian-American incorporation in Dahl (1961). Keiser
(1997) theorizes conditions under which African Americans were successful in being meaningful/powerful members
of local coalitions.
41Erie (1988), Pinderhughes (1987), Hajnal and Trounstine (2010)
42Kaufmann (2004), Sonenshein (1994), Browning (2003)
43Bridges (1997), Trebbi, Aghion and Alesina (2008)
44Frymer (1998)
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phenomena such as individuals’ preferences or affect toward other groups) have also tended to
support racial threat theory. Indeed, Key’s (1949) landmark study of southern politics in the na-
tion, often cited as an early recognition of racial threat, employs data from congressional behavior
by Southerners to find that “black belt” representatives, whose constituencies included higher pro-
portions of African America were more conservative on race than their regional allies from whiter
districts. Even though they were barred from voting, the black citizens in these districts were seen
as influencing representatives’ behavior by posing a deep threat to the white supremacist racial
order. Trebbi, Aghion and Alesina (2008) find that local voters are apt to fundamentally alter their
local institutions of government to dodge rule by other groups when faced with demographic
change; a rising tide of diversity causes whites to erect protective barriers around their current
privileged status, rather than incorporate the growing groups of newcomers. Thus it is commonly
believed that higher levels of diversity leads to higher levels of conflict between groups—meaning
less “liberal” outcomes on the second dimension of political conflict.
Diversity is also thought to have a dampening effect on first-dimensional liberalism. Studies in
this vein suggest that there is reason to expect racial and ethnic heterogeneity to undermine statism
(not only intergroup comity), even as density promotes it, prompting us to think twice about how
we might expect cities to represent themselves on “first dimension” issues like regulation, redis-
tribution, and public goods provision. In one oft-cited study, local jurisdictions provided fewer
public goods when levels of diversity were high, indicating that it may be difficult for groups to
overcome their ethnic or racial differences and govern at the local level.45 These key findings of
how politics distill diversity into representation and policy have tended to support the idea that
diversity makes things “worse” for proponents of both dimensions of liberalism.
But when we look closely at how cities represent themselves in national politics, the expecta-
tions that diversity engenders racial division and fiscal conservatism—that diversity contributes
to two-dimensional conservatism—has not been borne out. Rather, while cities were often the
site of internal racial hostility and domination, they were also the modern home of racial lib-
eralism, incorporating racial minorities into a broader coalitional politics. Previously, the last
45Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999), see also Habyarimana et al. (2009) for experimental evidence in a different
context.
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round of immigration-driven American diversity (from roughly 1890-1920) eventually gave rise
to the initial articulation and promotion of both dimensions of liberalism at the national level, a
two-dimensional liberalism that was resilient to the challenges posed by diversity and intergroup
strife.46
How, then, are we to understand the complex relationship between liberalism, diversity, and
urbanicity? These liberal policies and ideals are famously urban—they were generated by and
drew their staunchest support from the most diverse sections of the nation, the large cities of
the New Deal coalition. City political commitments, rooted in diversity, pluralism, and state ac-
tivism, would ultimately undermine white supremacy as an assumption of American politics. It
would also undermine the Democratic Party’s midcentury dominance, which relied in part on ar-
rangements maintaining that white supremacy itself. This process of developing, defending, and
sustaining racial liberalism by cities that were themselves deeply divided along racial lines and
on racial issues at home, is the focus of Chapter 5, which will assess the role of city delegations
in sustaining unity in a potentially fragile anti-racist liberal coalition. First, however, I will out-
line a theory of city representation, the City Delegation theory, which proposes a mechanism by
which one element of urbanicity (size) can help mitigate the challenges of another (heterogeneity).
2.3 Representing a city interest: City Delegations
An answer may lie in the pattern of city representation that John Vorys worried about in 1964, ac-
cording to which city representatives are responsive not only to their particular constituencies, but
to a broader city interest as well. The conditions of urbanicity generate pressures for governance,
and for amelioration of conflicts between groups. Particularly urgent and clear are the “citywide”
implications of urbanicity for statism outlined above, which are complicated by institutional pres-
sures about where interventions should come from. As articulated by Peterson (1981) and others,
the powerful logic of interjurisdictional competition supports a division of labor among levels of
46Buenker (1973), Ch. 6
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government for specific sorts of policies: developmental policies at lower levels, redistributive at
higher levels where the threat of exit by high-end taxpayers is less.47 A similar logic holds for
other market interventions that may prompt the exit of wealthy taxpayers from the local polity.
Those who hold the reins of local government feel the pinch of this logic quite acutely; to meet the
demand for such policies, they should pursue them at higher levels of government, rather than at
the local level.
This presents yet another strategic problem, however, because at those higher levels, even
though the geographic basis of representation results in some legislators having city constituen-
cies, cities themselves are not formally represented. There is no representative of “Chicago” or
“New York City” in either the statehouse or the Capitol, and the shorthand “D-LA” would be in-
terpreted as “Democrat from Louisiana,” not “Democrat from Los Angeles.” Instead, these large,
heterogeneous communities are represented by a collection of representatives, each with his or
her own separate geographically-based constituency, which may include a subsection of the city
as well as some part of the surrounding area.48 These collections of representatives, which together
make up a city’s delegation to a legislature, often represent very different kinds of constituencies:
neighborhoods with different class or ethnic compositions, with different business interests, and
so forth. They are often not much alike in terms of important aggregate demography, and their
residents may see themselves as cross-town rivals, not natural allies. As I will illustrate in Chap-
ter 4, they are often particularly heterogeneous collections of districts, especially when it comes to
race. Beyond proximity, they often share very little, according to the formal logic of the legislature
or the demographic building blocks of politics.
One characteristic that members of a city delegation do share by definition is membership
in a common local political community, their city. Given the often dire circumstances of cities,
those concerned with the fate of the broader city—and many elites may count themselves among
47Peterson (1981)
48The exception, of course, is is when a city’s population hits a sweet spot equal to the size of a legislative district at
a particular historical moment (such that the district would encompass the city as a whole, rather than a subdivision of
the city, or the city and its surrounding areas, which may have very different interests). This is fairly rare, but such a
district would be the closest we can often get to identity between a city and a member in a legislature.
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this group—must strategize to pursue organic citywide interests.49 For such a bloc, any successful
strategy must begin with the forging of unity in the city bloc. Even though cities and their districts
are often very different, they must overcome these differences in a legislative alliance to pursue
citywide goals. They must also find or recruit allies to support “city” positions. In state legisla-
tures where large cities contend with rural forces, political scientists have seen city delegations
pursue such strategies to some success. Burns et al. (2009) find that city unity will increase the
success of the urban delegation on urban issues by sending information about a citywide accord
to the rest of the legislature, who then defer to the city delegation on that vote. This is an “urbaniz-
ing” strategy. Weir and Wolman (2005) argue that city unity and alliances with inner-ring suburbs
(who may face similar governance problems) help cities achieve legislative victory. Because this
strategy relies on the attraction of the “next-most urban” constituencies, and on the development
of shared interests, this is an “affinity” strategy. Each of these strategies has been employed at
different moments by national city representatives, but the premise of each is a unified city bloc.50
Given the diversity of city districts, however, rivalries from the local level might be transmitted to
higher levels as well, so the city delegation unity presupposed by each of these strategies (and by
Rep. Vorys in 1964) should not be automatically assumed.
2.3.1 Unity despite diversity
Statism and and group pluralism are important for city governance, and these ideas have com-
bined to define “dual liberalism” in contemporary politics. Even in local politics, however, these
ideas are not settled matters; they have been the subject of contentious debate and deep division in
city politics for over a century, and cities, like other places only more so, are home to a multiplicity
of voices and political perspectives. They are often deeply divided. Given such divisions, how
49In the context of an urban-rural divide, a common feature of politics even if it is not along partisan lines, strategic
action is particularly crucial because city representatives rarely constitute a majority in a legislature, and their prefer-
ences on important issues (like statism) are likely to be at one end of the continuum (rather than centrist and potentially
pivotal), and may be strongly opposed by some set of non-city legislators.
50In his exchange with Rep. Celler in Chapter 1, Daley seems to be articulating an affinity strategy. In Chapter 5, I
will argue that city representatives pursued an urbanizing strategy on civil rights.
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can a city represent itself cohesively in higher levels of government, in pursuit of the strategies
above, which might help foster policies that make city governance easier?
Given the high levels of demographic heterogeneity and plurality of interest within and across
cities, these communities do not seem like particularly fertile ground in which to base a national
political alignment. Within cities, social division and resource scarcity constantly threaten, as
repeated episodes of urban violence have illustrated. Between cities, competition for taxpayers
and finite intergovernmental aid could undermine alliances. Sustaining political alliances in such
circumstances requires constant attention and significant skill. Nonetheless, a national urban po-
litical order has been resilient and growing on city issues since the beginning of the New Deal.
Given their vulnerable position within the federal political economy, the continuing incentives for
cities to compete with one another, and the great potential for internal division within cities, it is
remarkable that this political force formed and endured. Understanding how cities maintain in-
ternal order may help us understand how the national urban order sustained itself through most
of the 20th century.
Because of their high levels of social conflict and vulnerability within the federal order, cities
are prone to political chaos and sometimes appear to be “ungovernable.”51 Capital flight, crime,
congestion, labor and social unrest, pollution, and even weather all present recurrent, powerful
governance challenges to American cities typically faced with severe resource constraints. Over-
laid on top of these chronic governance problems is the high level of ethnoracial diversity present
in many cities, which can intensify or create conflict in its own right. The uneven patternings of
race and class across space within cities, fostered by local practice and policies at all levels in ev-
ery American city, mean that these conflicts may take place within the city but across legislative
districts, meaning that local political conflict can be transmitted or intensified in representative in-
stitutions, which are based on that same segregated territory. The result of these many cleavages
and constrained resources can often resemble irresolvable “hyperpluralism,” resulting in fragility,
chaos, and the constant danger of civic crisis.52 These governance challenges have at times made
cities fairly unpleasant places to live or do business for those with other options, prompting exit
51Cannato (2002)
52DeLeon (1992)
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by many and further compounding these problems.
For political elites within the city, however, exit is not an option. For this group, the estab-
lishment of political order and the pursuit of some approximation of an organic city interest is
a priority as they attempt to manage the city and solve governance problems in the context of
deep pluralism.53 Several important institutional arrangements, distinctive in cities, foster civic
political order. These institutions foster political integration horizontally, across the breadth of
the city, by including different constituencies and their representatives in common forums. They
foster common interests and perspectives among their participants, and serve to “smooth” (even
if only a little) the rough edges of city politics. By integrating local politics, they also help to foster
“vertical” integration, up the political food chain to higher levels, and allow for a more cohesive
representation of a city interest in higher levels of government.
There are two main categories of institutions of horizontal integration (IHIs): jurisdictional
and organizational. The chief jurisdictional institution is simply the city boundary and the central
city government that oversees governance of the territory within. This kind of horizontal integra-
tion is common to all cities, and is what makes size an important characteristic of urbanicity. We
often take the city boundary for granted, but this invisible line is an important political institution.
The larger the city, the more likely that different kinds of areas will be included within the same
jurisdiction. As American political communities get “fenced off” into smaller and often more ho-
mogeneous units (often suburbs), this shapes politics in a way that undermines the possibility for
two-dimensional liberalism. Gainsborough (2001) finds that the “suburbanization” of American
politics leads to a strengthening of political localism and increasing support for small-government
policies, while Oliver (2001) finds that homogeneity leads to diminished political participation and
civic capacity. Shrinking the political community seems to shrink the public sphere and tighten
the public purse strings.
When heterogeneous collections of residents, constituencies, and representatives are forced to
come together in a central place for municipal matters, they may conflict, but they will at least
interact. More, they will have a shared stake in the organic health of the city, and a chance to take
53Katznelson (2009)
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part in the citywide accord. This process is at the heart of the ideal-type pluralism described by
Dahl (1961) and others. It is not obvious that power is as dispersed as the pluralists believed, but it
does seem clear that the most legitimate participants in government are persons and groups from
within the political community, and the processes they engage in are the sources of binding leg-
islative or administrative decisions. Persons and representatives from outside the border do not
have a seat at that table, nor typically a vested interest in what happens there. The citywide accord
is likely to entail decisions about the allocation of goods and services over space within the city;
these decisions are most often made centrally, so access to and participation in these centralized
city decision-making processes is important—for residents who want access to city services and
public goods, and for elites who want to take credit for their provision or direct them in particular
ways for some reason or other. Membership in this common community itself makes represen-
tatives more cohesive in national politics, even though the districts themselves are not formally
associated with citywide governance.54
Overlapping with jurisdictional institutions, organizational institutions of horizontal integra-
tion include the many more visible institutions that have been created to help provide political
order in cities, from parties and machines to informal regimes. Made up of groups of persons, of-
ten elites, concerned with promoting some version or vision of a city’s organic interest, the study
of these institutions constitutes much of the field of urban political science.55 Unlike jurisdictional
horizontal integration, the strength of organizations vary across cities: some cities have strong
citywide institutions of horizontal integration, while these kinds of organizations are virtually ab-
sent in others. In places where these institutions are strong, ties between the center and periphery
within a city, or between far-flung and very different parts of a city, may be particularly strong.
Where a single boss or small group controls access to office and resources, as in the strongest ma-
54Advocates of metropolitan governance schemes are implicitly emphasizing the importance of jurisdictional IHIs
in the articulation and implementation of policies reflecting a broad “organic” interest; much to the dismay of such
advocates, these institutions are usually fairly weak or restricted in their substantive purview.
55For instances or conceptual outlines of strong local parties in cities, see Banfield and Wilson (1963), Bridges (1984)
and Mayhew (1986). For classic accounts of machine politics, see Gosnell (1937) and Erie (1988). Bridges (1997) out-
lines instances and characteristics of Reform regimes, and Trounstine (2008) draws an important connection between
these institutional arrangements and partisan-style machines, conceptualizing each kind of political order as a sub-
set of the broader category “monopoly.” Stone (1989) conceptualizes the elite urban regime and describes some of its
characteristics in action in Atlanta.
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chines, that boss has many resources with which to enforce political discipline and order across
the city; elected officials dependent on that central decisionmaker for (re-) nomination and mate-
rial delivery of goods and services to their constituencies are more likely to attend to the will of
the center. And the strong demands of some part of the city are more relevant to representatives
from other parts of the city, if they can reach the citywide agenda and become part of the citywide
accord.
Each of these institutional configurations, formally or informally, has the important effect of
channelling or limiting the potentially infinitely varied content of public participation in policy-
making to some ultimate decision, enacted and enforced by an established authority. While each
has been often, and often fairly, criticized as undemocratic, these criticisms are oblique to the deep-
est crisis of the 20th century American city, beset as it was on all sides by both demands for action
and constraints on resources and authority. In such a context, representation and responsiveness
to public opinion on particular issues are important, but must coexist with, and at times accede to,
the primary goods of political order and a city’s organic interests.56 Political order can be estab-
lished through these institutions of horizontal integration, forging a citywide accord.57 Crucially,
these institutions of horizontal integration, which force plural interests into resolution, have been
developed in cities but not in other social spaces of comparable size, as described below.
City delegation theory, which I articulate and investigate in this study, argues that local in-
stitutional factors influence the way that cities represent themselves in higher levels of political
decisionmaking, especially making them more cohesive in representing a putative city interest.
Institutions of horizontal integration do not only function at the local level, providing political
order in the context of resource constraint and governance challenges; they can also serve to co-
ordinate action by the representatives of cities. These representatives, who come from and retain
links to local institutions that integrate politics across the city, tend to be particularly cohesive
56Huntington (1968)
57Again, this citywide “accord” may be undemocratic, and may reflect neither the “will of all” the city’s residents
nor the abstract “general will” of the city as a corporate body (though ideally it will include elements of those), but
it is an enforceable policy or position that results from the deliberation and workings of the institutions of horizontal
integration. I choose the language of “accord,” as opposed to “city interest” or “consensus” to reflect this idea—that
there may be winners and losers, and that it is certainly possible that the accord reflects neither consensus nor the city’s
organic interest.
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units, especially when we account for the high levels of heterogeneity among city constituencies.
I will demonstrate this in greater depth in Chapter 3, but the next section includes a fuller expla-
nation of the logic of this theory.
2.3.2 Cities and representation
Many factors influence legislative decision making, and the composition of a constituency is fre-
quently employed to explain legislator behavior.58 In the ideal abstract, a legislature is something
of a microcosm of broader society, with the views and preferences of its constituent parts brought
to bear on political questions for deliberation and action. In reality, along the way to final leg-
islative decisions, unavoidable collective action and social choice problems give rise to legislative
institutions that shape the way constituencies’ preferences are aggregated into policy. Much of
the study of Congress and lawmaking is devoted to determining how much these institutions
matter—the relative influence of legislative parties and precameral “preferences” (of constituen-
cies or legislators themselves) in shaping legislative behavior.59 When cities turn to higher levels of
government to pursue solutions to their local governance problems, both constituency and party
should therefore be taken into account.
When scholars have considered the role of cities in the national legislature, the typical ap-
proach has been to identify “urban” districts, aggregate them, and study how representatives
from urban districts behave in congress: how numerous or powerful they are, their partisan dis-
tribution, and their potentially distinctive behavior on urban issues.60 The model underpinning
this typical approach to the role of urbanicity in national politics assumes that districts from large,
central cities, wherever they are, have similar interests and will pursue these interests in concert
58Mayhew (1966), Mayhew (1974) Fenno (1973). This mix of factors is in itself something fairly distinctive about
American legislative politics, where relatively decentralized party institutions make strict party-line voting something
less than a given, as it is in most other Western democracies.
59They are both important. Aldrich (1995), Krehbiel (1998), Cox and McCubbins (2004). For a review of this literature,
see Aldrich (2011), Ch. 7.
60Mayhew (1966), Wolman and Marnicki (2005), Caraley (1976).
CHAPTER 2. URBANICITY AND CITY DELEGATIONS 57
in national politics.61 For some analyses, this is a good framework and can inform our under-
standing of the development of 20th century American politics.62 However, this assumption is
not straightforward for two important reasons. First, while cities may resemble each other as ur-
ban agglomerations, and often face similar challenges, particularly in the wake of the industrial
age, it is also true that cities, states, and regions can and do organize as rivals rather than allies.
According to Gelfand (1975), “rivalry, not cooperation, marked most inter-city relations” for most
of American history.63 Particular development strategies may favor one region or group of cities
over another. In the early days of the Republic, New York and Philadelphia vied for supremacy. As
California grew, rivalries between Los Angeles, San Francisco, and San Diego often made the cities
rivals rather than allies.64 At a regional level, Republican urban policy in the middle of the 20th
century tended to favor the rapidly growing Sun Belt cities, while Democratic eras have tended
to be more beneficial for the older cities of the Northeast and Midwest.65 Thus the creation and
construction of an urban bloc and partisan-place character divide was not inevitable or natural;
it was a political project that involved interactions between national elites, urban constituencies,
and city elites.66
Second, the belief that each urban district will identify an urban interest, line up, and coalesce
into an urban coalition underestimates not only the plurality of interests among cities, but also
within cities. Perhaps the central insight (or premise) of the study of urban politics since the field’s
birth is that cities are the site of heterogeneous constituencies, diverse and plural interests, and
deeply contested politics. Not only should we not assume that all cities will get along as allies,
we should not even assume that a “Los Angeles” or “Chicago” position on contentious issues
will naturally arise from unorganized social activity, because local politics is as likely to be con-
flictual as it is to be consensual, and there are likely to be winners and losers within cities even
61Mayhew (1966), Caraley (1976), Wolman and Marnicki (2005)
62Indeed, I implicitly adopt it myself, above in the discussion of the relationship between urbanicity and liberalism
and in Chapter 3’s analysis of the development of the urban bloc and its ability to pursue an “urban agenda” over time.
63p. 28
64Erie (1992)
65Mollenkopf (1983), Ethington and Levitus (2009)
66Many authors highlight different aspects of this project and its importance for the New Deal, including Dorsett
(1977), Mayhew (1986), Andersen (1979), Mollenkopf (1983), Buenker (1973)
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on issues of supralocal importance. Urbanicity may foster some predispositions, but a city’s or-
ganic interest (or citywide accord) may not “naturally” coincide with the aggregate positions of
its several districts, especially because those with different interests and perspectives are likely
to be separated into different constituencies. Thus the key attribute of the contemporary urban
political order—increasing unity and cohesion in representation as the base of a major party—is
remarkable precisely because rivalries both among and within cities have been overcome to create
such a stable alignment in national politics. The basic building block of this alignment, where
cities’ propensity for insoluble conflict is first overcome in the name of national-politics unity, is
the cohesive city delegation.
2.3.3 Smoothing preferences
City delegations function by smoothing out diverse preferences into a more cohesive bloc, just
as institutions of horizontal integration can create political order in a fractious local political and
social environment. The city delegation theory offered by this analysis complicates traditional
models of representation by adding an extracameral intermediary between constituency and leg-
islative behavior. Consider the abstract model of representation in Figure 2.1. At left, there are four
hypothetical districts to be represented in a legislature. District-level characteristics, abstracted as
different colors or patterns at left, are reflected unmediated in representation at right.67
In such a model, the atomistic districts are unlinked, and representation is largely determined
by district-level characteristics. When districts share district-level characteristics, they are likely to
“agree” on a particular policy in question, and this agreement should be reflected in their represen-
tatives’ behavior. When they are very different on demographic or other fundamentals, however,
it may be harder to coordinate action, even when the districts are part of the same legislative party.
This is a relevant consideration in the historically relatively weak congressional party system in
the U.S., and a big part of the meaning behind Tip O’Neill’s famous aphorism that “all politics is
67These differences may be softened by chamber party, a truism in the study of legislatures. But such studies rarely
examine subdelegations, or patterns among them, which is the explicit focus of city delegation theory.
CHAPTER 2. URBANICITY AND CITY DELEGATIONS 59
Figure 2.1: A model of atomistic representation: Diverse preferences and interests at left are
mirrored by representatives at right.
local.”
In city delegations, however, district-level characteristics pass through mediating institutions
of horizontal integration, affecting representation among members of the delegation. This model
is depicted informally in Figure 2.2. Here, the abstracted districts are just as different from each
other as in the previous figure, but they are no longer atomistic; they are part of a broader city-
wide “molecule,” as indicated by the boundary around the districts. TInclusion within this group
means that the constituencies and representatives share some common political identity, and their
diverse preferences are at least somewhat filtered through the intermediate city institutions. The
result is that even when districts are very different from each other, they may still be very cohesive
in the legislature because they are linked to the other districts in their city.
What links city districts to each other? Institutions of horizontal integration (IHIs) connect city
districts in a way that other districts, even those that are geographically adjacent, are not usually
connected. First, members of a city delegation are linked by jurisdictional IHIs, reflected in a city
border and formal city governing institutions. Sets of districts that are not from within the same
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Figure 2.2: Model of a City Delegation: Diverse preferences and interests, at left, are smoothed
into a more cohesive bloc, at right, as they are filtered through the intermediate institutions of the
city.
city are not connected by jurisdictional institutions at the local level. 68 To the extent that policies
affect the city as a whole, rather than particular districts within a city, there will be an impulse
toward unity among these representatives. For instance, many supralocal programs distribute
funds not to particular neighborhoods, but to municipalities or other political subdivisions for
final expenditure.69 In a city with several congressional districts, a mayor, city council, or central
office would likely have a great discretion over how those funds were spent across districts.70
Members of a city delegation to a legislature are often members of more obvious and human
institutions of citywide horizontal integration as well, which may articulate city policy “accords”
and enforce cohesion. These are organizational institutions of horizontal integration, frequent ob-
jects of study in the field of urban politics. Examples of these include strong parties, machines,
68Districts from the same state are within the same jurisdiction, but the greater geographic extent of states and the
immediacy of local ties will make local jurisdictional institutions relatively more powerful integrators. Empirically,
state delegations of any significant size are not usually very cohesive.
69By “supralocal,” I refer to levels of government above the local, primarily state and national.
70The politically-motivated distribution of such goods is almost a truism of urban politics and has been rigorously
observed in several studies, eg. Trounstine (2008), Hajnal and Trounstine (2010), and Phillips and Brooks (2010).
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monopolies, and urban regimes.71 As well as making decisions about local governance, these city-
wide institutions often also play a role in selecting the personnel that represent the city at higher
levels. A strong local party is the best example of this phenomenon, because it is purposefully
designed as an institution of both horizontal and vertical integration, connecting electorates and
elites at all levels and across constituencies. A strong local organization can centralize nomination
decisions and create a more cohesive city delegation, either by selecting agents it is confident will
be reliably and loyal, or by threatening to remove a rogue from the ballot at the next election.
They can also serve powerful agenda-setting functions, shaping the realm of the “possible” or ac-
ceptable in politics. Even without formal parties, other IHIs, such as the elite coalitions known as
“regimes,” still rely on longstanding relationships that develop norms of loyalty and reciprocity
to maintain partnerships in city governance.72 Thus a representative from a city with strong insti-
tutions of horizontal integration, especially of the organizational type, must attend not only to the
preferences of his or her own constituents, but also to the citywide accord manifest in the integra-
tive institutions—the stronger these institutions, the greater cohesive effect the city can have on
the representative’s primary goal as a Mayhewian “single-minded seeker of re-election.” A city
without such strong institutions of horizontal integration will be less effective at this, and its city
delegation will be less cohesive.
2.3.4 Cohesive liberalism
The following empirical chapters analyze aspects of city power and behavior in national politics.
In each analysis, the tendency toward cohesion and liberalism among city representatives will
be a salient theme. A key IHI that enhanced this cohesion during the urban interlude was the
traditional party organization. Together, these local institutions and their response to governing
helped define and defend liberalism as we know it in American politics today.
The broad suite of policies and political praxis of progressive liberalism was built largely upon
71See, eg., Erie (1988),Trounstine (2008),Stone (1989)
72Stone (1989), p.180
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urban policy and institutional experiences over the first three decades of the twentieth century.
Given the waves of “refreshed” diversity in these cities, the development and maintenance of this
suite of political commitments is important and continues to be worthy of examination, especially
because many studies of city politics during this time focus on some very undemocratic or conser-
vative (even illiberal) aspects of city politics, and this debate often focused on the arrangements
of local political institutions.
The most famous clash of this era of urban politics was between the “machines” and the “re-
formers.” It is unclear which of these groups was more “progressive” or “liberal,” (however those
terms are understood) and each has come in for its share of criticism on anti-democratic grounds
during this time. While the machines are sometimes seen as non-ideological parties run amok,
awash in corruption and incompetent governance, the assault on parties led by the urban Reform
waves of the early 20th century (part and parcel with the broader Progressive movement) has
itself been variously characterized as exclusionary, classist, xenophobic, and racist.73 From the
advantaged perspective that comes with time, and from a national-politics perspective, however,
the divide between “progressives” and “urban parties” was perhaps not so vast. Normatively,
Trounstine’s (2008) synthesis makes the fundamental observation that, taken to venal extremes,
both parties and reform-style institutions lead to too much electoral insulation for elites and not
enough responsive policy for the poor.74
This important finding about machine/reform domination at home, however, as with most
studies of urban politics, focuses on the local scene. As I emphasize in this study, under condi-
tions of modern capitalism and federalism, the city is not a hermetically-sealed polity. And it is
at the national level that the battle between Reformers and Partisans in the great industrial cen-
73An argument about the Machine-Reform dichotomy is perhaps the most long-standing argument in urban politics.
Early political science was sharply critical of the machines, and Reformers were among the first in the profession. Gos-
nell (1937), among others, was critical of some elements of machine politics, but strived for neutrality in his catalogue
of the machine’s operations. Banfield and Wilson (1963) seem to admire machine politicos’ professionalism, perhaps
because these hard-nosed operators they were not motivated by liberal ideology. ? unabashedly endorses the machine,
or at least the traditional party of the immigrants, and is skeptical that “self-styled reformers” were much different
from traditional parties, apart from their xenophobic WASPism. More recently, Erie (1988) affectionately examines the
role of urban machines played in welfare provision and the causes of their general extinction as a form, and Bridges
(1997) focuses on the anti-democratic impulses of Reformers, especially those designing institutions of a whole cloth
in the younger cities of the Southwest. Trounstine (2008) argues that both machines and reform regimes were often
inattentive to the concerns of those at the social margins.
74See also Hajnal and Trounstine (2010).
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ters really begins to lose its coherence. What is remarkable in the cast of characters who appear
to represent cities on the Hill and to lead the progressive liberal movement is how blithely they
leap (or ignore) this supposedly stark divide between machine and reform, even as they exploit
the institutional, political, and rhetorical advantages of each form.75 If we look again at the local
level, however, this should not be surprising, for city politicians, especially those of this era, were
particularly deft institutional players. As Dorsett (1977) would have it, this dichotomy is wholly
“artificial and oversimplified.”76
While machines and traditional parties were criticized by their contemporaries (and later po-
litical scientists as well) as conservative and inadequate to deal with the complexity and rapid
change of modern society, the real lesson from this era seems to be their resilience in the places
where they were in place when the reformers got going, and their ability to incorporate new ideas
and reforms while still retaining (or even growing) their organizational strength.77 The end re-
sult of progressive reform in the cities where it first appeared to fight the parties was not reform
government but “a hybrid system” in which traditional party organizations continued to operate
while taking on some elements of reform.78
The most effective “reformers,” in the long term, were those who grew out of the city orga-
nizations and could marshal their political style and might to some positive end. In Congress,
as Buenker (1973) repeatedly observes, “foreign-stock” urban representatives were often prime
examples of progressive urban leaders who had one foot with the reformers and one foot with
the party: for instance, Robert Wagner Sr. from New York, Adolph Sabath from Chicago, and
David Walsh from Boston. And while Roosevelt gained national prominence as an anti-machine
reformer and won his first nomination in a heated confrontation with the Democratic machines
(most of whom were again behind Smith), he did not hesitate after his election to engage these lo-
cal leaders in their own idiom, using the resources and discretion of national New Deal programs
to establish what amounted to a “quick understanding with the local Democratic organizations
on the terms of support downward in federal money and jobs in exchange for loyalty upward in
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elections, national conventions, and Congress.”79 It worked; the Democratic organizations gained
fuel for their machines from the New Deal, and Roosevelt (and future Democratic candidates)
would rely on them for his continued incumbency.80
That this mutual exchange became the glue holding together the entire Democratic coalition
was an extension of the city system: this was how city parties work, holding diverse coalitions
without much obvious interest or ideology in common together with material benefits meted out
through elite negotiation. Thus a great blurring of the lines between party hack and reformer, be-
tween “professional” and “amateur,” and in some cases even between Republican and Democrat,
became apparent as an urban perspective came to color the national agenda of the New Deal. As
we shall see in the ensuing chapters, however, there were differences between cities with strong
parties and those without them in terms of their cohesion in representation. Cities do foster lib-
eralism, but city organizations also foster cohesion, an important independent fact when those
divisive “second dimension” issues like race appear on the agenda, or when demographic change
threatens “natural” affinity between constituencies across a city, and when very different elements
of a city delegation need to coordinate action.
Finally, a key characteristic of the traditional party was its intense local focus, which bound it
to the local grassroots across a city. While “amateurs” were concerned with national or world af-
fairs, or values, those who studied traditional parties up close emphasize the priority of local over
national concerns in the way these parties thought of themselves and how they considered strate-
gic action or the city interest. As one participant-observer in the Chicago organization described
it, “The machine is willing to. . . subordinate the interests of the [national] Democratic Party to the
interests of the Democratic organization in the City of Chicago.”81 This local focus can help us
understand that national power for at least some of these local politicians was an instrumental
means to local success—where the real access to patronage, material benefits and final spending
was. Hence the push to leverage national power to help navigate local governance challenges,
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2.4 Cities in Nation: Strategic concerns
At the broadest level, cohesive city delegations are important because cities need to be united to
advance many of their urgent priorities in higher-level politics, and attending to a citywide ac-
cord will help contribute to this unity. Some observable implications of city delegation theory will
be tested in Chapter 4, where I show that, consistent with this theory, city delegations are more
cohesive than similarly contiguous sets of representatives not bound by a common jurisdiction,
and that cities with strong local parties, the classic institution of horizontal integration, are more
cohesive than cities without such parties. Looking more closely, I also demonstrate that, at the
individual level, representatives from the same city are more likely to agree on a congressional
roll call vote than representatives not from the same city, even when we account for other impor-
tant factors such as congressional party and district-level demography. Being from the same city
fosters cohesion.
But internal cohesion alone is not enough to create a national urban political order. Regional
or intercity rivalries must also be overcome to create a cohesive national urban political alliance.
As political scientists have noted, uniting and maintaining the loyalty of these large cities was the
major political project of the New Deal, and the key to Democratic control over the urban inter-
lude.82 The creation of the national urban bloc-of-blocs required the articulation and development
of a national agenda that could address the urgent governance requirements common to all cities
and regions. The articulation of this agenda by supporters, and the obstacles it faced within cities
and from the conservative coalition, has been chronicled in several notable studies,83 but the ac-
tual consolidation of city representatives in one party, and the maturation of the urbanicity divide
over the course of the 20th century has not been rigorously described. This is the subject of the
next chapter, where I analyze increasingly partisan character of the city-country divide in repre-
82Mollenkopf (1983), Dorsett (1977),Eldersveld (1949)
83Biles (2011), Mollenkopf (1983), Gelfand (1975)
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sentative institutions, and chronicle the power of the city bloc over time.
2.4.1 Marginal Urgency
Even cross-city cohesion, however, is still not enough for city success at higher levels. Bloc unity
is a crucial strategy for collective action among voters with shared interests or preferences, but it
is most effective when the bloc can realistically claim to hold the balance of power. This claim is
most credible when a bloc is near the center of the preference distribution, making it more likely
to include the pivotal vote (in the House, the median voter). This is the situation of “pivotal
cohesion.” During the long New Deal, this strategy of bloc unity was used quite effectively by
Southerners in Congress to defend their regional racial order.84 Southerners frequently and in-
creasingly “defected” from their copartisans on many issues, forming the conservative coalition
with Republicans that would be a recurrent feature of national politics for decades. Because they
actually defected, and because the positions they took did not seem incompatible with their “true”
preferences, their victories did not appear to be pyrrhic, and they gained significant leverage as
the pivotal bloc in the legislature.85 Concurrently, a similar strategy was employed in electoral
politics by the fast-growing African American population in some large Northern cities to ad-
vance their civil rights agenda and gain meaningful incorporation into local and national party
organizations.86 Previously loyal to the Republican “Party of Lincoln” in national and local elec-
tions, the black vote was still in play during the 1930s and 40s, and black power brokers sought to
extract concessions from their suitors in each party. This strategy would lose its power over time,
however, as return to the Republican fold began to seem less likely or self-defeating for African
Americans.87 Each of these groups was able to leverage pivotal cohesion into meaningful results.
For the urban political order, however, the strategic situation was typically different. Once a
city-country divide has emerged, and the agenda includes many potentially controversial issues
84Katznelson and Farhang (2005)
85Katznelson and Mulroy (2012), Sitkoff (1978)
86Sitkoff (1978) pp.88-92, Keiser (1997) pp.7-9, 26-33.
87The Democrats’ approach to race and retaining the black vote are discussed in Chapter 5.
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on which positions are structured by urbanicity, cities’ claims to being pivotal are quite weak. Be-
cause of their high demands for statist “maintenance,” cities—even if united—may frequently find
themselves at the margins (as opposed to the pivot), while still facing urgent needs that require an
adjustment of the status quo. In such a context, city representatives have relatively extreme pref-
erences and thus little real leverage based on cohesion alone—even the most cohesive minority
will lose every time without allies. But the changing conditions of urbanicity mean that adjusting
the policy status quo is often urgent to meet concrete governance challenges and maintain social
order. This “marginal urgency” means that further steps are needed to achieve policy success; a
strategy more sophisticated than simple unity and the threat of defection from a coalition would
be required to pursue policy success at higher levels.88
2.4.2 Unity and Agenda Control
Several strategic tools seem important for advancing the non-pivotal city agenda, and each is im-
portant for the subsequent empirical chapters in this study. The first strategy is to consolidate the
urban political order, building the bloc-of-blocs by uniting city delegations within one national
party. This has happened over time, as Democrats have claimed the mantle of the “party of the
cities” since the 1930s.89 The growth of the urban bloc in the Democratic Party is chronicled in
Chapter 3.
Second, the city bloc can pursue majority status and leadership positions. In both chambers,
but especially in the House, majority status confers special power to advancing or defending a
policy agenda.90 Control of committees and the floor agenda allows the majority to dictate much
of the action of the legislature. Thus membership in the majority coalition is vital for a bloc, such as
the urban political order, that seeks to create national policies to meet important local governance
88During the New Deal, moreover, the newly consolidated city bloc was closely identified with the administration
and proposed many initiatives the adoption of which, they argued, was urgent for their constituencies; they could not
very convincingly threaten to walk away from them.
89Mayhew (1966)
90Cox and McCubbins (1993)
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needs. Additionally, membership in the party’s chamber leadership (or “cartel”, consisting of
the Speaker, floor leadership, committee chairs, and membership on “prestige” committees such
as Rules, Ways and Means, and Appropriations) is especially desirable for shaping the agenda.91
Given that these leadership positions are largely a function of seniority, city representatives should
take steps to enhance their own prospects for return to office, in both absolute terms (this is a pri-
mary goal of all ambitious politicians, and of course easier said than done) and relative to other
members of their party. This requires a difficult balancing act, potentially trading off between bloc
policy priorities with party success, in order to hit the sweet spot of leadership-in-majority. If
there is another firmly entrenched (and therefore electorally “safe”) bloc within the party that is a
threat or obstacle to the urban bloc’s policy goals (Southern Democrats in this case), then majority
status alone may not be enough to satisfy a bloc that cares about more than retaining office, so
alternative strategies or coalitional shake-ups may be strategic imperatives. City Democrats have
had some success in achieving leadership positions, but this has also left them in the minority for
most of the last two decades.
In pursuit of long-run majorities in support of their desire policies, the national urban political
order has pursued partisan allies using several strategies that are also apparent among city dele-
gations in other contexts: mutual exchange,92 urbanizing,93 and affinity.94 Each of these strategies
were apparent at different moments or in different areas of policy during the urban interlude, and
I describe them briefly here.
2.4.3 Mutual inclusive exchange
In the search for elusive majorities, a non-pivotal minority like the urban political order can pur-
sue a strategy of inclusive exchange, or logrolling, in which they may be able to institutionalize
91Cox and McCubbins (2004), Wolman and Marnicki (2005)
92Mayhew (1966)
93Burns et al. (2009)
94Weir and Wolman (2005)
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legislative success with allies with which they share little in common.95 This is a useful strategy
when some groups of legislators have intense preferences about some issues, but are relatively
indifferent about others, and they can exchange support to meet their intense desires. Throughout
the Long New Deal, city representatives were never a majority of the Democratic Party (see Chap-
ter 3, Figure 6b), and most of their copartisans were from rural areas and may have been rather
unconcerned with the distinctive pressures of city governance that could be relieved through na-
tional policy. In many cases, these rural allies, especially Southerners, were actually quite wary
of statism by the national government. To get the state interventions they needed, the New Deal
city bloc constructed a coalition and held it together with the distribution of material benefits.96
In keeping with the urban politics tradition of material exchange and distributive politics, city
representatives were the most avid and consistent logrollers in Congress during this period on
distributive issues; that is, they were just as supportive of many rural projects and programs (from
which their constituents gained little) as they were of programs targeted at the cities. The same
was not true of rural representatives, even Democrats, who increasingly defected from this intra-
party arrangement, in part on ideological grounds.97 Intense ideological conflict that cannot be
resolved with the sharing of material goods, such as those about race and culture, are particularly
dangerous for political alliances. This city-Southern partnership was fraught from the beginning,
though city representatives worked hard to establish and maintain it from early in the 1930s, as
we will see in Chapter 4.98
Over time, however, the urban bloc’s main partners in this distributive politics (the South) be-
came increasingly unreliable on a range of issues of critical importance to cities.99 This was espe-
cially true on nationalized urban issues, in which policies were being pursued that would apply
95Mayhew (1966), Aldrich (2011) p.23-24
96Fleck (2008), Bateman and Taylor (2007)
97Mayhew (1966)
98The “uneven” logroll that was the heart of the Democratic coalition also fits with an understanding of how ur-
banicity and Peterson (1981)’s logic fit together as an example of collective action on statism. Cities, which were had
relatively more resources, and could ostensibly provide some of these goods/interventions on their own, but they are
constrained from doing so. In turning to the national level, they were forced in effect to provide certain goods to other
constituencies (where such interventions are less important, because the conditions of urbanicity did not obtain, and
where they would not be far less likely to be provided even if there were no constraints), in order to ensure that such
interventions were made in cities. This helps explain why less densely populated areas actually received more federal
largesse during this time, according to Bateman and Taylor (2007).
99Katznelson and Mulroy (2012)
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to all cities, including those in the South, such as public housing and fair employment, as op-
posed to more decentralized and locally-administered. City representatives turned to alternative
or complementary strategies to pursue their city agenda. Political scientists have only occasion-
ally investigated how city blocs deal with the strategic challenge of marginal urgency, and they
look most often at the state level. While the urban-rural divide is more complicated at the national
level (because there are also important racial, regional, and sectional divides), it has long been
clearer and more enduring as the dominant cleavage structuring politics within many states with
large cities. In some states (such as Illinois, New York, and Michigan), a major city (eg. Chicago,
New York City, and Detroit) is often pitted against suburban and rural constituencies in partisan
and ideological struggle. In some cases, the main thing that non-city constituencies holds in com-
mon is its antipathy toward (or at least mistrust of) the major city. On many issues, these outstate
constituencies do not share much natural affinity. Regardless, the city is faced with the marginal
urgency problem: city representatives constitute a non-pivotal minority bloc—forged by of geo-
graphic proximity, some demographic similarity, and institutions of horizontal integration—that
must attract allies for their urban agenda, which usually demands adjustment of the status quo.100
2.4.4 Urbanizing
The third and fourth strategic “tools” have been identified as effective for pursuing “urban” in-
terests at the state level, and each has been apparent at different moments in national politics.
“Urbanizing” is a potentially powerful strategy cities employ in state legislatures to address their
urgent needs in the face of potentially hostile outstate forces is to “urbanize” a policy issue.101
This consists of a two-step process. First, a city bloc defines a problem as distinctively urban and
articulates an urban consensus position on the issue (and demonstrates that consensus by voting
100Again, the conditions of urbanicity mean that the status quo does not usually work for very long; social and
economic flux mean that policies must change to address new realities and associated governance challenges. Thus
city representatives must typically forge coalitions for positive action, not merely block policy changes that would
harm their cities (though they must do that as well).
101Though they do not use the term “urbanize,” this model is drawn from Burns et al. (2009)
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cohesively). Second, having established and demonstrated an urban consensus on the issue, city
members urge outstate copartisans, who should have weak prior commitments on such urban
issues, to defer to the wisdom of the city delegation and support the urban position.102 This strat-
egy is attractive because, if successful, it leads to the adoption of the city bloc’s preferred position.
However, it is also entails significant risk if relied upon as a primary strategy. First, it is premised
on city cohesion. As Burns et al. (2009) note, when the city bloc is divided, the non-city representa-
tives do not have a powerful cue to defer to, and may make up their own minds. Thus developing
a cohesive city delegation (or nationally, a cohesive urban political order) is a necessary condition
for this strategy. Second, it relies on the persuasive power of the city bloc to bring the non-city
votes along. Those non-city voters may not be persuadable, depending on the strength of the
urban-rural divide. They may, on a range of issues, choose not to defer to the city bloc’s position
precisely because they find “urban” positions anathema, leaving the urbanites without sufficient
support for their policy. This urbanizing strategy was employed as city Democrats were increas-
ingly the congressional force behind civil rights issues over the course of the urban interlude, the
subject of Chapter 5.
2.4.5 Affinity
Even more straightforward than urbanizing is an affinity strategy, in which a city bloc forges an
alliance with the next-most-urban constituencies, essentially emphasizing the urban-rural contin-
uum. This is what Daley seems to have wanted, based on his exchange with Rep. Celler in 1964.
Many years later, Weir and Wolman (2005) do identify such an emerging alliance between city
constituencies and inner-ring suburbs in Illinois. In this strategy, affinity between blocs is almost
natural, and based on common interests or preferences; the premise is that the interventions vital
for big-city governance are only a little less important for the next-most urban environments. To
pursue this strategy at the state level, the big-city bloc would pursue allies among suburban con-
102Burns et al. (2009)
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stituencies, especially those with important links to cities (the first-ring of suburban communities
in a metropolitan area, which are often older and increasingly face some of the same governance
challenges as central cities).103 On a national scale, the city bloc can build alliances with these
older suburbs, as well as with districts that are not in large metropolitan areas but which may
include one or more smaller cities, which may also be facing similar governance challenges and
consist of at least some urban built environments. In many cases, these smaller cities contain large
minority populations, another potential source of affinity (related to, but not identical with, ur-
banicity affinity) as political affiliations and identities are increasingly related to race and racial
issues.104 Surveying the contemporary political landscape, this is very much the composition of
“Blue” America today.
Pursuing an affinity strategy may reduce the material costs of maintaining a more diverse
coalition with logrolls, because the preferences of marginal members of the alliance (suburbs or
small cities, in this case) are closer to the preferences of the city bloc. In circumstances in which
ideology makes exchange or compromise very difficult, logrolls may be impossible in any case.
An alliance based on affinity also makes it more likely that city representatives hold important
leadership positions, and thus agenda power, because as the urban-rural divide is emphasized,
the least safe (ie, suburban or small-city, near the median of the urbanicity distribution) members
may face the most competition from the opposition, and therefore be junior members of the coali-
tion. This may contribute to polarization, as relatively extreme coalition members will be safest.
On the other hand, the affinity strategy also gives some leverage to the marginal additions to the
city bloc, because this is essentially a median-voter, minimum-winning coalition strategy, and im-
portant policy outcomes may reflect their preferences more than those of the “core” members of
the city bloc. This leverage may restrict the range of policies the city bloc may successfully pursue,
or simply shape the content of what policies may ultimately succeed, because of the character of
suburban politics.105
103Weir and Wolman (2005)
104Sears and Tesler (2010)
105Gainsborough (2001)
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2.5 Urban Politics in National Institutions
Beginning with the partisan consolidation of the nation’s large cities in the New Deal, urbanites
in Congress pursued each of these strategies, sometimes in combination, and instances of this are
observed in the following empirical chapters. A fundamental dysfunction ran through the Demo-
cratic Party of this era, which had as its key elements a rural remnant bloc from the “Solid South”
that was deeply conservative on both fiscal and (especially) racial issues, and a city bloc that was
driven by the logic of federalism to pursue a suite of progressive liberal, especially statist, poli-
cies at the national level in order to prevent catastrophe at home. The strategies pursued by city
representatives and the character of their behavior in Congress, were mimetic of the character and
values of the city representatives and the political traditions from which they emerged.
Many came from the “traditional party organizations,” common in Northern cities but rare
elsewhere, that emphasized a politics of party discipline, unity, local orientation, a preference for
materially distributive politics for core members, and largely symbolic recognition of peripheral
members.106 Mutual exchange is the primary currency in exchange for loyalty is the stock and
trade of such politics, and some efforts of city representatives to pursue this exchange are noted
in Chapter 3.
Along with these well-known qualities, however, the importance of these traditional organi-
zations’ inclusive traditions of cultural pluralism (values shared by the more “programmatic” lib-
erals with whom they were increasingly allied in national affairs) should not be underestimated;
this meant that white supremacy was not a necessary condition for politics they would support,
as it was for Southerners. While the pursuit of electoral success, for Southern Democrats, was
related to (or secondary to) the maintenance of white supremacy, city organizations had incorpo-
rated other “suspect” groups in the past and often actively sought black support at home when it
suited their political needs (these new constituencies were urbanites, after all) These efforts per-
manently alienated their national Southern allies over such issues. To bring a liberal position on
race to the national agenda, city representatives pursued an urbanizing strategy. Their role in this
106Mayhew (1986), Erie (1988)
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signal political change, which fulfilled the deep logic of the changes of a generation earlier, is the
subject of Chapter 5. For now, we turn to a description of the urbanicity cleavage and city power
in the national legislature.
CHAPTER 3. THE CITIES ON THE HILL 75
Chapter 3
The Cities on the Hill: Urban Power in
Congress
Reece: It happens that I come from a small city. Now, we do not look upon our sanita-
tion problem there as a federal problem.
Moses: If you lived here (in New York City), and you had New Jersey just across an
arbitrary line, you would feel differently about it.
—Exchange between Rep. Brazilla Reece
(of Johnson City, TN) and Robert Moses,
Hearing of Subcommittee on Public Works and Construction,
July 28, 1944
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3.1 The Urban Bloc(s) in Congress
In the introduction, we saw that the urban-rural partisan cleavage in the electorate today is stronger
than ever before, and closer analysis reveals that it is not solely a function of the increasing ethnic
and racial diversity of urban areas over that time period.1 While these individual-level prefer-
ences and behavior are important, they do not contribute decisively to policymaking. Ultimately,
the system of representation distills the preferences of individuals-in-communities into seats in the
legislature; thus this urban-rural divide may be re-presented within national political institutions.
Formally, however, representation is based on residence: legislators represent geographic con-
stituencies, not sectors of the economy or age cohorts or other possible cross-sections of society.2
A representative will represent a particular built environment and the persons that dwell within
it—and to the extent that urbanites, suburbanites, and ruralists are affiliated and represented dif-
ferently, this may create or intensify political conflict along this dimension. A 55-45 victory (in
percentage of the vote) is quickly exaggerated to 1-0 (in terms of seats) in a winner-take-all con-
stituency, so even seemingly small place-character effects can be magnified in the process of rep-
resentation. The increasing identification of one place-type with a particular political alliance or
ideology, moreover, may feed back into the system, prompting further geographic sorting, height-
ening polarization, and deepening division.3
1The average urbanite wasceteris paribus about 9 percent more likely to support Obama in 2008, even when we
account for other important factors known to be related to vote choice, such as ideology, race, income, religiosity, edu-
cation, age, and sex. Such a “small” place-character advantage may not only shift a district’s baseline disposition from
one party to another, but also make a district practically uncompetitive, though this effect would be smaller in the many
“mixed” districts that combine more than one character of place and in suburban districts, where voters are less dis-
tinctive in their partisan choices. Such safe districts may give representatives electoral slack and allow them to deviate
from the preferences of the district median voter, even without any insidious or overly partisan gerrymandering.
2Under the Voting Rights Act, some racial and ethnic minorities are identified as communities of interest that are
not strictly spatial, though the solution to their historic political marginalization has still been rooted in territory. The
controversy over the odd shapes of some of these districts reflects the dominant view of spatial proximity as the most
“natural” basis for representation in the U.S.
3It is very difficult to convincingly identify the causal relationship between residential location and geographic polit-
ical polarization. Gainsborough (2001) speculates that the processes are mutually reinforcing, at least in the suburbs—
that suburbs attract conservatives, who then become more conservative among like-minded neighbors. Bishop (2008)
makes a similar argument about the role of political homophily in residential sorting, though this claim is not uncon-
troversial. It is probably not only conservatives who are moving to suburbs, of course, as these areas have become
less Republican, in aggregate, since the 1960s. It is unclear whether analogous processes are at play in other kinds of
places—for instance, whether mostly liberals move to cities or conservatives are the most likely residents to remain in
rural areas. See Fiorina et al (2012) and Gimpel et al (2011).
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This study focuses on the relationships between local place-character, local political institu-
tions, and national representative institutions. Looking for the effects of local institutions in na-
tional politics is a fairly unusual path to take for a study of local politics, but it should not be.
The logic of federalism and the disciplining power of financial institutions do not determine the
character of every local outcome, but they do constrain cities seeking to promote progressive pol-
itics locally—particularly on questions of statism and public goods provision.4 As an alternative
or complement to at-home policies, urban political forces can organize at higher levels to shape
the broader contexts in which their communities govern themselves. From the earliest days of the
New Deal, such intergovernmental links were important in solidifying the nascent urban national
political order.5 Redistribution, labor law, regulatory policy, public works projects, and a host of
other market interventions are perhaps better planned and paid for at a national scale, where in-
terjurisdictional competition—between cities and between cities and their suburbs—is less of an
undermining force. Urbanicity predisposed city elites toward what we call a liberal position on
each of these interventions, and that position, when advanced, has typically been given voice in
national politics by the Democratic Party since at least the New Deal.
As a useful first empirical step, the focus of this chapter is to show how the growing urban-
rural political cleavage has manifested itself in Congressional power and how city issues have ap-
peared on the agenda over the long-dure´e. While previous studies have described urban power
in the House over a couple of decades, there has been no analysis of the power of city interests
over the century and a half since the consolidation of the national two-party system.6 While today
it is something of a truism that the Democratic Party is the “urban” party, the parties have not
always been organized along this continuum. Sectional conflicts, or long periods of fairly one-
sided national politics, have been more typical with no place-character divide.7 Theoretically and
4Peterson (1981), Hackworth (2007)
5Dorsett (1977), Biles (2011), Mayhew (1986)
6Mayhew (1966), Caraley (1976) (1976), Caraley (1992), and Wolman and Marckini (1998) examine different facets
of city representation over some parts of the postwar period. Lieberman (2009) takes a first step at quantifying city
representation over the longer scope of U.S. history, but does not account for within-state variation in place-character.
There does not seem to have been a study of city power in the Senate, perhaps because it is so difficult to tell whether
a Senator is “urban.” I take a first step toward such description in Appendix 3.
7Mayhew (1966) and Caraley (1976) each identify the Democrats as the party of the cities over different periods over
1940-1970, in analyses of the partisan breakdown on issues identified as especially important to cities.
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in practice, even if some political conflict is urban-rural, its partisan split need not be national; in
some places we could have the “typical” contemporary configuration, while in others Republican
cities could be surrounded by a Democratic outlying areas.
During the New Deal era, however, “local and national political entrepreneurs used federal
programs to introduce and solidify a new system of alignments in American politics.”8 Ever since,
the nationalization of the urbanicity-partisanship identity has spread, so now cities in all parts of
the country and of all ages tend to be more Democratic than their outlying areas, in the electorate
and in Congress. Given our present demographics (with an ever-increasing proportion of Ameri-
cans living in metropolitan areas, but also ever-increasingly in the growing suburban fringes), an
elite partisan politics with opponents arranged according to constituency place-character is likely
to be contentious and close-fought, as we have seen in the past few electoral cycles.
Analyses of city representation in Congress, and of the place of cities generally in the devel-
opment of national politics, have been too rare in political science.9 Previous studies focusing
explicitly on city representation in Congress have examined the influence of cities on legislators or
the power of city legislators in the chamber to pursue a distinctive urban agenda. In what may be
the first scholarly indication of the Congressional ideological-partisan sorting to come, Mayhew
(1966) finds that city Republicans were cross-pressured by constituency and party. On housing
roll calls from the 1950s, city Republicans voted against their party, ostensibly on behalf of their
constituents. Conversely, city Democrats found the same vote on those bills compatible with both
their urban constituencies and their national party—probably because they had formulated the
party position on such issues themselves. Among Democrats, however, there were high levels
of defection by non-city representatives, especially from the South, an important instance of the
conservative coalition. Though the urban-rural partisan divide had not yet matured in Congress
at this point, its seeds were clearly there. Wolman and Marckini (1998) systematically explore
the developing character and strategic position of the urban bloc over the three decades in which
suburban pre-eminence took hold, finding that city influence in Congress did not wane as much
as might be popularly believed, but that the growth of suburban constituencies (at the expense
8Mollenkopf 1980,p. 17
9Lieberman (2009)
CHAPTER 3. THE CITIES ON THE HILL 79
of “non-metropolitan” areas) has left Congress “thoroughly dominated by suburban representa-
tives.”10 This chapter updates and expands each of these endeavors, focusing on two strategic
“tools” available to the putative urban political order, cohesion and chamber leadership. Urban
cohesion has been strengthened by the cities’ continuing shift to the Democratic Party, and cham-
ber leadership among city representatives has been strengthened—but made brittle—by the out-
flow from the Democratic Party of non-city constitencies.
3.1.1 Measuring district urbanicity
To study city representation in Congress, we need some standard of what constitutes a “city”
district. Unlike states and persons, however, cities are accorded no formal representation in the
national legislature. Congressional district boundaries often blithely cross municipal boundaries,
so identifying an “urban” or “city” district may not be straightforward. Worthy approaches typi-
cally rely on the availability of Census data listing the districts’ proportion of rural, suburban, and
urban residents. Mayhew (1966) used this approach, combined with an accounting of percentage
in the district who rented their homes. Wolman and Marckini (1998) identify a district’s charac-
ter with its largest population group: central city, suburban in-metro, out of metro, or a mixture.
These studies represent the best examples of attempts to identify and track urban representatives
in the House using Census data.
These techniques are straightforward, but they share two shortcomings. First, comparing
across long timespans is not easy, as readily available census data for congressional districts only
go back a few censuses, so getting a long-term picture of city power or the urban-rural divide
may be impossible using this approach. To study the New Deal, for instance, another tack must
be taken. Second, the “central city” of a Census Bureau Metropolitan Area may not conform to
our idea of what a city is in national terms. Sioux City, Iowa, is the center of a small metropolitan
area, but it does not really conform to our intuitive understanding of a city because it is still very
10Wolman and Marnicki (2005) p.310
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small—we would not think of it when listing urban places, so should we consider a congressional
district anchored by such a place urban? Mayhew (1966) attempts a fix to this issue, by applying
threshold of percentage in the district who rent their homes. This approach appeals to a certain
dimension of what urban residential patterns are like, but it is too exclusive: it jettisons some dis-
tricts within large cities if they have too few renters, even if those residents are part of the large
political communities we call cities.
The alternative approach employed here is to identify a priori the locations of large cities at a
given time and then identify the districts that comprise these places. Lieberman (2009) defines
a standard of “city” that allows for consistent, intuitively satisfactory comparisons over time. A
place is considered a big city if its population constituted .1 percent of the total national popula-
tion in the most recent Census. This is a nice round number, and the actual list of cities it produces
fits well with what one would intuitively expect from such a list, but it is also theoretically com-
pelling: each modern congressional district (if they were exactly equal in size) makes up 1/435
of the nation, or .22 percent. Thus the .1 percent threshold is just shy of a majority of a district.
For a city to have its “own” district in Congress, it should at least be close to a majority of a Con-
gressional district.11 In this approach, size is the key definitional element in defining cities over
time: without a large population, a city cannot make a strong claim for representation in the legis-
lature, especially in the context of partisan conflict along an urbanity cleavage, where city is pitted
against hinterland.
Urbanicity scores for districts are created as follows. For each Census, Lieberman (2009) iden-
tified the cities that constituted at least .1 percent of the national population. Using this list and
congressional district atlases, I assign each congressional district a set of qualitative codes about
its composition and shape to create what I call “USR” data.12 Districts completely within a city
are given a qualitative code of “U” and a numeric score of 7 on a 1-7 “USR” scale. A mixed district
11Employing a more rigorous “big-city” standard of .11 percent yields an identical list of cities for the 20th century,
though the two lists do differ slightly during the 19th century.
12ie, “Urban-Suburban-Rural.” Fuller description of the Lieberman city list is in Lieberman (2009). To code districts,
I used maps from various sources. For current Congresses, very useful maps are available online through the Census
Bureau’s TIGER GIS collection. For recent pre-Internet congresses, the Congressional District Atlas of the United States
(Bureau of the Census, series begins 1960) is useful; for older congresses, Martis (1982) is an invaluable resource. Each
congressional district was given several qualitative scores by the author for this study, as detailed above and in the USR
scoring Appendix.
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split between central city and suburban areas would get a code of “U/S” or “S/U” and a score of
5 or 6 depending on the apparent balance between place characters.
As cities join or drop out of the Lieberman city set due to population changes, their districts’
USR scores change accordingly. I assume that cities that used to be large enough for inclusion
retain some urban character, so such districts are not immediately recoded as rural when their
central cities are downsized. For instance, Albany, NY, was once large enough to be a central city,
but it is not any longer, so its district’s code has changed from U/S to S/R/U over the years. Con-
versely, Fresno, CA, joined the dataset after the 1990 Census, and the districts geographic extent
shrank to reflect major population growth in the region, so its code has changed from R to U/S/R
(actually, two “U/S/R” districts and two “S/R” districts make up the Fresno metropolitan area).
Districts in states that have never had cities large enough to join the dataset, such as South Dakota
or Wyoming all receive codes of “R,” even though they do include some metropolitan areas.
The result is a dataset spanning American history that can allow us to see the character of
place-type representation in the national legislature, and to see the partisan distribution of these
different kinds of districts over a wider swathe of history than was possible before.13 In some
analyses below, the 7-category USR score is simplified to 3 categories (City/Urban, Suburban, and
Rural) for the sake of visual clarity; in regression analyses in subsequent chapters, the refined 7-
category variable is used unless otherwise noted. Figure 3.1 shows which cities made the list in
a few selected Censuses, as the American population spread from the East and North to greater
regional parity. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to some descriptive analyses of Con-
gressional history made possible by this dataset (referred to here as the Urban-Suburban-Rural, or
USR, data) follow.
13There is likely a high degree of overlap in the sets of districts identified as “city” districts by each of the the selection
mechanisms. For instance, using demographics, Mayhew (1966) identified 140 city districts for his time period of
study, 1947-1962. Using maps and the .1 percent population threshold, USR data classify an average of 143 as city
districts for Congresses during that time. The different selection rules mean that Mayhew would have more renter-
heavy districts from small cities, while the USR would have more districts with many homeowners in large cities.
Wolman and Marckini’s technique would code as “mixed” districts that include small central cities, while these would
most often be coded as rural in the USR data, because those cities do not reach the .1 percent threshold. Some of these
are captured in subsequent analyses with the USR data that attend to cities formerly, but no longer, large enough to
meet the threshold. The differences are at the margins, so broader claims about the size of the “city” bloc in Congress
are likely robust to different selection methods. The chief advantage of the USR data is its consistency over time where
more precise quantitative demographic data are unavailable or inconsistent.






































































































































Figure 3.2: Place-type representation over time. Congressional District urbanity distribution,
1865-2009. The graph at left depicts the distribution of place-types in the House. At right is the
same graph, with partisanship information. Source: USR data
3.1.2 City representation over time: the House of Representatives
Using the historical USR data, we can see how representation in Congress has shifted over time.
The story is not particularly counterintuitive, but for illustrative purposes it is worth re-telling
here. First, from the graph at left in Figure 3.2, we can see how the number of urban districts rose
in the early 20th century and levelled off just as the New Deal solidified. City representation in
Congress has not declined much in terms of overall numbers (though a closer look below reveals
that these city representatives are more diverse in their origins than they used to be). Since the
1930s, the real change has been in the growth in the number of suburban districts, from about ten
percent of seats to about one-third, while the share of rural districts diminished.14 The graph at
right in Figure 3.2 displays the partisan distribution of the different kinds of districts: dark blue
Democrats on the bottom of each category, red GOP seats above within each category. From this
14Judgement about the number of suburban districts is the biggest difference between USR data and Wolman and
Marnicki (2005); they put the figure at over fifty percent. See Appendix 1 for a discussion.
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figure, we can see the historical development of the urbanicity cleavage in Congress: from 1865 to
1929, city and rural districts were each alike in how they split between the parties (there were very
few suburban districts during this time, but they were all Republican), and both city and rural
districts were fairly responsive to national shifts: when one rose or fell a lot, so would the other,
as in the rapid sequence of partisan rotation in the 1890s.
After 1931, however, there was a large jump in the Democratic share of city districts, as the
New Deal assembled its city-based coalition of labor, newly mobilized “ethnic” whites, and even-
tually African Americans. Republicans regained some of these urban seats intermittently in the
40s and 50s, but as Mayhew (1966) notes, these urban Republicans had to “do violence to party
principles” when choosing to support many city-friendly policies.15 On the substance of urban
policy Democrats were better positioned to reconcile party programs and constituency pressure.
Thus, except for that dip in the 1940s, Democrats have held a large majority of urban districts
since the 1930s; since the 1960, that urban edge has been remarkably consistent even as the overall
strength of the parties nationwide has fluctuated. At the same time, the share of rural districts
held by Democrats fell, fairly gradually, until a big drop in the 1990s with the 1994 takeover of
the chamber by Republicans, in which many rural Southern districts were converted to the GOP
column. Until the 1960s the suburban middle zone of the graph was exclusively GOP territory, but
the Democrats have made some gains in this area since. By this time there were fewer total rural
districts in any case, as the suburbs grew, and large cities became more evenly spaced across the
country. The main observation from these graphs is that the development of the urbanicity cleav-
age in the national legislature over the 20th century has left us with Red Country and Blue Cities
in Congress as well as in the electorate: before the New Deal (and intermittently in the 1940s and
1950s) the two parties each featured sizeable city and rural factions, but this is far less true today.
The bottom half of the graph has gotten bluer, and the top half has gotten redder: this is a core
development in American politics in the past 80 years (not just recent cycles), and the institutional
corollary of the growth of the urban-rural divide in the electorate.
Within the set of city districts, two further observations are notable. First, we can see the par-
15Mayhew (1966), p.78
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tisan differential along the urbanicity dimension even within the set of city districts. City districts
come in many shapes, but there are four basic recurrent patterns (described more fully in the Ap-
pendix).
“Core” districts are part of a city (or in a few cases the entire city) and not very mixed with the
suburbs or rural areas. A city must be fairly large (roughly 4.5 percent of the national population,
or about a million people, today) to have more than one core district. “Metropolitan” districts en-
compass the entire metropolitan area and some outlying area, a common form for smaller cities.
“Sliced” and “Spillover” districts entail a mix of city, suburban, and/or rural contexts within a
metropolitan area with more than one district. Especially as America’s population has shifted to
the suburbs, and as redrawing district boundaries has become a more complicated affair, it is less
common for a district to be purely city, suburban, or rural, and core districts have diminished in
favor of slices and spillovers. Breaking urban districts into these four broad categories, an even
starker partisan picture emerges. Among core districts, only one was Republican as of 2011, and
Democrats have long predominated among representatives from these districts. The other kinds
of city districts are more evenly distributed between the two parties, though in each category
Democrats hold a majority.
The second broad observation is the increasing regional diversity of the city districts. We can
get a glimpse of this in Figure 3.1; the U.S. population has shifted dramatically from the North and
East to the South and West over the course of the twentieth century (as well as from the cities and
countryside to the suburbs), and this is reflected in the geographic dispersion of the set of cities
large enough to merit “their own” congressional representation. Figure 3.4 depicts the share of
total city districts coming from each of the four main regions of the country. For nearly a century,
more than half of all city representatives came from the Northeast, and another quarter from the
Midwest. Very few came from the West, and those from the South typically represented districts
that were grossly malapportioned, so even the larger Southern cities did not have core districts.16
By the late twentieth century, however, city representation in Congress had reached a point of
virtual regional parity: a city representative was as likely to come from the West or South as from
16For figures and trends in unequal district representation before the one-person, one-vote court cases of the early
1960s, see Snyder and Ansolabehere (2008).





















































Figure 3.3: City districts by type and partisanship.Core city districts are now almost exclusively
Democratic, while mixed districts are split between the parties. Source: USR data
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Figure 3.4: Proportion of all city districts by region. While city representatives came overwhelm-
ingly from the Northeast and Midwest until midcentury, today city districts are evenly spread
across the country. On a related note, while the number of total city representatives has not di-
minished, there are far fewer representatives from cities with a history of strong traditional party
organizations. Source: USR data
the Northeast or Midwest—even slightly more likely to come from these faster-growing regions.
This regional shift surely colors the content of any urban agenda, but what is most notable about
this change is that despite increasing geographic diversity the urban bloc has become more cohe-
sive, in partisan terms as we can see from Figure 3.2, and in terms of finer-grained measures of
congressional behavior such as roll call votes, as we shall see below. The urban political order is
more national than ever before.
As a byproduct of the dispersion of city districts to the south and west, there has been an
institutional change as well. One of the key institutions of horizontal integration, fostering greater
city delegation unity, is the traditional party, as we shall see in the next two chapters. These or-
ganizations are found mainly in cities, and mainly in the Northeast and Midwest. The subfigure
at right in 3.4 shows that the number of city representatives coming from places with traditional
party organizations (for this figure, TPO greater than 3 on Mayhew’s measure) has been in decline
since midcentury. Though the intracity power of most of these local parties has been diminished
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significantly since the early 20th century, important elements of their style of politics and integra-
tive potential remain in the cities where they continue to exist. Because of this qualitative and
numerical decline in TPO power, analyses (in Chapters 4 and 5) of the role of these institutions in
binding together the city delegations that are at the heart of the urban order will focus mainly on
the Long New Deal era, when the effects of traditional parties were of peak importance in national
politics.
The growing identity of the Democratic Party with its city constituency can also be seen by
simply depicting Democrats as a share of city representatives—and, vice versa, city representa-
tives as a share of Democrats in Congress. The two subfigures in Figure 3.5 tell the story again,
with closer attention to different outcomes of interest: most city representatives are Democrats,
and an increasing share of Democrats are from cities, nearly a majority of the party since the final
departure of the South in the 1990s. After the 2010 losses, city representatives actually constituting
a narrow majority of the Democratic caucus. At no time in our history has there been a more urban
party—a party more identified with cities, their citizens, and all that entails—than the contempo-
rary Democratic Party. This trend contributes to the strength of city power in the chamber, as we
will see in the analysis of House cartel members below: as city representatives become a larger
share of a major party, they become potentially more powerful when that party is in the majority,
but more powerless when they are not.
The sequence of the growth of the urbanicity divide is important: according to the model
argued in this study, urban constituencies became distinctive first, advanced their policy goals
in a manner shaped by the conditions of urbanicity and institutions of horizontal integration, and
more conservative, rural areas reacted away from them. We can see this sequence, and measure the
cleavage more clearly than in Figure 3.2 by tracking Group Seats Fractionalization (GSF), a sum-
mary measure akin to weighte disproportionality that clarify the differences between groups.17
17GSF is equivalent to GVF or Group Voting Fractionalization, an adaptation of Gallagher disproportionality, clarified
to refer to seats instead of votes. GVF is a method of comparing the voting behavior of different groups by measuring
the extent to which group identity is associated with vote choice. It is a quick, intuitive way of studying cleavages in
an electorate. GVF is developed in Huber (2010) as an approach to studying ethnic voting. The formula for GVF is
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Figure 3.5: Partisanship and place-type over time. Democrats are a stable majority of urban seats,
and urban representatives are for the first time a very slight majority of Democrats. Source: USR
data
Using city, suburban, and rural district characters as groups, Figure 3.6 illustrates that the urban-
rural cleavage has grown in the House, spiking first in the New Deal, again in the 1960s, and again
the 1990s until it is as high as ever in our contemporary congress. At right are the unweighted el-
ements of GSF for each place-type are plotted over time. This measure, Seats Disproportionality
(SD), is the the difference between each group and the overall chamber. Urban districts first be-
came distinctive in the 1930s; over time, the suburbs have become much less distinctive in their
partisan representation as they have grown in number and become less homogeneously Republi-
can. Rural districts, however, have become increasingly distinctive—in favor of the G.O.P.—since
where V is the share of votes from each of G groups g for each of P parties/candidates p, weighted by s, the proportion
of each group g in the electorate. In essence, it is the divergence of each group from the overall electorate, weighted by
group’s proportion in the electorate. Essentially, as groups become more different in their voting choice, the measure
rises. The minimum possible value is 0 and the maximum possible is 1. The original Gallagher Index is from Gallagher
(1991). Here the groups are based on place-character (Urban, suburban, rural), not ethnicity. The intuition of the
measure is the association between district place character and party, or “how likely would you be to guess the place
character of a representative’s constituency if all you knew about him or her was party membership?”
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Figure 3.6: Group-fractionalization by district place-character. Congressional partisanship has
become more organized around the urbanity dimension over time, indicated by the general rise
in GSF (using place-character-types as groups) in the plot at left. At right, the general increase in
place-character disproportionality is disaggregated. The increase in the overall measure is driven
by the sharp and then gradual increase in distinctiveness in urban representatives beginning in
the 1930s and the recent drift of rural representatives to the GOP. Suburban representatives have
become much less distinctive. Source: USR data
The absolute magnitudes of GSF measures are not easily interpreted, but we can see that ur-
banicity is important by contrasting that cleavage with the other variable commonly seen at the
heart of the Red-Blue divide. The typical narrative about political polarization today usually in-
volves the “Red” and “Blue” states, which are usually grouped on a roughly regional basis. In
Congress, at least, regional division has fallen since a peak around midcentury, though it has in-
deed seen a resurgence over the last decade. We can see this in Figure 3.7, which shows changes
in GSF since 1865 at left and in SD at right.18
18In this plot, I employ the Census “Region” definition, which has four regions. Using the “Division” definition,
which divides the country into ten groups of states that are closer to pieces of the “Red-Blue” map (and which are
themselves nested in the Regions) yields very similar aggregate results, and also reveals that the increasing distinctive-
ness of the Northeast is attributable mostly to changes in New England. The simpler regional results are shown here
for clarity’s sake.
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Figure 3.7: Group-fractionalization by district region. Congressional partisanship was more di-
vided along regional lines, especially in the “Solid” South, for the century following the Civil War.
After a decrease to almost zero, division along regional lines has risen over the last decade, driven
mostly by changes in New England and the South. Source: USR data
The foregoing description of city representatives in the House of Representatives over time
leaves us with two important new observations: first, the urbanicity cleavage has matured in two
main steps since 1933. Initially, city districts became disproportionately Democratic in 1933, forg-
ing a national urban political order and initiating a trend that continues to the present. Then,
beginning in the mid-1960s, suburban districts became less distinctively Republican (while con-
tinuing to become more numerous) while rural districts became more distinctively Republican
(and less numerous). Before the New Deal, place character was not an important dimension of
partisanship at the national legislative level; since then, the cleavage has grown in importance
and become more monotonic—the more “city-like” a district is, the more likely to be Democratic.
The second observation is related to the first, and will be more fully elaborated on in the next
section, on actual legislative behavior by these city representatives. City legislators have become
more Democratic even as they have become more diverse geographically. At the beginning of
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the New Deal, 80 percent of city representatives came from what would become the Rust Belt of
the Northeast and the Midwest (see Figure 3.4). With its fairly similar patterns of settlement, in-
dustrial relations, civil war legacies, such a bloc might seem easier to hold together than a bloc
representing city constituencies evenly spread across the four major regions of the country. Yet
we do see greater partisan similarity among cities even as the list of cities becomes more diverse.
City representatives are more stably Democratic than they were at mid-century, and they are more
cohesive as a voting bloc. The maintenance and development of this geographically diverse coali-
tion is rooted in the common city experiences that are shared across cities from diverse regions.
These include the city-killing forces of deindustrialization and suburbanization, but also the basic
characteristics of urbanicity, which fostered common responses to such challenges, and common
national goals, even among cities that shared little politically before the construction of the urban
political order.
3.2 Urban Power in the House
Cities across the country have become more identified with the Democratic Party over the past 80
years. The governance demands associated with urbanicity in the wane of the Fordist industrial
era, and the intensifying constraints cities face, have prompted the growth of a substantive city
agenda in national politics since the New Deal. This growing urban agenda marked a departure
from the past in large part because many of its policies dealt directly with the uncertainties and
challenges of modern urban life, and the work by city representatives to articulate and advance
such measures from the New Deal on have been described in detail elsewhere.19
However, even if a national urban agenda has become more important for cities, city districts
have not become more numerous. Given that city districts make up at most a third of the leg-
islature, pursuing an urban agenda requires strategy and institutional leverage. In this section,
I explore key elements that might foster legislative success for cities in the legislature, given the
19Gelfand (1975), Biles (2011)
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obstacles presented by an urban-rural partisan divide. Three strategic imperatives present them-
selves in pursuit of any such non-majority bloc’s goals: attain leadership positions to influence
the agenda; be cohesive, especially when cities and other kinds of places do not agree; and gain
reliable allies with either common interests or with a propensity to logroll or compromise, provid-
ing extra votes for the city bloc. The remainder of this chapter analyzes different aspects of these
strategic concerns.
3.2.1 Chamber power positions
Within Congress, the increasing identification of the parties with different kinds of places has led
to the potential for institutional exaggeration of the smaller urbanity cleavage in the electorate.
This place character divide may be further exaggerated if the leadership of the two parties are
also sorted by place character. In the House of Representatives, the majority party has signifi-
cant control over the legislative agenda.20 This agenda power allows significant control over what
kinds of policies are considered for change: according to the cartel agenda model, the leadership
group allows a bill to the floor only when the majority party median prefers the bill to the status
quo. Though this agenda power is mostly negative agenda power, membership in the leadership
group of the House majority is quite valuable, especially for a subpartisan group like the city bloc
that may struggle to achieve chamber majorities.21 In particular, the majority median, committee
chairs, majority party members of important committees, and party floor leadership have outsize
influence on substantive agendas and the precise content of legislation. For all these reasons, an
analysis of the power of the urban bloc in congress should attend to the personnel in these struc-
tural positions. Here, I explore how successful city representatives were in securing leadership
positions, becoming members of the cartel that could control action in the House.
For over fifty years, beginning with the New Deal, the diverse Democratic Party alliance held
20Cox and McCubbins (2004)
21Wolman and Marnicki (2005), Mayhew (1966), Mollenkopf (1983)
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almost uninterrupted majority status in the House of Representatives. Many of the key legislative
battles that took place during this time were as much between different factions of the Democratic
Party as between Democrats and Republicans.22 The most famous struggle was between (mostly
rural) Southerners, who had been the core of the party since Reconstruction, and (mostly urban)
Northerners, many but not all of whom were relative “newcomers” to the Democratic team. Thus,
while the city wing often enjoyed greater numbers and closer links to Democratic Presidents, the
moderate/conservative southern wing had advantages in ideological centrality and seniority.
City power within the House cartel has not tracked broad city representation in the chamber.
The overall number of city representatives in the House grew for roughly the first third of the
century, and then plateaued between 135 and 145 seats to the present day, accounting for about
one-third of House members, as illustrated in Figure 3.2. Within the leadership, however, the pat-
tern was more uneven but also potentially more promising for the city institutional order.23 The
first subfigure in Figure 3.8 estimates the agenda-setting power of representatives from different
place-types over time, plotting the proportion of members of the legislative cartel—members of
the majority party leadership and committee chairs—who represent city constituencies. As in Fig-
ure 3.2, the dark grey shaded area at the foot of the figure represents city representatives, the light
grey is suburban, and the white area on top is representatives from outside major cities’ metropoli-
tan areas. The endpoint of the urban series in the 112th congress is indicated with a small circle
for visibility. Overlaid on the shaded series from each type of place are vertical lines indicating
Congresses when the chamber’s leadership changed hands (there was Republican control before
1931, for one congress in the 1940s, and from 1995-2007), a horizontal line at .5, and a black line
showing the proportion of overall seats in the House held by city representatives (as in Figure 3.2).
This subfigure tells a dramatic tale. While city representation in the legislature has been fairly
steady, as indicated by the black line hovering around .3, city inclusion in the leadership has been
volatile: the dark grey shaded area careens up and down over the black line representing city
22Lieberman (2001), Katznelson (2012)
23Another way in which the trajectory of city power has not tracked the overall plateaued representation of cities is
a result of the continued partisan sorting by place-character. In addition to the leadership, another important player
in the cartel model is the majority party median, to whom the leadership is responsive. Over time, as the share of
Democrats representing cities has grown (See Figure 3.5) the median Democrat is likely a city representative, though
the median voter surely is not.
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share in the legislature. By the late 1930s, city representatives made up nearly half of all lead-
ership positions, peaking in the 77th Congress, including John McCormack (Boston) as Majority
Leader, Adolph Sabath (Chicago) as chairman of the Rules Committee, and Mary Norton (Jer-
sey City) as chair of Labor. New York City alone had six committee chairmen in its delegation
in the 77th Congress, though none had particularly important portfolios. The city’s place within
the Democratic chamber leadership dropped precipitously during the postwar era, despite mostly
Democratic chamber control. This was an era in which some northern city districts were closely
contested, and a wave of quick reversals—seats shifting Democrat-Republican-Democrat over a
very few congresses—erased city seniority among Democrats in some cases, and there were also
some notable retirements among old-guard city Democrats during this time. Beginning in the
1950s, however, city power in the Democratic leadership grew until they achieved a numerical
majority during the 1980s. In the 101st congress, half of the chamber’s key roles were filled by city
representatives including: Speaker; Majority Leader; Majority Whip, and the chairs of Rules;24
Ways and Means; Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs; Education and Labor; and Public Works
and Transportation. After a half-century of contending with the powerful conservative Southern
wing of the party, city representatives had established control over important areas of city legisla-
tion. While the urban interlude is often seen as the peak of city power, a strong case for the 1980s
can be made as well, at least in this important representative institution.
Of course, this moment of city rule was short-lived. The loss of the House by Democrats in the
1990s was not evenly experienced across different kinds of places: there were few Republicans to
represent cities in the legislature, and the city presence in the House leadership dropped quickly,
replaced by a largely suburban, but increasingly rural, Republican leadership. By 2005, only 2 of
the 27 House cartel members were from cities, the lowest level of city power on this measure since
the 83rd Congress.25 This was also a half-century high tide for rural membership in the cartel.
With the frequent changes in House leadership in recent years, city representation in leadership
has become even more extreme. After the Democratic gains of 2006 and 2008, city representatives
24Claude Pepper’s district included Miami
25Before that, we need to go back to before the Civil War to find comparably weak representation of cities in the
leadership.
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made up a greater share of the cartel than ever before, including the Speakership, and chairs of
Ways and Means, Commerce, Foreign Affairs, Veterans Affairs, and Judiciary; after 2010, they
were back to near-historic lows.
City representatives’ ties to the Democrats, their increasing seniority, and the wane of secure
non-city Democrats has meant that city representatives have often been over-represented in the
leadership when Democrats have been in control of the House, and under-represented when Re-
publicans have controlled the chamber.26 Wolman and Marnicki (2005) attribute much of this tie
between Democratic majority and city power to the increasing seniority of many city Democrats.
Their findings, which end in 1995-6, have been amplified by the broad swings in city power in
the prior and ensuing decades. As the city-country divide has grown in the chamber as a whole,
and in the electorate as well, the institutional implications for cities in the nation have become
something of a feast or famine: when Democrats control the House, city representatives make up
more of the leadership than ever; when the GOP controls the agenda, city representatives are not
included in the leadership.
The other subfigures in Figure 3.8 reinforce the narrative of chamber power for city represen-
tatives. In each figure, the partisan place-character divide is illustrated within sets of represen-
tatives with particular power over city issues. The central panel includes the proportion from
each kind of place on the “prestige” committees: Rules, Appropriations, Ways and Means, and
Budget.27 These committees have broad jurisdictions that impact virtually all significant policy,
so members of these committees may be particularly powerful. City and suburban representation
on these committees have grown, and rural representation diminished, roughly parallel with the
proportions in the chamber as a whole. Even more than in Figure 3.2, the partisan place-character
divide is amplified on these powerful committees. This changes somewhat with shifts in chamber
control—the membership proportions of these committees somewhat exaggerate chamber pro-
portions as a whole, and a couple more city Republicans are assigned when their party is in the
majority—but generally holds true. Finally, the subfigure at right shows membership by place
26This analysis builds on Wolman and Marnicki (2005), filling in gaps, including more votes, extending the series
forward and back, and refining the set of majority party leaders based on Cox and McCubbins (2004).
27This list of prestige committees is from Wolman and Marnicki (2005), who adopt it from Smith and Deering (1990).
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Figure 3.8: City representation in House leadership over time. At left, members of House lead-
ership cartel, by urbanicity. Middle, membership in House prestige committees by urbanicity and
party. Right, membership on House Finance (Banking/Urban Affairs) Committee by urbanicity
and party. Vertical dashed lines indicate change in House majority control. Source: USR data,
Charles Stewart Committee Roster Data
character and party on the most important House committee for city issues, Financial Services.28
On this committee, cities have always been overrepresented, especially around the middle of the
last century, when city representatives made up over half of the committee (vs. a third of the
chamber), because of the committee’s important role in oversight of large housing and urban
development programs. Suburban Republicans have since become more numerous, while rural
representation on this committee has greatly diminished. On issues controlled by this committee,
which include urban and regional development, and many of the specific programs established to
help cities manage the paradox of urban governance, the dividing lines between city Democrats
and non-city Republicans are particularly clear.29
28This committee was formerly known as the Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, but the urban affairs were
dropped in 1995 when Republicans assumed the majority, a title change that in itself reflects the parties’ attitudes
toward city issues. The correspondent committee in the Senate remains Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
29Caraley (1976)
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Taken together, these analyses of place character in leadership and on important committees
reinforces two observations. The clearest long-run historical trend here is the diminution of rural
power on committees and in leadership. Rural interests were once dominant in the most impor-
tant institutions within the House, but city and suburban representatives, and ostensibly their
perspectives, now predominate. The exception to this trend is that when Republicans are in con-
trol, rural representatives do have an outsize share of power positions, though still less than they
once did. The other important observation is the volatility in city power that results from the
place-character partisan divide. Before the GOP takeover of the 1990s, just under a half of House
committee chairs were from urban districts, and the proportion of committee chairs from differ-
ent kinds of places had held fairly steady for two decades (though there was a gradual increase
in the share that went to suburban representatives). Since the mid-90s takeover, however, when
Republicans have had a majority of House seats, less than five committees have been headed by
urbanites; when Democrats have held a majority, more than half of House committees chairs have
come from city districts. This may be due to aging-out or defeat of partisans who did not fit
the place-character dimension; representatives more naturally compatible with their districts (ie,
those whose party affiliation and district character match the partisan character of the urbanic-
ity cleavage) can more easily accrue seniority as the place-type sorting of Congress continues.30
As in the electorate and in the legislature as a whole, the place-character cleavage has matured
within legislative party leadership. Even at the very top of the parties’ leadership the divide is
clearly present. The contrast in style and self-presentation between Barack Obama and, say, Sarah
Palin or George W. Bush is obvious. But within Congress the urbanicity divide is manifest as well.
Among the past four Speakers of the House—Newt Gingrich, Dennis Hastert, Nancy Pelosi, and
John Boehner—each represent constituencies in synch with their party’s placement on the urban-
icity spectrum.
30Wolman and Marckini (1998)
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3.2.2 The Urban Agenda
What were some effects of the consolidation of city representatives within the Democratic Party?
During the urban interlude, one obvious change was the ascent of important urban issues to the
national agenda. Many of the major New Deal programs dealt with individuals—social security
and the large welfare state programs, changes in labor regulation, and so on—but there were also
major changes in the way the national government related to cities. One place this is evident is in
the agenda of House hearings, which reflect salient concerns of the day that at least some mem-
bers believe merit national attention.31
Representatives from cities that were (now more obviously) vulnerable to sudden collapse un-
der conditions of capitalism and federalism began to support a program of national economic
regulation, but a bigger change was in the relationship between the nation and municipalities
would be, channeling aid of all sorts to urban centers. Over the course of the 1930s, city represen-
tatives made federal aid to cities a major element of national policy, and as time went by it would
become an increasingly important source of overall revenue for cities themselves.32
Before 1930, when the federal government considered aid to local government, it was almost
exclusively for rural areas in response to natural accidents. After 1930, aid was increasingly
thought of as a response to market conditions, to help cities weather economic storms and struc-
tural adjustment.33 We can see this from Table 3.1, which is a list of all hearings that relate to
federal aid to local governments from 1900-1940.34 In this table, the gray rows indicate those that
are primarily about city or urban issues. This was determined by the substance of the hearings
and the witnesses who appeared before the committee: on topics that were possibly urban, wit-
ness lists that were primarily persons from or representing cities were taken as signs that this was
31Much of the story of the rise of urban issues to the national agenda has been told well elsewhere, eg. Gelfand
(1975). Here, I add observations specifically germane to the urbanicity paradox (high demand, constrained resources
for governance) and to the strategies city representatives pursued to overcome their situation of marginal urgency.
32Caraley (1976)
33Dreier, Mollenkopf and Swanstrom (2004), ch. 4
34This list was assembled from a search of the LexiNexis Congressional Hearings database using the search terms
“federal aid to local governments” and “federal aid to municipalities,” two standard subjects for hearings, and searched
between 1900 and 1940 for this table. Extending the search back in time produces only a few more hearings in the
results; extending it forward toward the present produces hundreds more. 1930-33 is clearly an inflection point where
the substance and frequency of these hearings changed dramatically.
CHAPTER 3. THE CITIES ON THE HILL 100
a “city” issue. Topics that were obviously not urban, such as “Forestry,” were coded as non-urban.
Early in the century, federal aid was considered for many particular agricultural and hydrological
purposes. Flood control was a primary concern—indeed, before 1930, the only hearing that was
primarily relevant to a city was about flood control in Pittsburgh.
By contrast, after 1930 (and especially after 1932), as the Depression set in and hit the indus-
trial cities of the North particularly hard, federal aid was considered for a much larger portfolio of
policies, most of them primarily targeting urban areas. Unemployment relief, road building, and
public works were frequently considered for federal aid, and funds were ultimately appropriated
for these purposes. This marked a shift in the target and scope of federal aid to local governments.
As Fiorello LaGuardia put it in a 1937 hearing on housing, “If anyone had suggested. . . 10 years
ago that mayors would come to Washington to talk about housing with the congress it would
seem so extreme and so far-fetched as to receive no serious consideration.”35 Aid in these areas
was conceived of or adjusted to help cities more than it had before; while these kinds of poli-
cies could ostensibly benefit all kinds of communities, city leaders and representatives staunchly
supported these programs, and cities certainly gained great benefits from them.36
Hearings about federal aid to local governments, 1900-1940.
Hearing title Year
Agricultural Education and . . . the Oleomargarine Law 1908
Sites and Plans for Public Buildings 1910
Compensation for Use of Highways 1912
Good Roads. 1913
Urgent Deficiency Bill, 1915 1914
Donation of Land, Malden, Mass. 1914
Flood Control at Pittsburgh, Pa. 1918
Farm Organizations 1921
Umpqua River, Bar, and Entrance, Oregon 1922
Forestry 1922
Aswell Agricultural Extension Bill 1924
County Agents in Flood-Stricken Areas . . . for South Carolina
Continued on next page
35“To Create a U.S. Housing Authority,” Senate Committee on Education and Labor. April 14, 1937. HRG-1937-EDS-
0013. p.100
36Unemployment in large industrial cities was higher than the national average, and the potential for unrest there
made increased or extended relief particularly valuable. Though massive roadbuilding projects were already contribut-
ing to city-killing suburbanization by the 1920s, city officials supported them from the start because of the massive local
stimulus they provide.?
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Table 3.1 – continued from previous page
Hearing title Year
Flood Control. Part 1: Mississippi River and Its Tributaries 1927
Flood Control. Part 3: Mississippi River and Its Tributaries 1927
Cooperative Agricultural Extension Work 1927
Flood Control. Part 4: Mississippi River and Its Tributaries 1928
Flood Control. Part 5: Mississippi River and Its Tributaries 1928
Loans for Relief of Drainage Districts 1930
River and Harbor Bill 1930
Unemployment Relief 1931
Nontaxable Indian Lands 1931
Emergency Appropriation. . . in Rural Sanitation, etc. 1931
Flood Control, Drainage, Levee Districts 1931
Unemployment Relief 1932
Roads 1932
Rehabilitation of Storm-Stricken Areas 1932
Establishment of Administration of Public Works 1932
Roads 1932
Boston Harbor, Mass. 1932
Federal Aid Highway Legislation 1932
Drainage, Levee, Irrigation and Similar Districts 1932
Loans for Relief of Drainage Districts 1932
Relief to Municipalities 1933
National Industrial Recovery 1933
To Amend the Emergency and Construction Act of 1932 1933
Surplus Navy Coal for Distribution to Needy at Nominal Prices 1933
Hearing on H.R. 13026, To Amend Section 546, Title 34, of the U.S. Code 1933
Further Unemployment Relief Through the RFC 1933
Loans by the RFC To Aid Public Schools 1933
Additional Public Works Appropriations 1934
Roads 1934
To Provide Loans Through RFC 1934
Revision of Laws Concerning Bankruptcy of Drainage Districts 1935
Revision of Municipal Districts Bankruptcy Filing Procedures 1935
Revision of Municipal Districts Bankruptcy Filing Procedures 1935
Payments in Lieu of Taxes on Resettlement Projects 1936
RFC Aid To Refinance Indebtedness . . . in Conservation Areas 1936
Service Charges on Federal Slum Clearance Projects 1936
R.F.C. and Federal Housing Loans for Municipal and Flood Relief 1936
U.S. Housing Act of 1936 1936
Stream Pollution 1936
To Create a U.S. Housing Authority 1937
Comprehensive Flood Control Plan for Ohio and Lower Mississippi Rivers 1937
River and Harbor Bill. 1937
Amendments to U.S. Housing Act of 1937 1938
Continued on next page
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Table 3.1 – continued from previous page
Hearing title Year
Loans to Public Agencies and Business Enterprises by RFC 1938
Public Buildings and Grounds 1938
Rehabilitation of Drainage Works, . . . Ottawa National Forest 1939
To Amend the U.S. Housing Act of 1937 1939
Federal Cooperation in Development of Airports 1940
Construction of Hospitals 1940
Table 3.1: Hearings about federal aid to local governments,
1900-1940. Hearings primarily about aid to cities high-
lighted in gray. Source: LexisNExis Congressional Hearings
database
Urban issues, especially programs that would help cities qua cities, were brought to the na-
tional agenda in earnest in the urban interlude. The constraints faced by cities, and the urgency
with which they sought federal help for relief, were severe, but the use of the federal government
for such purposes was not uncontroversial. From even before Roosevelt’s election in 1932, a dif-
ference in attitude toward federal aid to cash-strapped local polities was apparent even among
Democrats from different kinds of districts. In 1932, for instance, several bills for unemployment
relief were considered in a Senate hearing. The bills were written by senators from the urban in-
dustrial states (Wagner from New York, Bulkley from Ohio, Barbour from New Jersey, and Davis
from Pennsylvania. Barbour and Davis were in the Republican majority, Wagner and Bulkley
were Democrats). At this hearing, the three perspectives on government activity that would per-
sist throughout the Long New Deal were already in evidence. Wagner, who was already the face
of urban liberalism in the Senate, advocated for large-scale unemployment relief in the form of
public-works construction financed by a combination of grants, loans, and bonds by the national
government to the states through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.37 He was supported
37“Unemployment Relief.” Senate Committee on Banking and Currency Hearing, June 2-13, 1932. (HRG-1932-BCS-
0008)
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by a bipartisan group of senators with close ties to industrial cities: Bulkley had formerly repre-
sented Cleveland in the House; James Couzens (R-MI) was a former mayor of Detroit; and James
Davis (R-PA) was a former union official and civic organizer from Pittsburgh.
Wagner and his allies met with resistance from Secretary of the Treasury Ogden Mills, who
voiced the administration’s chief concerns of maintaining a balanced budget (the bond issue
would constitute deficit spending) and the efficiency of government-financed public works as
a means for relieving unemployment. Mills’s
fundamental objection is that it unbalances the budget; that it resorts to the unsound
device of an extraordinary budget, that it breaks down a sound financial policy pur-
sued since the beginning of the government. . . These figures prove beyond question
that this method of attack is wholly ineffective in solving the unemployment prob-
lem. . . It becomes all the more necessary when you consider that an unbalanced budget
and the abandonment of sound financial practices will cause a further shock to public
confidence, tend to retard business recover, and so not only prevent re-employment on
a large scale, but very possibly add to the number of those already unemployed.38
While Mills supported emergency grants to states and small loans to businesses in an effort to
jump-start production, he voiced concerns that the program as designed would allocated funds to
all states, including large, relatively wealthy ones, which he argued should be able to fund these
projects themselves:
I know of no conceivable reason why great, rich states like New York and Pennsylvania
should receive a grant from the federal treasury or be invited to accept one. They are
well able to take care of their own. The bill should be so drafted as to provide for an
emergency fund for the states that need it; not for a gratuitous distribution to all states
on a per capita basis irrespective of need or resources.39
This perspective ignores the intrastate urban-rural divides that cities like New York faced, which
made it difficult for New York City to get much help from Albany. It also ignores the broader
constraints inherent in the logic of federalism, which provides a “conceivable reason” why even
relatively wealthy states would be smart to pursue such essentially redistributive interventions
38HRG-1932-BCS-0008, p. 14-15
39HRG-1932-BCS-0008, p. 17
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through national policy.
In the hearing, Mills came under attack from the city senators (from both parties) for his con-
tention that public works were not effective or efficient means of providing unemployment relief
and of spurring other industries, but their main contention was that under the urgent conditions
of the Depression, massive action must be taken by the national government. He mainly found
support, however, from a pair of conservative Southern Democrats on the committee, Carter Glass
of Virginia and Thomas Gore of Oklahoma. These two represented the older strain of the Demo-
cratic Party, having been in the chamber for over a decade each (of the aforementioned “urban”
Senators, only Couzens had arrived in the chamber before the late 1920s). While Mills was chiefly
concerned with keeping a balanced budget, and generally supportive of emergency aid to states
in principle, Glass and Gore went further, emphasizing the principle of state self-reliance. Glass
stated plainly that he was “opposed to the whole business. I don’t think a state has a right to exist
that can not take care of its own interests.”40
Wagner responded that his bill had a purpose of “giving relief to the destitute where the facts
justify it. . . and that is where we are working toward opposite objectives.” For him, action by
the national government was the appropriate response to the nationwide economic crisis.41 With
New Yorkers Roosevelt and Smith again preparing bids for the Democratic presidential nomina-
tion, Mills argued that the appropriate source of funds for relief of unemployment in New York
was the State of New York:
The question is, whether they are going to get those funds from their own people,
or are going to the federal government for them. New York . . . need[s] funds for relief
work today. But the question is whether the governor of the State of New York is going
to call the state legislature into session and ask additional income taxes let us say, for
relief purposes; whether he would call upon the great wealth of New York to meet the
situation, or whether he will avoid that responsibility and come to Washington to get
it.42
40HRG-1932-BCS-0008, p. 17
41At this point, Wagner, Roosevelt and other leading progressives such as Republicans LaFollette and LaGuardia
were avowedly opposed to deficit spending on principle (Leuchtenburg (1963), p.37), but the inclusion of bond issuance
for these loan programs presages the later adoption of Keynesian countercyclical budgeting.
42ibid, p.17
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Glass agreed, calling
“so-called federal aid the biggest humbug on earth. You get money from the states and
bring it on here and land it in the treasury, and then you dole it back to them.”43
The conservative Southern position voiced by Glass was roughly in agreement with the admin-
istration, and emphatically not with the bipartisan city position. Later in the hearing, Gore also
took this position, arguing that increased aid to states would lead to a state “ceas(ing) to be a body
sovereign and becom(ing) a department like the departments of France.”44
But the Southerners did not agree with Mills on everything. Glass and Gore also criticized
government intervention on behalf of businesses, which was the core of Mills’s position. Glass
lamented that “Ordinarily when private industry no longer has any credit it closes up, and it
ought to close up. . . I am old fashioned. I do not understand these modern devices,”45 while Gore
wondered
What is the difference between government ownership and government wet-nursing?. . . The
contention is that there should not be government ownership. A large group of people
look upon it with bitter criticism and horror and yet it is proposed that the government
shall set up a wet-nursing establishment—the RFC—and collect taxes from the people
and loan money to public utilities and everything else that comes along. . . 46
Gore also saw some hypocrisy on the part of businesses calling for state intervention in crises:
In normal times whenever mention is made of the government engaging in private
business, a chorus is raised against it, but in hard times they raise a chorus in favor of
it. ”Come over and help us”, they cry.47
On distributive matters, Glass and Gore agreed that “the government ought not to go into your
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New York” were unacceptable (even as they agreed that relatively wealthy New York paid more
in taxes than Virginia or Oklahoma, both overall and per capita). They were joined by Duncan
Fletcher (D-FL), who wondered if “the people who pay taxes are now beginning to realize that
in order to decrease taxes they must decrease this demand for appropriations?”48 In this hearing,
at least, the rhetoric of these (non-city) Southern Democrats was even more conservative than the
Republicans, and was deeply skeptical of any national plan to manage the economy or deal with
the current economic crisis.
After the landslide elections of 1932, the conflict within the Democratic Party over aid to local
governments did not disappear, but the terrain on which it was fought had changed; city advo-
cates of robust, national intervention were clearly on the higher ground. This was apparent during
a 1933 appearance by Boston Mayor James Curley before the Senate Banking and Currency Com-
mittee. Curley gave the city perspective on another Wagner bill that would allow cities to borrow
against anticipated tax receipts to cover current shortfalls; the immediate recipients of the pro-
posed aid had shifted from the state to the local level since the previous year’s RFC proposal. In
a hearing entitled “Relief to Municipalities,” Gore sought to pre-emptively admonish cities for
seeking aid from the national government:
If [witnesses] are here to make a statement concerning the state of the union or matters
of interest to the public generally, of course, we greet them with courtesy and are glad
to hear the suggestions. If they have come here to seek money out of the Treasury of
the United States and out of the pockets of the taxpayers of the United States, I want
to enter a protest against hearing them.49
Speaking as “Ambassador from the American cities to the Congress,” Curley quickly replied that
he could not imagine
anything that would be more in the nature of an innovation than some representative
of any of the various units that go to make up the government of the United States or
the states of the union appearing in Washington for any other purpose than endeavoring
to seek some money out of the Treasury. So far as I have been able to ascertain, following
48ibid, p.189
49“Relief to Municipalities,” Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, May 3, 1933. (HRG-1933-BCS-0021) p. 5.
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the press, that has been about the purpose of the visit of every one that has come to
Washington.50
Gore, in response, urged local fiscal self-reliance:
I feel that when they come here, these towns and cities, to ask money at the hands of
the federal government it is just a deadly blow to the system. Not only that—it is an
admission that they are dead, and they will never rise, and I am going to bid you good
day.51
Gore’s frustrated, rather stormy exit from this exchange marked a moment when the coalescing ur-
ban political order, represented by Curley, confronted the previous heart of the Democratic Party,
and forced it into a both symbolic and literal retreat.
The new norm of a distributive politics that would benefit a wide range of constituencies was
established, allowing for the “inclusive exchange” of goods throughout the New Deal era.52 But
city representatives needed to continually remind their partners in this exchange of the deal, and
had to make concessions to keep it alive. In 1933, for instance, the NIRA formula for allocating
road construction and maintenance funding was adjusted to increase the importance of popula-
tion (and the importance of a state’s geographic area diminished). When When Rep. Fuller (D-AR)
objected to this change, John McCormack (D-MA) testily rebuked the Arkansan for not being “big-
hearted” enough to keep quiet about the shift of funds to states with large populations.53
While transportation and infrastructure policies could be subtly adjusted, housing policy was
a new realm of massive activity for the national government in the 1930s. Early housing and slum
clearance programs were clearly designed with cities in mind, because of the relative scarcity
of city land and high costs of construction. In keeping with the party’s principle of inclusive ex-
change, however, benefits were also extended to rural areas. The urban liberals (mainly Democrats
in Congress and the administration) were careful to characterize the nascent housing programs as
unbiased and inclusive with regards to urbanicity; thus in addition to support for programs that
50ibid, emphasis added
51ibid
52Mayhew (1966), Fleck (2008)
53“National Industrial Recovery.” House Committee on Ways and Means. May 18-20, 1933. (HRG-1933-WAM-0006),
p. 299
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benefited rural areas, city representatives also included benefits for rural areas in urban legisla-
tion, sweetening the deal all along the way. In the hearing on the USHA’s initial approval, when
Sen. Franklin Hancock (D-NC) expressed skepticism that the program would actually make an
impact outside the cities, Fiorello LaGuardia (appearing on behalf of the USCM and New York
City), was barely able to disagree:
Hancock: Why was the word “rural” inserted [into the bill describing slum condi-
tions]?...I am in favor of aiding slum people whenever they exist and naturally some
of the advocates want to leave that word in, but I do not want to fool my people. You
must know why it was put there. You know the practical philosophy of this bill makes
it unsuited to rural communities as well as I do. . .
LaGuardia: Don’t you think that the American farmer would like to have a nice cheer-
ful place to live in, just as much as the unskilled laborer of a city would?
Hancock: Of course, but who would buy it for him? He couldn’t participate under
this bill.
LaGuardia: Some sort of arrangement could be made, the same as in the city.
Hancock: Does this bill contemplate the purchase of farm lands?. . . Why make a gesture
in this bill in that direction? Let us make this an urban bill and work out a companion
measure for the rural communities.
LaGuardia: Will you vote for it?
Later, USHA administrator Nathan Straus insisted that his agency did not subscribe to
the principle that slum conditions and the ill-housed poor are phenomena existing only
in large metropolitan areas. Our assistance in attacking the low-rent housing problem
is based, not on the population, not on the urban or rural character of the applicant,
but on the demonstrated need for slum clearance and rehousing.54
This insistence that housing policy (and other city-centric New Deal policies) would also benefit
rural communities was no doubt attractive for non-city legislators who might not have supported
54HRG-1939-EDS-0007 p29
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such expensive programs. Rep. James Meeks, a downstate Democrat from Illinois, inquired of
Straus how he could gain benefits for his district, which included no large population centers:
I see that you earmarked nothing under 100,000 population there (in Illinois). I would
like to get what the local difficulty is in Illinois, because if we are going to pass a nice
fat pie around, I want our State to get some of it. 55
Illinois did indeed, get some, though maybe less than it “should have.”56 While the housing pro-
gram was mostly targeted at larger cities, as seems intended by the authors and proponents, the
partisan distribution of the program’s early funds is apparent. The 1937 Congress was the most
lopsided in postbellum history: Democrats held 75 of 96 seats in the Senate and 333 of 435 seats in
the House. Even so, the initial allocations of the USHA grants were somehow even more dispro-
portionately sent to districts represented by Democrats. Ninety-two percent of over $600 million
in first-wave USHA funding for housing went to localities (mainly cities, but also small towns and
counties) represented by Democrats in the House. Most of the money went to major Democratic
cities: New York City received $53 million, Chicago $16 million (Illinois got a late start in the pro-
gram), Philadelphia $32 million.57 None of the members of these large cities’ delegations were
Republicans. Smaller Republican cities in some of these states did receive grants as well: Syra-
cuse, Peoria, and Worcester all sent Republicans to the House, but they were also real industrial
cities with demonstrable need of redevelopment. It is the smaller allocations that reveals partisan
allocation of funds. Such poetically small towns as Paducah (KY), Muncie (IN), Norwalk (CT),
and Laurel (MS) also were among the recipients of these initial grants. The sums they received
were fairly trivial in the grand scope of the program—typically less than $1 million. But of the
40 “small-town” allocations made by the USHA, 38 (95 percent) were to places represented by
Democrats. Most of these small-town grants were made in the South, despite the very low costs of
labor, construction, and land in that region (the high costs of these factors in cities are what makes
government intervention in the housing market necessary). It seems unlikely that 95 percent of
55“Amendments to U.S. Housing Act of 1937,” Hearing of House Committee on Banking and Currency, April 28,
1938. (HRG-1938-BCU-0004) p16
56And Meeks’s district did not get any of the fat pie, either.
57Author’s analysis of first-generation USHA grant figures given by USHA administrator Nathan Straus before Sen-
ate Subcommittee on S. 591, Committee on Education and Labor HRG-1939-EDS-0007, p. 27-28
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the low-income housing needs outside of the cities happened to be in these particular districts;
this was distributive politics to woo rural representatives even within the city-centric housing
program.
All of this is consistent with the cities’ primary strategy of addressing marginal urgency by in-
clusive exchange. The large cities in the Democratic fold (as well as some, like San Francisco, that
were not in the Democratic fold) received much-needed funds to implement low-income housing
and slum clearance programs, but the cost of the urban program was that a small allocation (about
five percent of the program) went to small-town Democratic constituencies where the demand for
such subsidies could not have been as strong.
Nonetheless, this urban-rural mutual exchange program had begun to fray by the end of the
decade. While rural areas and states with small populations received higher per capita largesse
from New Deal programs, these same places joined a conservative coalition less than enthusiastic
about supporting programs (notably housing) that primarily benefited cities.58 Frustrated with
the perceived disloyalty or defection from the inclusive bargain, city representatives Raymond
McKeough (D-Chicago) and Henry Ellenbogen (D-Pittsburgh) engaged in the following pedagog-
ical exchange for the benefit of their rural colleagues in 1937:
McKeough: Do you think that the requirements of this (housing) bill are to cover a
parochial problem, or a national problem?
Ellenbogen: National.
McKeough: Is there any more reason why the municipalities that have got to cure this
condition should be penalized, as against the farmer that receives his soil-erosion con-
tribution from the federal government?
Ellenbogen: I agree. . . [cities] contribute millions and millions of dollars more in Fed-
eral taxes than the Federal government pays in servicing that area. The money goes
somewhere else.
McKeough. May I ask if any of those dollars that Pittsburgh paid in were earmarked so
that none of them might reach the rural settlements in the payment of gratuities to the
58Gelfand (1975) and Biles (2011) chronicle the growth of the conservative coalition and resistance by non-city Democ-
racts to a cabinet-level “urban” department beginning in the 1930s. Mayhew (1966) quantifies the relatively frequent
defection by non-city Democrats from the party’s practice of inclusive exchange over the 1940s.
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farmers?59
Of course, city representatives were successful in getting city issues onto the permanent na-
tional agenda. At the final stages of representation, at roll call voting, this achievement has been
lasting. Figure 3.9 shows the over-time trend in the number of roll call votes having to do with ex-
plicitly urban issues during the 20th century. To identify urban roll calls for this time series, I use
data from the American Institutions Project (AIP) dataset, which assigns substantive issue codes
to all roll calls in congressional history.60 I identify votes from 3 categories as particularly impor-
tant for cities, and the kind of interventions considered here and promoted by city representatives
during the urban interlude: Urban and Regional Development, Public Works Employment, and
Housing.
These issue areas increased in salience over the urban interlude. As we can see from Figure 3.9,
in which the solid/red line indicates the number of votes on city issues, while the dashed/navy
line indicates the proportion of all votes in these four city categories, the urban interlude saw an
increase in the salience of the urban agenda in roll call voting.The general trend in overall urban
votes is an increase since about the early 1930s, with an outlying peak during the urban fiscal crises
of the mid-1970s. As a proportion of the overall House voting agenda, urban issues rise with the
new Democratic majority in 1931, are at their highest levels over the 1930s-1950s, and peak in 1959
(though the extremity of that peak is due to a series of bills with several quick procedural votes).
Of course, simply counting roll calls on a topic does not tell provide very much detail about polit-
ical outcomes (and these city issues did not dominate agenda in any case, making up at most one
percent of roll calls). But reaching the final agenda is an important first step, and these figures also
reconfirm the historical treatments of urban policy and coincide with the content of the hearing
agenda above.61 In the next chapter, we shall see that city delegations were particularly cohesive
on these votes, helping to promote a united urban agenda. For the remainder of this chapter, I
turn to an analysis of urban voting behavior and strength in the House.
59“To Create a U.S. Housing Authority”, hearing of House Committee on Banking and Currency. Aug 3, 1937. HRG-
1937-BCU-0002 p.101
60Up to the 100th Congress. See Katznelson and Lapinski (2007) for a detailed description of the dataset. AIP data is
also used in the next two chapters to identify certain kinds of votes.
61Gelfand (1975)
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Figure 3.9: Total urban roll call votes, and urban votes as proportion of all roll call votes, 45th-
100th Congresses. The number of votes about urban issues has increased since the beginning of
the urban interlude. The proportion of the overall agenda taken up by urban issues was generally
high throughout the period, and peaked in the 88th congress (1959-1961).
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3.2.3 City voting in the House
The overall number of city representatives has held fairly steady over the past eight decades, but
relative to other groups they have seen changes. Suburban representatives have become a larger
group overall, and city representatives have become a steadily larger share of the Democratic cau-
cus. In this section, I will investigate the pattern of city power in roll call voting on the House
floor. Has the political character of the city bloc changed accordingly? Has the frequency of city
victories changed as the bloc has diversified geographically but consolidated politically? Have its
internal characteristics changed, as different kinds of cities have displaced some of the industrial
New Deal core as representatives of cities?
The most immediate thing we can see is that city representatives are typically the most liberal
members in congress in their voting behavior, and a gap opened between them and other repre-
sentatives around the beginning of the New Deal, as we would expect from Figure 3.2. This is not
surprising, but has not generally been shown clearly, as even most close analyses stop at the tripar-
tite level of non-Southern Democrats, Southern Democrats, and Republicans. City representatives
were the most assertive forces behind various important policies of the New Deal, including relief
employment programs, public works construction projects, housing subsidies, and new labor reg-
ulation. Support for this suite of market interventions came to define liberalism, and what it meant
to be a “Democrat,” in national politics. We can see this in an analysis of a common measure of
congressional behavior/ideology, DW-NOMINATE scores. Figure 3.10 illustrates that urbanicity
is indeed associated with liberal voting on the primary dimension of conflict: city representatives
have long been more liberal than rural or suburban representatives on the first dimension, and the
right-hand panel shows that this is true within each party as well.
The left-hand panel in Figure 3.10 illustrates that there was little place-character divide be-
fore the 1920s: the lines for each kind of district track each other, and the chamber mean, fairly
closely. After 1933, however, the city average is consistently (with a brief exception in postwar
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Figure 3.10: At left: Mean DW-NOMINATE first dimension scores by urbanity group over time.
Beginning in the 1930s, city representatives became distinctively liberal on this dimension of con-
gressional behavior. At right:Mean DW-NOMINATE first dimension scores by party and sub-
group. Within each major party, non-southern urbanites were more liberal on statism than non-
southern, non-city representatives. The shift by non-southern city Democrats begins before the
New Deal.
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congresses, when Republicans briefly held a number of city districts) well below the other kinds
of places and the chamber mean. Rural districts are generally slightly above average, and above
the other groups, on this dimension, while suburban districts are in between, closely tracking the
chamber mean. This is what we would expect, given the theorized relationship between urbanic-
ity and preferences about statism, as well as the party-place character divide illustrated in Figure
3.2. Central city districts are to the left on this dimension (ie, have lower scores on average), while
rural districts are the furthest to the right. Of course, the first dimension DW-NOMINATE scores
also capture party affiliation, so this explains much of the gap in place-types on this dimension.
The right-hand panel in Figure 3.10 shows that when we “control” for party (and region, among
Democrats), the gap between representatives of different kinds of places is still clear. The top pair
of (dashed) lines are the mean first-dimension scores among urban and non-urban non-Southern
Republicans. The grey line in the middle is the chamber mean. The morse-dashed red line that
arcs up and down across the graph is the mean for all Southern Democrats.62 The solid lines run-
ning slightly downward across the bottom are the means for non-Southern non-urban Democrats
and non-Southern urban Democrats, respectively. In each party, city representatives are, on av-
erage, almost invariably more liberal on this measure than their non-urban sectional copartisans.
For Republicans, this gap was largest during the urban interlude, when a sizeable gap opened up
between urban and non-urban members of that party—but it has diminished and even become
slightly inverted over the last two decades (though there are now few city Republicans in any
case, and all of them represent mixed urban-suburban constituencies). Still, during the urban in-
terlude, there seem to have been important defections among city Republicans on statism.63
Among Democrats outside the South, urbanites have been consistently more liberal on this di-
mension than those from outside cities. Though both groups have moved slightly to the left over
the past decades, the gap between them has remained relatively constant. One important obser-
62Disaggregating Southern Democrats by place character reveals a slight gap (in the expected direction) between ur-
ban and non-urban representatives, but makes the figure less legible. Population-based maldistricting was particularly
bad in the South, so even many “city” districts in this region contained very large rural components, as noted by Snyder
and Ansolabehere (2008) and Martis and et al. (1982). The gap within the Southern Democrats is smaller than for the
GOP and non-Southern Democrats, and disappears after the 1980s, when most conservative Southern Democrats faded
away.
63This is what Mayhew (1966) finds in his analysis of housing votes among postwar city Republicans, who supported
housing legislation despite their party’s opposition.
CHAPTER 3. THE CITIES ON THE HILL 116
vation from this figure is the “switch” that occurs between Southern Democrats and urban non-
Southern Democrats in the early 1920s, well before even the surge in non-Southern Democrats
in the New Deal. This dimension measures partisan conflict, typically over the economy; but
something changed in the 1920s, wherein the urban Democrats became the furthest “left” on this
dimension, and the most likely to disagree with Republicans, while Southern Democrats became
more “centrist.” Southerners remain slightly to the left of center on this dimension for the entire
period of the Long New Deal, before eventually moving back toward the rest of their party.64
That switch in the 1920s represents a significant development, in which the city Democrats be-
came the most consistent opponents of Congressional Republicans, and Southerners were became
relatively less staunch in their opposition to the GOP. This marks the beginning of the conserva-
tive coalition and of the partisan place character divide, as the collection of progressive liberals,
especially those Democrats Buenker (1973) identifies as the “new stock” immigrants, began to take
the reins of the national Democratic Party. While city representatives did not constitute a majority
of the party’s national delegation in Congress until the 1930s, they did seem to be asserting their
muscle in intraparty politics, notably in the contentious nomination of Al Smith for President in
1928 (and the failed re-attempt in 1932). Smith lost to Hoover, of course, but between him, Roo-
sevelt and Truman, Democratic nominees were closely linked to large cities for the next quarter
century, reflecting and reinforcing the pre-eminence of urban forces within the party.65
With the Democratic takeover of the 1930s, which saw the largest congressional majorities in
history, the ascendant urban Democrats transformed their party and national politics. Bringing
the active, pragmatic approach of city politics to national issues, they expanded the agenda and
created the famously large catalogue of New Deal programs, including those most relevant to
cities, as illustrated in the previous section. The most important of these made the market in-
terventions prompted by the conditions of urbanicity: public goods provision (for example, the
PWA, WPA, and TVA,), regulation (NLRA, AAA, SEC), and redistribution (Social Security Act,
64Though they are still more moderate on average. The recent leftward drift of the Southern Democrats’ average is
most likely the result of the creation of relatively safe, liberal majority-minority districts and the conversion of many
Southern districts to the GOP during this era, lowering the overall average for the remaining Democrats.
65Before Smith, Grover Cleveland, former mayor of Buffalo, had been the last Democratic nominee with significant
political ties to or background in a major city.
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CCC and other relief employment). Each of these modes of economic governance had become
hallmarks of city politics over the previous decades as city leaders sought to grapple with the
challenges of modern, complex society. Only when the economic catastrophe of the Depression
revealed the shortcomings of laissez-faire to an increasingly urban electorate did these kinds of
policies receive significant agenda attention from national elites.
City representatives thus came to be the most partisan Democrats, ostensibly redefining the
main content of what that partisan identity meant. Given this relative marginality on the primary
dimension of political conflict (ie, city Democrats were the most extreme group, and mostly not sit-
uated near the median voter), it is worthwhile to analyze trends in other strategic considerations.
The potential influence of a voting bloc is related to is size, cohesion, and other factors exogenous
to the bloc itself, such as the preference/ideological distribution of other voters.66 To the extent
that a bloc is large and cohesive, and the rest of the voters are not united against that bloc, the
bloc can be said to have influence. Of course, the usual example of a powerful bloc in Congress
is that of the congressional party, an institution designed to be a bloc large and cohesive enough
that it does not matter much what the other voters do.67 In the case of the city bloc, this group
has never constituted a chamber majority in the House, nor has it been entirely from one political
party (though city representatives have long leaned toward the Democrats as a bloc). Thus bloc
influence will be contingent on both intrinsic and extrinsic factors. Figure 3.11 illustrates trends
over 20th century congressional history.68 In each of these measures, the “city position” is defined
as the position taken by a majority of city representatives casting a vote on a given issue, unless
specifically clarified otherwise.
The first subfigure shows the proportion of roll call votes on which the city bloc “won,” where
winning means the majority of city legislators agreed with the chamber majority. The grey dashed
line in the same subfigure shows the percentage of contested votes on which the city bloc won;
66For instance, a small bloc situated in the middle of the distribution—near the “pivot”—may be much more influen-
tial than an enormous but relatively extreme bloc. Wolman and Marnicki (2005) engage in a similar analysis of roll call
voting by urban representatives to the one that follows, though their study is limited to voting on a small set of votes
in a small number of congresses. The present analysis includes all roll calls from all post-Civil War congresses, refines
the measures of leverage, and looks more closely at votes on which city representatives were distinctive.
67Though American legislative parties have often notably not cohesive by comparative standards.
68These roll call analyses combine USR place-character data with roll call data from Voteview.
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contested votes are those with the support of less than 3/4 of the chamber. The morse-dashed
line shows the proportion of “urbanicity cleavage” votes on which the city side won. Urbanicity
cleavage votes are those on which the majority of city representatives disagreed with the majority
of non-city representatives. Again, the thin vertical lines mark important changes in chamber con-
trol. As in Figure 3.8, city success in the legislature has become much more volatile and contingent
on chamber control. This is especially on votes on which the city position differs from the non-city
position, an increasingly common state of affairs. On such votes, when Democrats are in power,
the city position wins. When Republicans are in power, the non-city position wins. This was not
the case during the long period of mostly Democratic control, from 1933-1995. Especially early
in that era, despite Democratic control and the Democrats being the party of the cities, when city
and non-city representatives disagreed (which happened on about a fifth of all votes, as opposed
to about half of all votes during the recent era of GOP control) the city position generally lost, or
only won about half the time in the 1960s and 1970s, but the percentage of urbanity-cleavage votes
on which the city position won from one congress to the next was fairly steady. The new, volatile
arrangement leads to more feast-or-famine prospects for both legislative success and legislative
leadership.
The second subfigure in 3.11 illustrates measures of congressional leverage for the city bloc,
following Wolman and Marnicki (2005). The grey dashed line is the proportion of contested votes
on which city representatives had potential leverage. These are votes on which the total number
of city representatives was greater than the difference between non-urban voters, so if the city
bloc was perfectly cohesive, it would be in a position to decide the vote one way or the other. This
has been true of a large and slowly increasing proportion of votes for over a century. Given that
that size of the city bloc has not been growing as steadily as that, this is an indication that non-
city representatives have become more evenly divided, leaving more potential opportunities for a
cohesive city bloc to cast decisive votes. Of course, city representatives are usually not perfectly
cohesive, so a more realistic and useful measure is the black line, which traces the percentage of
contested votes by congress for which the city bloc had “positive leverage.” Wolman and Marnicki
(2005) define positive leverage votes as votes on which “the majority of city representatives cast
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Figure 3.11: The City bloc and roll call voting. At left, the percentage of votes in each category
in which the city position won. At right, percentage of contested votes on which the city bloc was
had potential and positive leverage, respectively. Vertical dashed lines indicate change in House
majority control. Source: Analysis of USR and Voteview data
the decisive winning votes.”69 This means that the votes from non-city representatives would not
have been sufficient to carry the vote without city allies, and that most city representatives voted
to pass the ultimately successful measure. As with overall win rates and leadership positions, the
leverage of the city bloc is increasingly sensitive to partisan control. The previous trough, in the
1930s, is a reflection of large Democratic majorities and a sometimes-divided city bloc: on many
votes, city votes were not necessary for passage, even though a majority of city representatives
supported most of these measures, and on others the closer partisan split among city representa-
tives themselves made them less cohesive. The trough beginning in the 1990s, however, reflects
the fact that the city position was defeated on a large proportion of votes, followed by the peak
in the 110th and 11th congress, when city votes were, more often than not, necessary for passage
69p. 304
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and enough to put the proposal over the top. 70
3.3 Discussion: City Representation in the House
In this chapter, I have illustrated the secular development of an urban-rural cleavage in the House
of Representatives over the past eighty years. The electorate increasingly makes choices that reflect
the continuum of this cleavage. These choices are filtered into the system of representation, and
the composition of the national legislature and its leadership reflects this dimension of division to
an even greater extent. The manner and cause of the divide, however, are less clear. Authors fo-
cusing on spatial polarization have often focused on the city-suburb divide, with special attention
paid to the 1970s or the 1950s as key moments for the development of this cleavage.71. This kind
of conflict is real, and has been important since the New Deal, but among voters and in the halls
of Congress, cities and suburbs are becoming more alike, not less, while partisan sorting matures
along the full urbanicity continuum.
In Congress, the parties began to sort themselves along urbanicity lines beginning with the
New Deal Democrats’ urban gains and accelerating with delayed rural shifts away from the
Democrats about thirty and sixty years later. Republicans were reduced to a primarily suburban
redoubt in the 1930s, and made gains in the South first in presidential politics and later converted
that largely rural (but increasingly suburban) “solid” region into their stronghold. In the North,
the disappearance of urban Republicans starting in the 1930s led to cohesive Democratic urban
blocs in many industrial cities. Though some urban liberal “Rockefeller” Republicans lingered,
they were on borrowed time well before Rockefeller’s 1964 defeat at the hands of conservatives.72
70Of course, “leverage” should be understood with an important caveat. The broader argument of this study is
that there is a partisan-ideological continuum that has been developing for eighty years, with city representatives at
one doubly liberal pole. With city representatives more likely to be doing the proposing from a position of chamber
leadership, and to theoretically have relatively extreme (ie, not near the median/swing vote) preferences on these
issues, it is not clear how perfectly the concept of “leverage” applies to these votes: some more centrist group likely has
more. But following Wolman and Marnicki (2005), I present these trends forward and backward to more fully describe
how the position of the city bloc in the legislature has evolved.
71Gainsborough (2001), Nall (2010)
72Mayhew (1966)
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Most scholarly focus has been on the conversion of the South, understanding its drift away from
the New Deal coalition, and the resilient causal force and effects of racial conservatism in regional
and national politics. Carmines and Stimson (1989) emphasize the effects of choices by Republi-
can national elites in the 1960s, who seized upon an opportunity to use race as a wedge issue to
appeal to Southerners and other white voters and eventually escape their seemingly permanent
minority status, and how that issue evolved into a cross-partisan, rather than intrapartisan, con-
flict. Katznelson and several co-authors have identified the divide coming earlier. These studies
identify “defections” by Southern members on core New Deal issues related to race, especially
on labor, in the 1940s and 1950s as precursors of the eventual break over national civil rights leg-
islation.73 These are of course crucial developments, but they partly naturalize the main change
during this time, which was the growth and consolidation of the urban political order within the
Democratic Party, which substantively changed what it meant to be a “Democrat” and brought a
host of state interventions to the agenda fairly abruptly. Southerners, from their seat as the long-
established core of the party, did not change much on size-of-government preferences, or on white
supremacy. They only changed parties, and it took them decades to do it. Needing an active state
to alleviate their governance challenges at home, however, city Democrats pursued a program of
mutual exchange with their Southern colleagues, but were met with much resistance on a range
of issues, and eventually began to pursue other strategies, and other alliances, incompatible with
the South’s chief priorities. That will be the subject of Chapter 5, when we see the role of city rep-
resentatives in promoting civil rights legislation over the urban interlude. Over time, as the South
departed from the party and the urbanicity cleavage matured, city representatives have created a
party in which they are perhaps more powerful in advancing their agenda in the chamber—but
also more vulnerable to being left in the minority.
Cities, more than other kinds of places, have a particular incentive to forge a united bloc in the
national legislature. They often face common challenges associated with urban life and urban so-
ciety that could be addressed with similar policies. More importantly, the conditions of urbanicity
create higher demand and/or need for significant market interventions, but economic and insti-
73See, eg. Katznelson and Kryder (1993), Katznelson and Farhang (2005), Katznelson and Mulroy (2012).
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tutional constraints leave them ill-situated to deal with many of these challenges on their own.
In this context, cities have actively turned to state and national levels to ameliorate some of their
governance challenges. Before the New Deal, there was nothing distinctive about city representa-
tives in partisan terms; as a group, city representatives mirrored the national partisan split. The
New Deal changed that, and made urbanicity an important cleavage in national politics. From
the beginning of the New Deal, city representatives, practicing a style of politics distinctive to the
the traditional party organization, recognized the increasing peril cities faced under conditions of
late industrial capitalism, and sought to use national resources and national political alliances to
alleviate their governance problems. Since the New Deal, not only has national unity among cities
grown, through the vehicle of the Democratic Party, but rural constituencies have become more
associated with the Republicans, strengthening the place-character divide at the highest levels of
national representation. This change was not initiated by migration to the suburbs (the shift pre-
dates the migration), though it was surely accelerated by it. It was also not merely a function of
white flight and race: all but two congressional districts had overwhelmingly white electorates in
the early 1930s, when the urbanicity rift opened up.74 The progressive liberalism of the New Deal
brought city issues to the fore in national politics, and city representatives pursued these policies
from their position as an important, if not pivotal, bloc.
Casually, we often think of the middle of the 20th century, the middle of the “Metropolitan
Era,” as the height of city power in national politics, a sort of golden age for American cities. More
Americans lived in large central cities at that moment than at any other time in our history, and
it embodied a kind of “metonymic moment” for cities in the nation.75 As illustrated above, it
also marked a time when important city issues (especially aid to cities) first reached the national
agenda, and city issues took up their greatest share of the national agenda during this time as well.
The relative social decline and recurrent problems faced by cities since the 1960s make the urban
interlude seem like a golden age for city power in national politics; it was the key moment when
political change began, with cities becoming identified with a then-overwhelmingly successful
74Though Americans’ understanding of who counted as fully “white” may be a relevant consideration here, a factor
that will be relevant in the discussion of racial issues in Chapter 6.
75Ethington and Levitus (2009)
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Democratic Party. Institutionally, however, cities have actually gotten stronger in some important
ways since then, though this strength has become more closely linked to national partisan strug-
gle, which has itself become more uncertain. As cities become more closely identified with the
Democratic Party, the median congressional Democrat and the Democratic leadership are more
likely than ever before to represent city constituencies; this is a new reality for an American po-
litical party. These leaders, in committee and chamber alike, may be particularly attentive to and
protective of “urban” perspectives and interests on many issues.
However, given that a large majority of representatives are not from cities, and that when Re-
publicans hold majority status cities go virtually unrepresented in the leadership group and are
very unsuccessful in roll call voting, city power in Congress is also more brittle and vulnerable
than it was during the Long New Deal, when Democratic majorities were less urban but more
safely entrenched. City power on the Hill thus faces a deep, fundamental uncertainty in terms of
chamber power and intraparty power.
The next two chapters will focus on the the role of local institutions in shaping the behavior
of city representatives on important issues during the urban interlude, as this urban bloc-of-blocs
was taking shape within the Democratic Party. First, in chapter 4, I will test general implications of
city delegation theory, finding that local institutions foster cohesive representation, even though
cities are most notable for their deep social divisions. Then, in chapter 5, I explore the role of this
urban political order, and of local city institutions, in the reappearance, assertion, and develop-
ment of “second-dimensional” liberalism, on issues related to race and civil rights, a dimension of
conflict that would ultimately fracture the national Democratic alliance but also strengthen the as-
sociation between Democrats and cities, and further heighten the urbanicity cleavage in national
politics.
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Chapter 4
Ties That Bind: City Delegations and
Cohesive Representation in Congress
“In order for anything to be done under public auspices, the elaborate decentralization
of authority. . . must be overcome or set aside.”
-Edward Banfield and James Wilson, City Politics1
“Local experience has taught them that in unity there is power.”
Leo Snowiss,
“Congressional Recruitment and Representation”2
1Banfield and Wilson (1963), p. 101
2Snowiss (1966), p.630
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4.1 Political Order
Before there can be a meaningful urban political order in the nation, there must be political or-
der within the cities. To effectively pursue policy goals at the national level, cities must reach an
internal accord about what policies best address governance challenges associated with urbanic-
ity. But urbanicity also presents political challenges as well: heterogeneity of all kinds make cities
famously fractious polities, and these divisions can themselves undermine civic unity as well as
support for the statist interventions in the market discussed in the previous chapter. At times, the
most salient social characteristic of city politics is the presence of deep divisions, not unity. This
was most obvious in the 1960s, as racial and class tensions met the urban fiscal crisis, bubbling
over into an “urban crisis” that left an indelible mark on the face of many cities’ geography, poli-
tics, and residents.3 But even in less extraordinary times, social conflict seems sewn into the very
fabric of city life. Groups and individuals compete for scarce resources, workers and bosses clash,
business leaders and neighborhoods fight over development patterns, and so on. Because of res-
idential segregation by class and race, representational institutions may strengthen rivalries and
identities by linking them to the distribution of benefits, further deepening the potential for divi-
sions along group lines.4 Given the wide range of complex issues cities face, fragmented politics
and their simultaneous, conflicting demands can lead to “hyperpluralism” and make a city “un-
governable.”5 Such deep pluralism means that articulating a “city interest” may be impossible
or a contradition in terms—the interests of a city’s residents and groups are too varied and nu-
merous, and too much in conflict, to be easily aggregated into a single, articulated position. How,
then, can a city pursue its interests at higher levels of government?
The answer to this question is not always made easier by the formal constellation of local gov-
ernmental institutions. Social heterogeneity provides a basis for political conflict, and the formal
lines of authority in many cities do not make it obvious how political conflicts will be resolved.
In most cases, Banfield and Wilson (1963) remain correct in their assertion that “the American
3Rae (2003),Sugrue (1996)
4Massey and Denton (1993), Katznelson (1982)
5DeLeon (1992), Cannato (2002)
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city is not governed by a single hierarchy of authority. . . On the contrary, from a purely formal
standpoint, one can hardly say that there is such a thing as a local government” because of the
many institutions with legitimate, sometimes conflicting, claims to governing authority in a given
geographical space.6 The conditions of city life create a need for governance solutions that are
greater than in other kinds of built environments—those that are less dense, less heterogeneous,
and smaller, where the demands for and obstacles to “getting things done” are less imposing.
Thus some political accommodation must be reached to overcome the division in cities to perform
the basic work of government. As discussed in Chapter 2, cities are typically constrained, by law
or logic, in their ability to provide at least some of these solutions in a purely local way, so turning
to a higher level of the federal order, especially the national order, presents itself as a vital strategy
for meeting local needs. To effectively pursue any position—any “city interest”—at a higher level,
however, the vast plurality of voices must be narrowed.
The distillation of many different voices into one city position for representation or policymak-
ing is the creation of political order. In rapidly changing societies (like cities, which are continually
refreshed with new populations and buffeted by powerful economic forces), order, especially po-
litical order, is a primary good.7 The deep divisions present in cities have in many cases provided
an impetus for city elites to forge institutions that promote order across the extent of the city and
make governance more manageable. These are the institutions of horizontal integration discussed
in Chapter 2, which bind city constituencies and their representatives in ways that other collec-
tions of districts are not linked. The study of the development and effects of such institutions
is a major subfield of urban political science. In this chapter, I use evidence from congressional
roll calls to argue that institutions of horizontal integration developed at the local level do in-
deed foster cohesion among the representatives of cities. Consistent with city delegation theory,
I find that city delegations are more cohesive than other collections of representatives from sim-
ilarly proximate districts, and city delegations from places with strong institutions of horizontal
integration are more cohesive than those from places with weak integrative institutions. Looking
6Banfield and Wilson (1963), p. 76. If anything, the lines of authority have probably become harder to parse in the
past half century with the accelerated creation of new governments, especially special districts.
7Huntington (1968)
CHAPTER 4. CITY DELEGATIONS 127
more closely, I find that members of a city delegation are more likely to agree on a roll call votes
than representatives not from the same city, even when we account for other measures of plau-
sible legislative affinity, such as congressional party, geographical proximity, and district-level
characteristics (including urbanicity). These results support the claim that cities, and their local
institutions, contribute to greater unity in legislative behavior, helping to make the city delegation
the building block of the larger urban political order in national politics.
4.1.1 City Institutions of Horizontal Integration
As argued in Chapter 2, institutions of horizontal integration (IHIs) foster cohesion between rep-
resentatives of different constituencies across a city, and they are generally not present among
other collections of representatives. The two main IHIs analyzed here are the jurisdictional IHI of
the city boundary, which includes or excludes constituencies and representatives from a local po-
litical community, and the organizational IHI of the traditional party, which moves an important
locus of political influence outside of particular districts and into a citywide party or party com-
mittee, centralizing politics within a city and providing an institutional link between particular
constituencies and the city as a whole.
The city border fosters some common interests among those included within it. For instance,
many urban programs are administered through grants to city governments that are then allo-
cated across the city’s districts. A close relationship with the city government may increase a
representative’s share of any discretionary allocation. The overall well-being of a district may also
depend to a great deal on the well-being of the wider city; externalities of city life do not typically
stop at congressional district borders, so working as a city delegation to maintain or improve the
“health” of the city is likely to be a project that benefits all participants. The same cannot really be
said of suburban or rural districts, each of which may contain many local governments without
much overlap in day-to-day governance. The sparser populations of such districts are also less
likely to interact with or affect outcomes in other districts, so there is less impetus for coordination
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across constituencies. If these ideas are true, then we would expect representatives from the same
city to coordinate their behavior on policies that affect the city they share.
The most important organizational institution of horizontal integration has been the local tra-
ditional party.8 A traditional party is defined as an autonomous organization that can successfully
control access to nominations to office, a very important institutional site for shaping outcomes,
and these organizations served broad integrative functions in local politics.9 Urban machines are
particularly powerful species of this kind of organization—they not only control nominations, but
are very successful at winning office as well. In these organizations, “unity and hierarchy” make
“organization decision-making relatively impervious to the influences of rival non-party groups,
associations, and elites in the primary electorate.”10 This power to effectively choose candidates,
and most officeholders, extends not just to local or state office, but often to congressional office as
well.11 In New York and Chicago, the most important Democratic cities and the homes of effective
traditional party organizations, access to nominations was controlled by the local parties through-
out the Long New Deal; similar local political conditions obtained in many of the other, smaller
cities of the New Deal coalition.12 Wilson (1962), in his close study of intraparty dynamics in
three large cities, observed that the Chicago organization was “virtually unbeatable” in primaries
even when the offices were statewide, and that in the (then) thirty years since the establishment
of a citywide Democratic organization, “only one Democrat. . . has won nomination to an impor-
tant office without regular organization backing.”13 In New York, organization dominance was
more effectively challenged within the party, but even as late as 1960 almost all New York City
Democrats in Congress “owed at least their initial victories to organization slating.”14
8Mayhew (1986) shows that strong parties were powerful shapers of local outcomes. Bridges (1984) calls the political
machine (the strongest species of party) the “characteristic form of city government” in the 19th century, and though
these institutions were weakened by reform and other factors, their structures and legacies are still evident in the cities
they once dominated, and were certainly the most powerful political forces in many cities during the urban interlude.
Erie (1988), Mayhew (1986).
9Mayhew (1986). This is the definitive, almost encyclopedic, text on such organizations in the mid-20th century U.S.
10Snowiss (1966), p.629
11Mayhew (1986), Wilson (1962), Snowiss (1966), Rakove (1975)
12Though they each had their own particular histories. See Mayhew (1986) for state-by-state narratives of party
strength and development. See Dorsett (1977) for closer case studies of several machines’ relations with the national
Democratic leadership under FDR.
13An incumbent governor defeated a Chicago-backed insurgent. p. 67
14Mayhew (1986),p. 45
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In each of these cities, party leaders from inside the city but outside the individual districts
had significant influence in slating and supporting candidates for office, and in each place the city
nominees, even after electoral success, were vulnerable to attack from within, and faced the dan-
ger of purge if perceived as disloyal to the organization.15 Beyond conventional incentives such
as career advancement and renomination for office, the traditional organizations were often able
to rely on their agents in Congress because they were creatures of habit. These were men (almost
invariably men) who had
risen through the disciplined and unified local party organization [and were] well
aware of the virtues of party unity. . . Chicago Democratic congressmen. . . value party
cohesion as a positive good in need of little or no justification.16
Unity and cohesion were themselves valued goods for such politicians, the product of socializa-
tion and habit as much as of continuous monitoring or oversight. On domestic issues in par-
ticular, such representatives—members from traditional parties with localist backgrounds and
orientations—were extremely cohesive, and loyal as a bloc to the city position. This loyalty was
given to both the local and national parties (the positions of the two typically overlapped), but if
forced to choose, the local organization seems to have been the primary home for many of these
representatives.17
In Los Angeles, by contrast, a large city with no traditional party organization, party-like ac-
tivity during this era was limited to clubs that were both weaker and more local than the city-wide
organizations present in Chicago and New York.18 Without a citywide political “umbrella,” politi-
cal integration was much weaker. This is not to say that the Los Angeles congressional delegation
was wholly disorganized or in disagreement all the time. After all, the city boundary still serves
15For instance, New York Democratic boss Carmine DeSapio successfully purged a rogue Democrat from the city’s
congressional caucus in 1949 (though the party was not omnipotent; DeSapio was unsuccessful in an effort to replace
Adam Clayton Powell with someone more loyal to the organization in 1958, and the organization’s pre-eminence was
ultimately shattered by Mayor Wagner’s defection in 1961). See Wilson (1962), p.47. In Chicago, the head of the Cook
County Democratic organization (Mayor Kelly’s mentor Patrick Nash, and then Mayor Daley himself) routinely slated
loyal longtime party stalwarts for congressional seats, and manipulated statewide tickets to provide maximum benefits
for the county organization. See Snowiss (1966) and Rakove (1975)
16Snowiss (1966) p. 630
17Rakove (1975)
18Wilson (1962) ch. 4
CHAPTER 4. CITY DELEGATIONS 130
as a jurisdictional institution of horizontal integration. But without the added, potentially more
powerful integration that comes from a city-wide organization, Los Angeles was less apt to rep-
resent itself cohesively in Congress. The traits and interests of the particular districts were more
evident at the higher levels.
4.2 Cohesion from Diversity
In this chapter, I test several of the observable implications of the city delegation theory outlined
in Chapter 2. The basic logic of the theory is that city institutions of horizontal integration (IHIs)—
developed to provide political order at home—foster cohesive representation in national politics,
even though cities are more heterogeneous than comparable collections of representatives.19 Be-
fore testing these claims, I will define a few terms that will be used in the analysis.
First, in this analysis and others in subsequent chapters, a city district is a congressional dis-
trict that is entirely or almost entirely within a large, central city as identified by the USR dataset
developed for this project.20 A city delegation is a collection of city representatives in the House
of Representatives from the same city. Thus the Chicago city delegation, for instance, is the set of
representatives from Chicago at any given time. Over the course of the 20th century, the Chicago
city delegation ranged in size from 6 to 12 representatives. A suburban district is a district wholly or
mostly within the developed area surrounding a large city,21 and a suburban delegation is a collec-
tion of representatives from such districts from the same city’s metropolitan area. A metropolitan
delegation encompasses both the city delegation and suburban delegation from a given metropoli-
tan area. By cohesion, I mean the tendency to agree on roll call voting; the more likely the members
of some pair or set of representatives is to agree, the more cohesive they are.
19While such cohesion could theoretically be marshalled for indeterminate ends, in practice these blocs have sup-
ported the “doubly liberal” program of the urban political order.
20And described in fuller detail in Chapter 3 and Appendix 1.
21“Metropolitan, non-central city” in Census terms.
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4.3 Tests of City Delegation Theory
Empirically, the main implication of city delegation theory is that collections of representatives
that are bound by common local institutions of horizontal integration will be more cohesive
than we might otherwise expect—and that delegation cohesion is a function of the presence and
strength of such institutions.22 A demonstration of this phenomenon can be observed by examin-
ing the relationship between diversity and cohesion among different groups of legislators in the
House of Representatives. Two basic hypotheses about city delegations should be true if local
institutions play a role in fostering cohesion in representation. First, city delegations should be
more cohesive than other comparable collections of districts that do not share a common local
political community. This is the effect of the city boundary (the primary jurisdictional institution
of horizontal integration) on legislative cohesion. To evaluate this hypothesis, we can compare
the cohesion of city delegations with like delegations-of-interest, of their suburban rings and their
metropolitan area (that is, the city and the suburban ring). Formally, this hypothesis is
HJurisdictional : CCity > CMetro,Suburbs (4.1)
whereC is Cohesion of the subscripted delegations. Second, we can compare across cities, because
cities vary in the strength of their IHIs. Cities with strong institutions of horizontal integration
should be more cohesive that cities with weak IHIs. Formally, this hypothesis is
HOrganizational : CStrongIHI > CWeakIHI (4.2)
I will test these hypotheses on representatives’ behavior at the group and individual levels.
First, we can compare city delegations to suburban and metro delegations, with the expecta-
22As in many other models of legislative behavior, the underlying theory is that representatives will tend to vote
alike to the extent that they share characteristics and/or interests in common. Most of the time, this means they are
members of the same congressional party, or their districts have similar characteristics (like including many farmers or
African Americans), or they share some common personal experience (like being veterans). Here, the characteristic that
the districts share is membership in a common local polity and/or political organization, and I am testing this model
at the group level now and later at the dyad level.
CHAPTER 4. CITY DELEGATIONS 132
tion, drawn from the jurisdictional hypothesis, that cities will be more cohesive.23 Comparing
cities to their suburban rings is useful because they often have comparable numbers of represen-
tatives, because state and local politics are often characterized by a strong city-suburb rivalry (an
indication that suburban districts do share some political affinity in common, just as city districts
do), and because using these groups allows us to automatically “control” for factors related to
region, geographical proximity, and urbanicity.24
4.3.1 Heterogeneity, not just diversity
It is important at this point to bear in mind that city delegations are typically more heterogeneous
than other collections of districts, and this is different that saying a city is more diverse than its
suburbs (though this statement is also usually true). A short diversion may clarify this concept.
We think of diversity as “not uniformity” in the sense that persons are less likely to be similar on
observable traits in cities. For instance, New York City is considered to be very diverse, because it
has lots of different kinds of people on dimensions of difference considered to be important: sev-
eral large racial groups, roughly at numerical parity; many immigrants but also many native-born
persons; many millionaires and many poor persons; thousands of Ivy-league graduates and many
more without a college degree; economic specialization is greater, so people have different occu-
pational and class identities; and so on. This is less true in the smaller, less diverse communities
that are common in the suburbs or rural places. If you were to pick two New Yorkers at random,
it is more likely that they would be “different” on whatever important dimensions you chose than
if you picked two persons from a less diverse place; this is what we typically mean by diversity.
This diversity is a necessary precondition for delegation heterogeneity, but one other thing must
be true for districts to be sufficiently different from each other: the different sorts of people that
23Later, using smaller units of analysis, I will control for more factors that might foster cohesion.
24All members of both delegations (city and suburb) from each metro area are from the same region, and most are
from the same state. High cohesion in a city delegation may be attributable to the fact that their districts abut one
another. The same is true of suburban districts, however. All members within each delegation have similar scores on
an urbanicity measure described in Appendix 1. Of course, city delegations and suburban delegations differ in their
urbanicity. The point here is that within-delegation variation on this measure is minimal, and similar across delegations.
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make a place diverse must also be unevenly grouped in the political space of the city. Richer
people must be separated from the poorer ones, instead of sprinkled in evenly; whites separated
from other racial groups; immigrants from natives; and so on. For various historical and economic
reasons, many of them lamentable, this is usually the case in American cities. It is also true in the
suburbs, but this phenomenon is more recent and in most cases not as pronounced. Because the
diversity within a city is often “lumpy,” with concentrations of different groups, rather than even
spacing across the city, city districts (not just city residents) tend to be quite different from each
other, on average. The underlying implication is that with different kinds of constituencies, the
pressures on representatives will be different; in a city delegation, therefore, agreement between
representatives of such different districts might not occur “naturally.”
To illustrate this point, consider the following. Two important dimensions of difference in
American politics (and in other societies) have always been class and race. Thus we might expect
representatives of districts that differ from each other on measures of class and race to disagree
with each other more than those from districts that are more alike—they would have higher levels
of “latent” conflict derived from demography.25
We can measure these dimensions of latent conflict using census data to evaluate this idea of
how different groupings of districts cohere using cities and their suburbs; we would expect more
heterogeneous blocs to be less cohesive, because they are more different on average. Thus if a city
delegation was both more heterogeneous and more cohesive, city delegation theory can provide
a possible explanation for this cohesion. For this and subsequent analyses, I use the four cities
that have been, in general, the largest in the U.S. over the 20th century: New York, Los Angeles,
Chicago, and Philadelphia. These cities not only represent the largest cases of city delegations
(helpful for studying a city delegation), but (again helpful for analysis) they also had very dif-
ferent patterns of local institutional strength. Philadelphia and Chicago were generally run by
strong-party, machine-style organizations for the period in question (though each had its own
idiosyncratic departures from machine domination). New York had a strong but not hegemonic
25Region is another dimension that we would expect to contribute to latent conflict,among others. It surely does, but
in following analysis all the groups I am comparing are blocs from within the same region, so this is not a factor here.
It is taken into account in the subsequent individual-level tests of predictors of agreement later in this chapter and in
Chapters 4 and 6.
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party system, and was also split organizationally across the larger boroughs. Los Angeles, as with
most of the West, is formally nonpartisan locally with very weak institutions of horizontal inte-
gration. The first analyses will use information from these cities and their metro areas to evaluate
the jurisdictional and organizational hypotheses above.
First, to show that city delegations are made up of districts that are different from each other,
and thus lack the basis for “natural” cohesion, we can examine how different from each other
the constituencies within city districts are. For each of these cities, I develop a city delegation
cross-district two-dimensional heterogeneity score that measures how different from each other
(as opposed to how internally diverse) the districts of the city delegation are. The same scores are
developed for their suburban ring.26 If city delegations are more cohesive despite being more het-
erogeneous, this is may be due to the influence of institutions of horizontal integration, and make
the alternative explanation of cohesion based in “natural,” prepolitical similarity less persuasive.
The heterogeneity scores are generated as follows. First, I identify the city and suburban area
delegations using the USR dataset (developed for this project and more fully described in Chapter
4 and Appendix 1). The two dimensions of heterogeneity measured are class and race, two de-
mographic identities of obvious relevance for both local and national politics. For each district, I
use the median family income as the measure of class. Representatives have compelling reasons
to be responsive to the median voter on many economic issues, so this seems an apt measure of a
district’s central tendency on this dimension. As a measure of district-level racial diversity, I use
the percent identified or identifying as “not white” in the district. This measure is imperfect, but
changes in the way race and ethnicity have been measured make it difficult to find a better one
over time. In any case, this measure is fairly highly correlated with the available alternatives,27 and
the largest racial divide and conflict in the U.S. is most often characterized as between whites and
non-whites, usually African Americans, and this is certainly true in the two-party system, where
all non-white groups tilt disproportionately toward the Democratic Party, so the white-nonwhite
26As in subsequent analyses, a given delegation must include at least 3 representatives in Congress to be included.
This is why some of the lines in Figure 4.2 do not begin until 1930.
27Such as ethnolinguistic fractionalization, or percent black plus percent Hispanic after 1970. The data for each of
these measures used in this diversity analysis are drawn from Lublin (1997), and therefore cover the 86th to 105th
congresses.
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dividing line is not a bad measure of latent group conflict. Using all congressional districts, I stan-
dardize these variables to put them on a common scale within each Congress, with a mean of 0
and a standard deviation of 1. Thus districts that are poorer, or more white, than average have
negative values, while those that are richer or less white have positive values. Standardizing these
values weights the two dimensions equally for the ultimate additive index of diversity.
Ultimately, we are interested not in each district’s level of these important variables, but in
the extent to which the member districts of a given delegation are similar to or different from each
other. Using these standardized measures of each dimension, the mean absolute deviation for each
bloc is calculated (that is, the mean of the deviations from the bloc mean). This mean absolute de-
viation is employed as the bloc-level standardized measure of cross-group heterogeneity on that
dimension. Then the two dimensions are simply added together to make the two-dimensional
measure of heterogeneity. This gives us a sense of how different the raw district-based pressures
on legislators are likely to be within a bloc. For instance, consider the example of Philadelphia
during the 94th Congress (1975-1977), when there were four city districts (PA 1 through PA 4) and
four suburban districts (PA 5,7,8, and 13). Table 4.1 shows the important values from these dis-
tricts. For Philadelphia in the 94th Congress, districts in the city delegation were more different
from each other on both class and race than were districts in the suburban delegation, as indicated
by the values in the grey “Mean dev.” columns. The same is almost always true for for Philadel-
phia, as well as for the other three major cities analyzed here. These measures were used to create
a two-dimensional diversity score for these four large cities and their suburban delegations, listed
in the last column at right (“2-D Het. Index”).28
28This particular comparison example is not exceptional; in fact, it is is from a time when Philadelphia’s city and
suburbs were unusually close on this two-dimensional measure, as is evident from Figure 4.1.
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While city delegations are not uniformly more diverse than their suburban ring delegations
(for some cities, in some decades, the two blocs are actually comparably heterogeneous, especially
on the economic dimension), this measure does confirm that there is almost always more hetero-
geneity among city delegations than among suburban delegations, and that this was especially
true in the mid-20th century urban interlude. Figure 4.1 shows the two-dimensional heterogene-
ity scores for each city and its suburban ring over time; in each case, the city delegation shows
more cross-district heterogeneity. On these two important dimensions, at least, the rawest social
building blocks for political coordination and similarity are weaker in cities than they are in the
suburbs.
4.3.2 City delegation cohesion
Because city districts are so often quite different from each other on politically relevant measures,
we might not expect city delegations to be very cohesive in how they represent themselves in na-
tional politics. On the other hand, there seems to be a general impression, articulated for instance
by John Vorys and other observers of city delegations, that city representatives were more “orga-
nized” than other sets of constituencies. We can test this impression more rigorously with Rice
cohesion scores, which measure the extent to which a group of voters agree.29 If city delegations
foster cohesion, we would expect the cohesion scores of city delegations to be higher than those of
suburban rings, even though the constituencies of those other places are similarly contiguous and
have more in common in terms of their demography. Over time, this has indeed been the case.
Figure 4.2 shows the average cohesion scores on all roll call votes for the four largest cities’ city
delegation (in solid/blue), suburban delegation (in dashed/red) and metropolitan area delegation
29Rice cohesion scores are one of the oldest and most intuitive measures in all of political science. Drawn from Rice
(1928), they range from 0 to 1, with 1 meaning a bloc of voters is unanimous and 0 meaning they are perfectly split.
Because Rice’s measures were designed for large numbers of voters, and are not appropriate for comparing among
small blocs of different sizes, I use the adjustment recommended in Desposato (2005) to correct for the small size of the
delegations being investigated as well as the differences across such small delegation sizes. The interpretation of these
scores is quite intuitive: if a bloc has a cohesion score of .93, there is a 93 percent chance that any two randomly chosen
members of that bloc agree.
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Figure 4.1: Cross-District Heterogeneity Among Congressional Delegations (1960-2000):
City delegations are almost always more internally heterogeneous than suburban delegations
Source:USR data, Lublin (1997)
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Figure 4.2: Average Cohesion Scores for City, Suburban, and Metro Delegations in Four Major
Cities: City delegations more cohesive than suburban delegations, despite being more heteroge-
neous. Source:USR data, Voteview
(in dotted/green). As a benchmark of “high” cohesion, the horizontal grey dashed line represents
the global mean of the two Congressional parties on this measure over time, y=.77.30
In each case, the city delegation is generally more cohesive than its suburban hinterland and
the metropolitan area that encompasses both blocs, despite the higher levels of cross-district het-
erogeneity that exist within the city delegations. The only time the suburban delegation’s cohesion
exceeds that of the city is for New York during a brief time in the 1940s. These city delegations are
particularly cohesive (as evaluated against the standard of a national party), while the other blocs
30Republicans have generally been a little more cohesive than Democrats. The parties’ average cohesion scores are
.73 and .81, respectively.
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are not particularly cohesive, much closer to or even below the average for a congressional party,
even though they share important baseline affinities such as geographic proximity. This provides
support for the power of jurisdictional institutions of horizontal integration in contributing to rep-
resentational cohesion.
There is also variation among cities, however. If the effects of local political organizations
matter for the character of city representation at higher levels, we would expect to see the cohe-
siveness of city delegations vary with the strength of local institutions of horizontal integration.
While all cities have jurisdictional boundaries that serve a centripetal function, not all cities have
had the same intensity of organizational political centralization over the course of the 20th Cen-
tury. Among the four large cities included in this analysis, there was great variation in the strength
of these organizational institutions, as described in many studies. Philadelphia and Chicago (es-
pecially after Richard J. Daley’s tenure as mayor began in 1955) had very strong organizations
that unified local politics. For Banfield and Wilson (1963), Chicago was characterized by an “ex-
treme centralization of power” in the machine leadership, especially under Kelly and Daley.31
Philadelphia had a similarly powerful machine organization, though the mayor was typically not
a part of it.32 New York’s local pattern of influence was “halfway” centralized; its Democratic
organization was strong but far from hegemonic. County divisions within the city, and struggles
between party factions made New York City’s local politics less integrated.33 Los Angeles’s local
nonpartisan rules made it virtually impossible to integrate politics citywide; power there was de-
centralized and no significant citywide organizations existed.34
Figure 4.3 takes the cohesion scores from the city delegations presented in Figure 4.2 and su-
perimposes them on the same graph for ease of comparison. In keeping with the expectations
of city delegation theory, city delegation cohesion is correlated with local institutional strength.
Cities with traditions of powerful parties that largely control a city’s politics should have more
cohesive delegations than cities without such strong organizations. From this graph, we can add
31p. 104
32Mayhew (1986), p. 58-59
33Banfield and Wilson (1963),Wilson (1962)
34Mayhew (1986), Banfield and Wilson (1963). Wilson (1962) reports on many of these dynamics in Chicago, New
York, and Los Angeles at midcentury.Mayhew (1986) provides summaries of party strength over time in these cities.
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Figure 4.3: Average Cohesion Scores for Four Major City Delegations: City delegations with
stronger organizational institutions of horizontal integration were more cohesive than those with
weaker ones. Source:USR data, Voteview
to the observation that city delegations are more cohesive than suburban delegations the further
observation that some city delegations tend to be more cohesive than others.
A similar observation can be made about the frequency with which the cities were perfectly
cohesive—that is, unanimous on a roll call vote. Table 4.2 shows that the relationship between lo-
cal institutions and city delegation unanimity is present for all roll calls, for all domestic roll calls,
and for substantive issues most obviously relevant to cities: housing, insfrastructure and public
works, transportation, and urban/regional development.35 In each of these categories, the cities
35The American Institutions Project (AIP) dataset assigns substantive codes to all roll calls from the 45th to 104th
Congress. I use the project’s substantive codes to identify the roll calls in each category here. City votes are those in the
AIP categories of Public Works and Infrastructure, Public Works Employment, Urban and Regional Development, and
Housing. For details, see Katznelson and Lapinski (2007).
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Unanimity Among City Delegations
City IHI strength All votes Domestic Votes City Votes IR votes
PHI Strong 0.76 0.59 0.77 0.59
CHI Strong 0.67 0.53 0.64 0.72
NYC Halfway 0.48 0.38 0.47 0.38
LAX Weak 0.46 0.34 0.40 0.45
Dem 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.11
GOP 0.11 0.07 0.06 0.14
Total votes 13962 10185 1099 2814
Table 4.2: Proportion of votes on which city delegations were unanimous, Congresses 70-100:
Cities with strong IHIs are unanimous more often than cities with weaker IHIs. Source: USR Data,
AIP
with strong IHIs were much more likely to be unanimous in representation than were the cities
with weaker IHIs. Again, the figures for the congressional parties are presented, though they are
not very informative because American congressional parties are so infrequently unanimous on
roll calls.
The relationship between IHIs and voting unanimity holds particularly well for domestic votes
and votes that are directly related to cities. The size of a delegation is more relevant here, as smaller
delegations seem more likely to be unanimous.36 This probably helps to explain why New York is
as infrequently unanimous as Los Angeles, but it cannot explain the difference between Los Ange-
les and Chicago or Philadelphia; for most of the time period, LA is about as large as either of those
cities (or both), but it is perfectly cohesive far less often. Interestingly, the pattern is not as strong
in the fourth category, International Relations votes. The demands and influence of the IHIs may
not exert the same pressures on votes that are not as obviously relevant to cities themselves. This
is an area for further investigation.
Of course, because congressional voting is closely related to a member’s party, much of a city’s
cohesion can certainly be attributed to the partisan makeup of a city’s delegation—or more plainly
the results of elections, when districts select their representatives. Winning seats in elections is a
primary function of a traditional party, and this is reflected in the partisan homogeneity of the
strong-party cities. The most cohesive city delegations, Chicago and Philadelphia, have often had
very unified partisan delegations, while New York and Los Angeles have had more partisan divi-
36This is a relevant concern here, but not in the previous analysis, which made a mathematical adjustment for dele-
gation size.
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sion; this fact itself related to the strength of local institutions of horizontal integration. Chicago’s
citywide Democratic machine was consolidated in the early 1930s and matured as a local hegemon
in the mid-1950s when Daley assumed office, linking the formal heads of the local government and
local party in the same person.37 In Philadelphia, local party chiefs, who held grassroots mobiliza-
tion power, converted en masse to the Democratic Party in the 1930s.38 These cities were unified
in their partisan mobilization, and their organizations were strong enough to elect a predictably
cohesive bloc. Struggles within the Democratic Party in New York (between reformers and reg-
ulars in Manhattan, and between Manhattan and the other boroughs) left that city more open to
Republican inroads at the Congressional level. Los Angeles had basically no local organization
that included the entire city,39 so the personnel of the city delegation seems more closely related
to district-level characteristics, rather than a city-wide political order. LA’s city delegation wound
up far less cohesive than the other cities, despite having generally lower levels of cross-district
heterogeneity.
4.4 Cohesion and two-stage representation
With a closer analysis, the relationship between city, local party, national party, and ultimately roll
call behavior can be more precisely delineated. In this section, I turn to a smaller unit of analysis,
the legislative dyad, to see more detailed patterns in the relationship between city institutions and
representation. Figure 4.4 illustrates the theorized causal (and temporal) flow in the shaping of
roll call votes in Congress, beginning with “pre-political” district characteristics at left and ending
with particular votes by representatives at right. This model entails the basic logic of the city del-
egation theory. At its base, the model contains the (sometimes competing, sometimes integrated)
theories of congressional behavior that suggest that the preferences of electoral constituencies and
37Keiser (1997)
38Though the mayorship was slower to change, and slower still to be openly associated with the regular party orga-
nization.Mayhew (1986)
39Wilson (1962), Mayhew (1986)
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congressional parties influence representatives’ behavior in Congress.40 This conventional model,
focusing on district/constituency preference and/or congressional parties, is captured by influ-
ence pathways A1, A2, and C.41
City delegation theory complicates that model by hypothesizing effects from an extracameral
institution from outside the district—the institution of horizontal integration(IHI)—as a factor that
influences both party affiliation and roll call behavior. 42 Strong local institutions of horizontal in-
tegration foster unity among representatives through the vehicle of local parties that tend to create
city delegations that are more homogeneously of one party, but they also influence roll call voting
even beyond that, by sending particularly loyal partisans (if they are Democrats) to the chamber,
but sometimes prompting agreement within a city delegation across national party lines (typically,
city Republicans “defecting” from their party to agree with the Democrats). And because these
institutions are present in cities, but not really elsewhere, the conditions of urbanicity push these
cohesive blocs in the progressive liberal direction on policy questions. Chapter 5 will engage the
particularly divisive issue of civil rights as it related to city institutions during the urban interlude.
In this section, I will dig into the analysis of city delegation cohesion above with a statistical model
of agreement among individual legislators.
The “cohesion gap” described above—the fact that city delegations, despite their relatively
high levels of heterogeneity, are much more cohesive in national politics than their suburban rings,
and usually more cohesive even than congressional parties—is partly a product of the partisan
homogeneity of the delegations these cities send to congress. That is, Chicago and Philadelphia’s
congressional delegations are so cohesive in part because they are so heavily Democratic.43 Sub-
40Krehbiel (1998), Cox and McCubbins (1993), Aldrich (2011)
41The classic “parties v. preferences” debate in the political science literature on legislative behavior is largely over
the independent relative import of “C.”
42This model also complicates Figure 2 in Chapter 2 by breaking “representation” into two main components: na-
tional partisan affiliation (selected by voters) and voting behavior (as finally occurs on the floor of Congress). These
are the two components of congressional studies, and to the extent that they differ, studying roll call behavior is theo-
retically compelling; if congressional party and voting behavior were perfectly correlated (ie, if American parties were
perfectly disciplined), it would become far less interesting to study the latter.
43The cohesion scores for these cities are very close to what we would expect if representatives voted along party
lines. To test this, we can generate “expected” cohesion scores based solely on partisan identification (ie, what would
the cohesion score be if members of city delegation voted according to their partisan affiliation. When we compare these
“expected” cohesion scores to the actual scores, there is no difference over 70 percent of the time. Observed cohesion
is less than expected on 20 percent of votes (almost always when expected cohesion is 1 in Chicago or Philadelphia),
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Figure 4.4: City Delegation Theory: Local city IHIs complicate the traditional model of Congres-
sional representation (denoted by the relationships of A1, A2, and C). Cities with strong IHIs will
have more homogeneous congressional delegations (B2), and their delegates will be more loyal
partisans in roll call voting (B1 and B3).
urban delegations, and those from the other cities, are more split. This observation goes only
halfway to explaining two things. First, geographic proximity is surely a dimension of affinity, so
it seems somewhat “natural” that that city delegations would be made of members of the same
party. But given the heterogeneous demographic building blocks, and political conflict in cities,
this shared partisanship should not be taken for granted. Second, partisan affiliation cannot ex-
plain all of the cohesion we observe in city delegations, because city delegations are typically more
cohesive than the congressional parties, as we can see from the grey lines in Figures 4.2 and 4.3;
and if we break city delegations down into city partisan delegations (ie, New York Democrats and
New York Republicans), they are almost unanimous almost all of the time. Congressional parties
are much more rarely unanimous, despite the fact that coordinating legislative behavior is per-
haps their main purpose. Nevertheless, party certainly matters quite a bit. We can get a glimpse
of how much of city cohesion works through partisanship, and how local institutions still matter
even when we account for party, with a closer analysis of congressional cohesion in a regression
framework.
and cohesion is higher than expected for about ten percent of roll calls. New York, with its notably liberal Manhattan
Republicans, is exceptional, and is more often more cohesive than partisan affiliation would predict.
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4.5 Pairwise cohesion
To evaluate the independent role of cities, city institutions, and congressional parties in shaping
representation, we can use a statistical model of similarity in representation among congressional
dyads to test which factors are associated with two representatives sharing party affiliation, or vot-
ing alike on a given proposal. To the extent that two individuals agree, this is akin to dyad-level
“cohesion,” and the basis for larger cohesive blocs. The underlying logic is that two representa-
tives are more likely to belong to the same party when they come from similar districts, and to
agree on voting in the chamber when they share relevant characteristics such as party affiliation
and constituency pressures.
If cities and their institutions foster cohesion, then city institutions—membership in the same
city delegation, traditional party organization at home—should be independently associated with
a greater tendency to be from the same party and to agree in Congress, even when we account
for other important factors. In each case, the “informal” institutions of city horizontal integration,
which are external to both the chamber and the district that elects the representative, should be
associated with cohesion.
In Figure 4.4, “representation” is disaggregated into two phases: one in which representatives
are selected for membership in the legislature and affiliate with national parties, and one in which
representatives actually vote. Institutions of horizontal integration may be associated with fos-
tering cohesion at each stage: by making it more likely that representatives from a city are in the
same party, and by making it more likely that representatives from a city will vote alike, even
when we account for party affiliation. I will take each of these phases in turn, testing dyad-level
models that estimate the relationships between similarity and agreement at each of these phases
of representation. In each of the analyses, the unit of analysis is a congressional dyad, first a pair
of congress members, and then a pair of votes by those members. We can see what factors are
associated with “agreement” between representatives. I test similar models first in agreement in
members’ partisan identities and then agreement in roll call votes.
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4.5.1 Selecting city delegations
First, I consider the makeup of the city delegation. Sending members from the same party, despite
heterogeneous building blocks that are often oriented as rivals in local politics, is a key way to fos-
ter cohesion in a city delegation. The model of this phase of representation has several observable
implications, which I evaluate below. The basic model to test the jurisdictional IHI hypothesis
(Hypothesis 4.1) at the dyad level is
Pr(Party) = City +Region+ Section+ State+Race+ Class+ Urbanicity +  (4.3)
where each variable is a measure of similarity between the members of the dyad on the measure
indicated. The underlying logic is that precameral similarities are likely to be associated with
membership in the same national party. On all variables, high values indicate similarity, so a
positive coefficient means that similarity on that measure is associated with similarity in the de-
pendent variable of membership in the same congressional party.
For instance, “City” equals 1 if members are members of the same congressional party, 0 other-
wise; if, city delegation theory predicts, membership in the same city is associated with agreement
on roll calls, we expect the coefficient on this term to be greater than zero. This would provide
support for Hypothesis 4.1 above.
Because many factors may be relevant in determining congressional agreement, I include sev-
eral other explanatory variables in the model. First, there are several measures of geographical
proximity. These categorical spatial variables are dichotomous indicators of agreement: 1 if from
the same city, region, section, or state, and 0 otherwise.
Urbanicity measures are available from the USR dataset developed for this project for all of
those congresses. In the regression, the difference between the dyads members’ scores on the
seven-category ordinal USR measure (ranging from a rural 0 to a core city 6) is subtracted from six
to give a measure of similarity on this dimension of demography and district character.44 Thus a
pair of core city districts would have a score of 6, a pair of rural districts a 6, but a pair made up of
44See Appendix 1 for further details on USR variables.
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a city district and a suburban district might have a 2, 3, or 4, depending on the particular character
of the districts in question.45
The demographic measures for dyadic similarity along ethnoracial diversity and class lines
are only available for later congresses (congresses 78 to 105 in most of the columns in the table
below), but were developed using a procedure as follows. “Race” is an estimate of similarity of
the proportion of the electorate identified or identifying as “native white” in each congressional
district. From the 73rd through 89th congresses, this is the total population, minus the proportion
of the voting-eligible population that is black (as estimated using the spatial techniques described
in Appendix 2) minus percent foreign born given by Adler (2012).46 For later years, data on racial
identities including Hispanic and Asian are available from a combination of Lublin (1999) and
Adler (2012). Once each district’s percent white has been estimated, I calculate the difference be-
tween the dyad members’ white populations, and subtract that value from one for use as a measure
of ethnoracial similarity. For class similarity, I use the same procedure, using percent blue-collar
from Adler (2012) as the initial measure. Union membership is an important element of partisan
competition as well, and I include it in Model 3 in the table; however, in Adler (2012) this variable
is measured at the state level and therefore not quite appropriate for a district-level analysis.
In all, there are four measures of spatial-geographic similarity (the primary explanatory vari-
able of interest, City, and three secondary explanatory variables, State, Region, and Section), and
three measures of district-level similarity on urbanicity, ethnoracial identity, and class dimensions.
I estimate a the probit model with congress-level fixed effects to account for shifts in the overall
partisan balance of the chamber (which would affect the baseline probability of two members
being from the same party), with robust standard errors clustered by dyad (to account for con-
tinuities among districts and/or members). The broadest analysis here covers dyads from the
40th through 105th Congresses (from 1865 through 1997, respectively), while the models that in-
clude the class and race variables are limited to congresses where data is available, after the 78th
45This measure of difference on the USR continuum also ranges from 0 to 6, the same as the variable it is constructed
from.
46For estimates of the foreign born population as for African Americans, Adler’s estimates still do suffer from the
issues described in regard to percent black in Appendix 2 and Chapter 6. The “new immigrants” of this era were not
as rigorously separated from native-born population as blacks were from whites, mitigating the problem significantly.
Refining these estimates is an ongoing piece of this project.
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congress.
These models test a few of the observable implications of city delegation theory. First, city in-
stitutions should be related to the partisan composition of city delegations. At the dyad level, this
means that a pair of legislators from the same city is more likely to be from the same party than
an otherwise similar pair that is not from the same city, even when we account for other factors
on which representatives’ districts may be similar. If this is true, the coefficient on “City”, the in-
dicator that representatives represent the same local political community, should be greater than
zero, even when all of these other known contributors to partisan conflict are taken into account.
Further, in keeping with the Organizational Hypothesis above, strong local IHIs should foster
partisan cohesion among representatives from the same city even more. Cities with strong insti-
tutions of horizontal integration, like Chicago and Philadelphia, should have more homogeneous
city delegations, because they are better able to resolve local conflict and pursue a city accord at a
higher level with a delegation that shares a national partisan affiliation. Cities with weak institu-
tions will be relatively disorganized across the city, and their districts will be less likely to cohere
within one party because district-level forces will be more powerful, relative to citywide factors,
in determining the representative from that place. This would be supported if we observe that
the relationship between membership in the same city and same national party was stronger in
cities with strong IHIs than cities with weak IHIs. To test this conditional hypothesis, I add a term
interacting the indicator for a dyad sharing a city with a measure of local party strength David
Mayhew’s Traditional Party Organization (TPO) scores, to Equation 4.3:47
47As in other empirical analyses in this study, TPO scores (which Mayhew assigns at the state level) here are adjusted
to account for Mayhew’s observation that such organizations tend to be most common and strongest in cities. I adjust
the scores based on the accounts available in his text. For ease of interpretation, in this analysis I then recode Mayhew’s
TPO scores (adjusted to account for within-state variation as described in his text) into dichtomous “strong party” and
“weak party” categories, and the variable used in the interaction and accompanying term is an indicator scored 1 if
both members of the dyad were from places with traditional party organizations and 0 otherwise. TPO scores of 4 and
5 were counted as strong, 3 and less counted as weak. Louisiana is the only state that receives a 3 on Mayhew’s scores;
alternative treatments of this state, such as exclusion, coding as either strong or weak, or introducing a third category,
do not affect the substantive results of the analysis.
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Pr(Party) = City∗TPO+City+TPO+Region+Section+State+Race+Class+Urbanicity+
(4.4)
In addition to estimating this interaction model on the full set of congressional dyads, I also
test it on the subset of dyads that consist of two city representatives (from any city), and on the
further subset of dyads made up of two representatives from the same city. In each case, according
to city delegation theory, the strength of city-wide party organizations should be positively asso-
ciated with representatives’ membership in the same party in national politics.
The results for all of these models of congressional representation are included in Table 4.3.
Table 4.4 lists marginal effects of interest, which have a more direct substantive interpretation.
The results and substantive interpretations are broadly consistent across the models and subsets.
We can see here that the coefficients of primary interest, those having to do with the IHIs of city
co-membership and local institutions, are positively associated with membership in the same con-
gressional party, even when we account for other likely factors such as geography and demogra-
phy. In the first three columns, which test the Jurisdictional Hypothesis, the positive, significant
coefficient on City is consistent with the theory that membership in the same local community is
associated with sharing a national political party as well. From Table 4.4, columns 1 and 2 we can
see that membership in the same city is associated with a 17-20 percent increased chance in being
in the same party, depending on the subset of Congresses and whether race and class are included
in the model.
The city boundary itself is not doing all of the work, however. Looking closer, columns 4-6
include tests of the organizational hypothesis, which holds that cities with stronger IHIs will have
more cohesive delegations than cities with weak IHIs. The interactive term City*TPO is the key
variable of interest in columns 4 and 5; in the regression framework, it evaluates the conditional
hypothesis that the relationship between co-membership in a city and co-membership in a con-
gressional party will be stronger in strong-party cities than in weak-party cities. It is positive and
precisely measured in both models, providing support for the idea that strong organizational IHIs
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are associated with citywide agreement.
A clearer interpretation of this conditional hypothesis is illustrated in Figure 4.5, which de-
picts the conditional relationship for the subset of dyads consisting only of pairs of legislators
from large cities.48 The vertical axis is the probability of two representatives belonging to the
same party, all else equal. Along the horizontal axis there are two categories, being from the same
city and not being from the same city. The top line is the probability of being in the same party
for dyads whose members are both from high-TPO cities, the bottom line the probability of being
in the same party for dyads whose members are not both from high-TPO cities (ie, one or neither
of them might be). The important thing to note is that the slope of the top line is much greater
than the slope of the bottom line: while being from the same city makes two representatives more
likely to be in the same congressional party no matter what, the effect is greater for strong-city
dyads. In this group, two strong-party city representatives are about 30 percent likely to be in the
same party if they are not from the same city, but about 51 percent likely to be if they are from the
same city, an increase of about 17 percent. Conversely, two members not both from strong parties
are only about 8 percent more likely to be in the same party if they come from the same city. Thus
in this pool having a strong organizational IHI appears to be about an 8 percent increase in the
effect of being from the same city, a substantively significant increase in “cohesion.”49
In the fifth column, which splits the sample to include only dyads from the same city, the ap-
parent relationship is even stronger: members of a dyad from a strong party city are 13 percent
more likely to have the same national party affiliation than if they are from a weak party city.
These results, incorporating data over most of the 20th century, provide support for the impor-
tance of both jurisdictional and organizational institutions of horizontal integration in fostering
unity within a city delegation through common congressional affiliation—that is, by having one
party win the city’s several elections for congress.50
48Estimates for this Figure were created using Clarify for Stata.
49And statistically significant, though the standard errors on these estimates are not presented graphically here.
50Running the same tests on only congresses from the urban interlude actually increases the magnitude of the coef-
ficients of interest, indicating that the relationship between IHIs and partisan affinity were particularly strong during
that time, though the coefficients are positive and significant in all eras.
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Tests of City IHI Association with Congressional Party Affinity
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
Pool (Dyads) All All All All City Only Same City Only
Congresses (45+) (77+) (77+) (77+) (77+) (77+)
City*TPO 0.28* 0.29*
(0.039) (0.039)
SameCity .44* 0.51* .52* 0.31* 0.39*
(.011) (0.015) (.016) (0.035) (0.036)
High TPO -0.068* -.08* 0.37*
(0.002) (0.004) (0.047)
SameState -.088* -0.12* -.11* -0.11* -0.24*
(.003) (0.004) (.004) (0.004) (0.007)
SameSection .25* 0.09* .12* 0.11* -.14*
(.0012) (0.001) (.002) (0.0019) (0.003)
SameRegion .17* 0.17* .17* 0.18* .12*
(.001) (0.002) (.002) (0.0022) (0.004)
Urbanicity .0097* 0.013* 0.12* 0.012* 0.077* .026
(.0038) (0.0062) (.001) (0.001) (0.0011) (0.11)
Race -0.12* -.12* -0.14* -.39* -1.63*
(0.012) (.012 (0.012) (0.019) (0.23)
Class -0.006 -0.11 -1.14* 13.83*
(0.06) (0.0659) (.12) (1.81)
Union -.005*
(.0002)
Pseudo-R2 .02 0.007 .007 0.0067 0.013 .0727
N 5,880,127 2,625,712 2,625,712 2,625,712 736,162 7,735
Table 4.3: Probit Regression Results: CCity Delegation Models with different samples of con-
gressional dyads. Dependent variable is membership in same congressional party, independent
variables are measures of similarity on the variable listed at left. Cell entries are probit regression
coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered by dyad. Congress fixed effects not listed here.
*p < .05
Marginal effects of IHI and other explanatory variables
on Congressional Party Affinity, 78th-105th Congress
Model 1 2 4 5 6
Dyads All All All City Only Same City Only
(Post-78) (Post-78) (Post-78) (Post-78)
City*TPO (Fig. 4.5) 0.11*
City .17* 0.20* 0.12* 0.15*
TPO -0.027* -.032* .13*
State -.034* -0.050* -0.042* -0.10*
Section .10* 0.040* 0.043* 0.056*
Region .069* 0.070* 0.070* -0.049*
Urbanicity .0039* 0.0050* 0.0046* 0.031* -0.008
RaceSim -0.052* -0.055* -.16 -0.52*
ClassSim -0.002 -0.0045 -.45* 4.35*
Table 4.4: Marginal Effects: City Delegation Models with different samples of congressional
dyads. Cell entries are the marginal effects of similarity on dimensions at left on dyad co-
membership in congressional party. Estimated with covariates held at appropriate levels. *p < .05
Note Model 3, which included a state-level measure of union membership, not included in this
table.
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Effects of SameCity for Cities with 
















Figure 4.5: Strength of Same-city effect on large-city dyads by organization-type. Congressional
dyads, 1939-1999. Each line represents the modeled probability of two members being in the
same party, depending on whether they are in the same city. The top line represents pairs from
strong-party cities, the bottom line pairs not both from strong-party cities. The slope of the line
for strong-party cities is greater than the slope for non-strong party cities. Difference in slope
significant at p < .05, verified using method described in Brambor, Clark and Golder (2005) (not
presented here). Sources: USR data, Voteview, Adler (2012),Lublin (1999). Estimated using Clarify in
Stata.
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4.5.2 Discussion: Homogeneous delegations from heterogeneous constituencies
The results above provide support for the key hypotheses that local IHIs foster unity in the first
phase of congressional representation, the selection of partisan representatives. Other results of
the models are worth noting: being from the same region and section is positively associated with
membership in the same party, but dyads from the same state are less likely to represent the same
party, all else equal. This may reflect intrastate rivalries of various sorts. District-level character-
istics include some surprises: while being similar in place character makes districts more likely to
come from the same party (this reflects the broader urban-rural divide), class and race seem far
less important, and similarity on these dimensions is actually associated with being represented
by members of different parties—though note that when the sample includes only districts from
the same city, the variables take on greater substantive significance, and the sign on the class vari-
able switches, indicating that within cities, class and copartisanship are more closely associated.
Finally, the extremely low pseudo-R-squared measure on the largest pools of dyads indicates that
even these measures of “prepolitical” geographic and demographic similarity do not account for
very much of the variation in the outcome variable. Politics is obviously complex, and simple
similarity between districts tells us less than one percent of the story of who wins office in any
given dyad.
4.5.3 Cohesive voting
The results of the previous analysis indicate that local IHIs are associated with representation by
members of the same national party. This is obviously important, as congressional party is a strong
predictor of how a member will ultimately vote in the halls of congress. But it is not the whole
story. In addition to contributing to city delegations with unified party membership, institutions
of horizontal integration should prompt cohesion in final voting. The step-by-step model of rep-
resentation in Figure 4.4 includes a second site where IHIs can foster cohesion in representation,
at the moment of roll call voting. In Figure 4.4, this is informally indicated by arrows B1 and B3.
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Some of the effects of IHIs work indirectly through congressional party (ie, via pathways B2 and
C), but because national American congressional parties are not strong or disciplined themselves,
we may be able to observe a direct relationship between IHIs and legislative agreement.
In this section, I build on the previous analysis to consider whether membership in common
IHIs fosters representational agreement even beyond membership in the same national party. In
this dyadic analysis, membership in the same city delegation should be associated with agreement
on final roll call votes, and this tendency should be strongest in cities with strong institutions of
horizontal integration, all else equal. These effects should be manifest even when we control for
congressional party, though some of the city’s effects flow through congressional party and into roll
call voting behavior. I test this hypothesis with additional regression analyses of roll call votes,
analogous to those in the previous section. In the previous comparisons of congresspersons’
identities, there was just one observation per dyad per congress, and the dependent variable mea-
sured whether the seats were held by members of the same party. To analyze agreement on roll
call votes, the dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator of whether the two representatives
in the dyad agree in their vote.
In these analyses, there is one observation per “complete” dyad on a vote—a dyad is consid-
ered complete if both members voted on that particular roll call. The dyad is coded 1 if the two
members of the dyad cast the same vote, zero if they disagreed.51 I then regress this agreement in-
dicator on several covariates of similarity between the dyad elements. As in the analysis of party
affinity, the explanatory variables are all measures of similarity, and values are the same for all
roll calls in a given Congress: members’ similarity in party, and districts’ similarity in urbanicity,
traditional party organization, racial (percent native white) and class composition (blue collar and
union) where available, region, section, and state.
To assemble data for this analysis, I used the set of roll call votes identified as pertaining to
domestic policy by the American Institutions Project from the 73rd through 89th Congress, the
range approximating the urban interlude. There are 1711 of these votes. Because the dyadic anal-
ysis creates very large datasets (about 90,000 dyads per vote), including all of these votes makes
51Missing votes were dropped from the pool from which dyads were constructed. Representatives taking a clear
position in absentia with a “paired” vote as recorded in the Congressional Record are included in complete dyads.
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the following analysis computationally unwieldy. I randomly selected 150 contested votes from
this larger set of 1711.52 Thus for the subsequent dyadic analysis of roll-call votes, I employ the
following model to test the Jurisdictional Hypothesis:
Pr(AgreeV ote) = City+Party+Region+Section+State+Race+Class+Urbanicity+  (4.5)
where with the expectation that if membership in the same local polity fosters cohesion, the
coefficient on City will be positive.
Testing the Organizational Hypothesis is a bit more complicated, because simply interacting
traditional party organization with same-city origins is not enough; if local organizations matter,
being from different parties in a strong-party city might make a dyad less likely to agree than an
opposite-party dyad with no local basis for rivalry. I thus test this hypothesis on a much smaller
subset of the data: those dyads composed of two representatives from the same city and the same
congressional party. If the organizational hypothesis is correct, then those dyads that come from
cities with strong local IHIs, as indicated by their TPO scores, should be more likely to agree than
dyads that come from cities with weak IHIs. Formally, this model is
Pr(AgreeV ote) = TPO +Race+ Class+ Urbanicity +  (4.6)
estimated using only dyads where city and party are the same, with the theoretical expecta-
tion that the coefficient on TPO will be greater than zero. In essence, this test “controls” for the
effects of jurisdictional IHIs (by including only dyads whose elements come from the same city)
and congressional party. An observed difference between dyads from cities cities with different
52A contested vote is one on which the majority had less than 75 percent of the total votes cast, except in the 73rd,
74th, 75th, and 86th congress, where a contested vote is one on which the majority had less than 85 percent of the total
votes cast (several of these congresses were very one-sided in favor of the Democrats, so even party-line votes were
likely to have 75 percent on one side). I repeated the analysis several times with different samples of 150 from the
pool of 1711, and using different samples does not seem to change the inferential substance of the analysis. With more
computing power and/or time, I can formally increase confidence in these results, but it seems unlikely that they will
change much.
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strength of local parties would support the theory that the shape of local institutions matter for
national representation.
The following analyses test these hypotheses associated with city delegation theory using roll
calls from the 73rd through 90th congresses (roughly spanning the urban interlude). Multiple
results are presented here to illustrate both robustness across slightly different subsamples of
the data (given limited availability of class variables) and because the different models illustrate
slightly different aspects of the patterns in the data. First, for models 1 through 3, I test a sample of
all roll calls identified by the American Institutions Project dataset as having to do with domestic
policy from the urban interlude.53 There are over 1,700 such votes, and there about 90,000 voting
dyads associated with each of them; this number made analysis computationally unwieldy. For
the results presented here, I sampled ten percent of those votes, and dropped uncontested votes
from that sample.54 After sampling, the dataset for analysis included 6,411,206 total observations
on 72 roll calls.55 In Table 4.5, these analyses are indicated by the label “All” in the top row. Sec-
ond, I run the analysis using a set of votes that should be of particular interest to city delegations.
These are the votes having to do with Housing, Public Works and Infrastructure, Urban and Re-
gional Development, and Public Works Employment, again as identified by the AIP classification
system.56 The relationships predicted by the city delegation theory should be particularly strong
on these votes, which have to do with a city’s interest.
Finally, I test the Organizational hypothesis with the same sample of votes from models 1
through 3 (a subset of all contested domestic affairs votes), but include only dyads from the same
city and same party in the analysis. In this model, the key variable of interest is the indicator for lo-
cal party strength, which is scored 1 if the dyad comes from a high-TPO city, and 0 if it comes from
a low-TPO city. Measures of regional, sectional, and state similarity are dropped here (because all
53The AIP Top-Tier category “Domestic Affairs.”
54Contested votes are those on which neither side won more than 80 percent of the vote; I employ this somewhat
unusually high level because of some particularly one-sided congresses during the era under investigation.
55Alternative trials and samples, which included different votes, yielded results that were substantively the same as
those presented here.
56These are all third-tier substance categories in the AIP, subsets of the broader Domestic Affairs category used in
models 1-3.
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representatives from the same city are necessarily share those higher levels of geographic affinity).
Again, in each of these models, the dependent variable is agreement between two members
casting votes on a roll call. All models presented were estimated with congress- and vote-level
fixed effects to account for dynamics that might make agreement more or less likely during a
congress or on a particular vote (though note that because uncontested votes were dropped, the
votes in the analysis received between 50 and 80 percent support from the winning side in any
case, so there is not a huge amount of variation there). Model 5, which includes only pairs from
the same city and party, includes city-level fixed effects as well to account for unobserved features
of particular cities that may make agreement more likely.57 Table 4.5 lists the results of these five
models evaluating the relationships predicted by city delegation theory and IHIs. Cells of primary
interest for tests of city delegation theory are highlighted in grey.
In this table, we can see that the hypotheses related to the primary coefficients of interest are
supported by the data. Being from the same city is positively associated with legislative agree-
ment, even when we account for a host of other factors that might be important in determining
voting position, particularly legislative party. Among dyads whose members both come from
the same city and party, those from strong local-party cities are also more likely to agree. Taking
these results a step further for ease of interpretation, Table 4.6 lists the marginal effects associated
with the coefficients above, calculated while holding the other variables constant at appropriate
values.58
These estimated marginal relationships provide support for the idea that being from the same
city does indeed foster cohesion among representatives in roll call behavior. Even when we ac-
count for other obvious factors like party affiliation, demography, and geographical proximity,
57Each of these models was also run without each set of fixed effects, and without any fixed effects at all, as a robust-
ness check in case these many indicators were biasing results (especially in case they were prompting false positives).
In all cases, the key substantive interpretations of the coefficients of interest (ie, sign of coefficient and precision of
estimation) were not affected by the inclusion of these indicators. In models without the indicators, the magnitude of
the key relationships were actually larger, so the results presented here are relatively conservative, when compared to
models that exclude the indicators for congress, vote, and city.
58The geographic variables are all binary indicators of similarity, so marginal effects were estimated holding these
constant at zero, which was both mode and median in each case, and therefore “typical.” The demographic measures
of similarity (on urbanicity, race, and class variables) were held at their median. This is the same procedure used to
create the estimates in Table 4.4.
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Marginal effects of IHI and other explanatory variables
on Congressional Party Affinity, 78th-105th Congress
Model 1 2 3 4 5
Dyads All All All “City” Votes Same City, Party
Congresses (73-89) (78-89) (78-89) (78-89) (78-89)
City .06* .09* .09* 0.12*
Party .25* .27 .27* .28*
TPO 0.21*
State .02* .02* -.011* .009
Section .017* .002* -.009* -.03
Region .005* -.001* -.000 -0.009*
Urbanicity .009* .0050* .012* 0.031* -0.04
Race -.11 -0.07* -.055* .17 -.09*
Class .057 .0051* .012*
Union .002
Table 4.6: Marginal Effects: City Delegation Models with different samples of congressional
dyads. Cell entries are the marginal effects of similarity on dimensions at left on dyad co-
membership in congressional party. Estimated with covariates held at appropriate levels. *p < .05
representatives from the same city were, on average, about six to nine percent more likely to agree
on domestic policy than members not from the same city. This relationship was particularly strong
on the issues that city governments mobilized around during the New Deal, including housing
and public works. On these issues, the marginal increase in probability of members of the same
city delegation agreeing rose to 12 percent. Sharing a city matters more on issues that matter more
for cities.
Finally, the test of the organizational hypothesis on the subset of dyads whose members were
from the same city and party also provides support for city delegation theory. Local copartisans
who were from places with strong local parties, which provide stronger links between representa-
tives from different parts of a city, were about 21 percent more likely to agree than local copartisans
from places with weak local institutions. This is an almost unbelievably strong relationship, given
the common sense believe that two representatives from the same city and in the same party might
almost always agree in any case. But not only are pairs from cities with strong organizational IHIs
more likely to share party affiliation, they are also more likely to be more cohesive partisan dele-
gations when it comes time to vote. These local party organizations provide a strong glue holding
representatives of heterogeneous constituencies together in the final phase of representation.
Again, the results of these dyad-level regressions support the main hypothesis of city dele-
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gation theory: that sharing common local institutional and political roots makes representatives
more cohesive. Pairs of representatives that come from the same city are more likely to agree on
roll call votes than pairs that do not, and this is especially true for those pairs that both come from
cities with strong institutions of horizontal integration. Moreover, pairs of representatives from
cities with such institutions (the most important of which are the traditional party organizations
tested here) are more likely to come from the same party than those pairs who do not. Since par-
tisan affiliation is an especially strong force for congressional behavioral agreement (that’s what
these parties are for, more than anything else), creating a city delegation that is monolithic in its
partisan identity is an important means by which local parties operate.
4.6 Discussion
The analyses in this chapter provide evidence of the association between extracameral institutions
of horizontal integration and legislative cohesion predicted by city delegation theory. Cities are
more cohesive in their legislative behavior than are other collections of legislators, and cities with
strong IHIs are more cohesive than cities with weak IHIs. This cohesion is partly attributable to
the election of representatives that tend to be from the same party. Dyads from the same city are
more likely to be affiliated with the same party, and this relationship is even stronger in cities with
strong traditional parties. But even beyond party membership, city delegations foster cohesion in
roll call voting on domestic policy issues. Representatives from the same city are more likely to
agree with each other than those not from the same city, even across party lines, an indication that
something like a city interest is being represented; representatives from the same city but from
different parties may be cooperating or competing for the same median voter (or each at different
times), but they are ultimately agreeing on policies relevant to the cities they represent.
Finally, among city representatives, those from the same local party are extremely cohesive.
Chicago Democrats were unanimous on 85 percent of votes during the urban interlude; New York
Democrats on 75 percent. These percentages increase to 90 percent (for each city) on “key” votes
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on which the parties were disagreed.59 Despite the fact that their constituencies were often quite
different on important dimensions like race and class, these blocs of legislative voters consistently
spoke with one voice for a city position, and were particularly cohesive when their votes were
most valuable. Whether this pattern of relationships holds for all substantive policy areas, or only
those most relevant to cities (like “city” or domestic roll calls) is an area for further investigation.
Even when we account for many other geographic, demographic, and political factors that fos-
ter similar representation, city institutions are related to representation on domestic issues, par-
ticularly those of most obvious relevance to a city’s ability to manage the governance challenges
of urbanicity. Institutions that link city constituencies make them more cohesive in their partisan
affiliation and more likely to agree on policy. Of course, there is still much work that remains to
more fully understand the precise mechanism for cohesion. For one, even with the inclusion of
many likely explanatory factors, the model in this chapter still does not account for very much
of the overall variation in whether or not dyads ultimately agree. But this is not an issue unique
to the questions at hand—after all, I include what is thought to be the main determinant of vote
behavior (national party) as an explanation in the model.
Second, a quantitative analysis like this cannot quite get into the why or how of city delegation
cohesion. Electoral processes may lead to the selection of representatives that are more alike than
their districts, or at least more mindful of citywide issues, and inclined to cohere based on some-
thing akin to true “preferences.” Such an arrangement would foster cohesion fairly simply and
without the active exercise of power. Alternatively, discipline and monitoring by a central orga-
nizational leader may have been more continually applied, if the different pressures of different
constituencies pulled representatives in different directions. This would entail more application of
the subtle tools available to citywide organizations and their leaders, such as rearranging electoral
slates, weakening incumbents or allowing challenges. The first possibility is widely assumed; the
second would be very difficult to see. It is likely that both realities obtained in different circum-
stances and combinations, as Snowiss (1966) observed late in the urban interlude.
The broader theoretical contribution of this analysis is to identify a set of institutions that are
59Key votes are votes of particular importance to cities as identified in Congressional Quarterly weekly reports. See
Caraley (1976).
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external to the formal, ideal models of representation that focus on factors internal to the congress
(like national party affiliation) or to a particular constituency (like demography). The city and
related institutions “should be” irrelevant to national representation; but something about cities
foster cohesion among their representatives to an extent the usual suspects cannot fully explain.
Such institutions linking several constituencies who have something in common at the local level
(membership in a common political community and/or in a local political organization whose
primary aims are focused at the local level), despite differences in the building blocks of politics,
contribute to their commonality at a higher level as well.
4.7 Conclusion
The large cities upon which the urban political order was built were famous for fractious (and
recurrently violent) politics at home, but they are notable for the cohesive way they represent
themselves in national politics, on domestic issues in particular. More, differences in overall cohe-
sion among city delegations are related to the institutional configuration of the cities themselves:
cities with traditional party organizations are also more cohesive in national politics, in part be-
cause they elect more members from the same party. By creating such cohesive representative
units, institutions of horizontal integration foster vertical integration as well: they transmit a dis-
ciplined, cohesive style of city politics into the higher legislature, making the effects of their local
institutions felt in national legislative politics.
Beyond the parties themselves, it is certainly possible that other informal, extracameral local
institutions may serve similar functions in places where traditional parties were not (or are no
longer) present. In midcentury Detroit, for instance, the nominally nonpartisan local politics were
often dominated by CIO unions, notably the UAW.60 In many formally nonpartisan cities, reform-
style regimes may have integrated politics at the times when they held political “monopolies”
(as described in Trounstine (2008)), though the foregoing analysis indicates that nonpartisan cities
60Mayhew (1986), p.157
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tended to be more divided than those with partisan institutions in general.61 The precise institu-
tions can change or adapt over time as well. In contemporary Chicago, for instance, local politics
have been formally nonpartisan since the late 1980s, but there has been little experiential doubt of
the continued power of the machine there, or of its sustained organizational ties up and down the
chain of political authority.
The cohesive force of city delegations complicates Tip O’Neill’s famous observation that “all
politics is local.” We usually understand this to mean that a politician will be responsive to his
or her constituency’s interests, and potentially resistant to a national party line when the local
conflicts with the national. This is true to a point, but we must be careful about how we under-
stand “local,” at least for city politicians. The cohesion of big-city delegations indicates that city
representatives are responsive to the city, including the part that they do not formally represent,
as well as to their own particular district within the city. In each case, from the relatively weak
ties of jurisdictional integration to the stronger bonds of organization-based linkages, the ultimate
point is that for city representatives, important local politics can happen outside a representative’s
district, even though they are still “local.”
These facts—that cities foster cohesion even though their component parts are very different
from each other, and that particular constellations of local institutions, especially parties, further
amplify it—present both a puzzle and a key insight for understanding the role of cities in na-
tional political institutions. These city delegations, heterogeneous rivals at home but united in
the nation, form the backbone of the “Blue” alignment of the Democratic Party today, making up
the cross-city alliance described in the previous chapter. The next chapter addresses a key area
in which the cohesive forces of institutions of IHIs were particularly important: the advance of
civil rights for African Americans during the urban interlude. This development, shaped by local
institutions, restructured American partisan politics and reinforced the place of cities within the
Democratic Party.
61Additionally, the “reform” cities of the West and Southwest usually had smaller city delegations because of the
timing of their development in national history. This does not mean their politics could not possibly be horizontally
integrated, but it makes it more difficult to appreciate empirically.
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Chapter 5
Anti-racism without Anti-racists: City
Representation and Racial Realignment
Lynching is called an American institution. . . They protected life and property, at least
in a way, and made those sections of the country, where there was no organized gov-
ernment, very safe sections in which to live.
Rep. Hatton Sumners (D-TX), 19341
The frontier days are gone, and few of us familiar with the rigors of living in that era
are likely to bewail its departure.
Rep. John Rooney (D-NYC), 19492
The only genuine difference between a southern white and a Chicago white was in
their accent.
Mike Royko, Boss3
1“Punishment for the Crime of Lynching,” Hearing of Subcommittee on S. 1978, Judiciary, HRG-1934-SJS-0003, p.237
2“Federal Fair Employment Practice Act,” Hearing of Special Subcommittee on Fair Employment Standards Act,
HRG-1949-EDL-0005, p. 8
3Royko (1971), p.139
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In the previous chapters, we have seen that the consolidation of the urban political order dur-
ing the New Deal provided a base of support for national state interventions in the economy. City
representatives were notable for their liberalism in such matters. City representation in national
politics is also marked by cohesion related to institutions of horizontal integration, which fos-
ter unified representation from local polities that are heterogeneous and fractious at home. One
dimension of difference that has always been particularly divisive in American politics is race.
Throughout the long New Deal era, conflicts within the parties over these issues created a “second
dimension” in American politics, on which the usual alignments did not hold. Today’s political
alignment reflects the parties’ resolution of those conflicts, such that the sides in conflicts over the
role of government in the economy and about race overlap. Neither of these dimensions of con-
flict has disappeared, but rather the two reinforce each other. The role of place character and local
institutions of horizontal integration in bringing the two dimensions together is the subject of this
chapter.
The New Deal realignment was marked by a major, lasting shift of city constituencies to the
Democratic Party, and this bloc supported an agenda generally congenial to big-city interests,
among others. The Democrats quickly became the party of the cities.4 This bloc of blocs, however,
did not enter a void. Democrats had dominated politics in Southern states since the region’s re-
entry after Reconstruction, and had long been the core of the national Democratic Party. Deeply
conservative on racial and cultural matters, and wary of any centralization of power that might
threaten their regional racial order and political economy, representatives from the South made it
clear early on that this would be a central dimension of conflict in the expanded New Deal coali-
tion.
Managing this sectional conflict within a large and heterogeneous coalition demanded skill
and compromise, and eventually the ties that bound the alliance would fray. In the end, the
sectional wings parted ways, and after a long process of sorting out, the contemporary partisan
divide—with the South as the “Red” base of the GOP and cities as the heart of “Blue” Democratic
support—represents the full flowering of the seeds sown in the New Deal realignment of 1928-
4Mayhew (1966)
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1932.
Most accounts of this partisan change focus on the transition of conservative Southern Democrats
to the Republican fold, the most estranged of the strange bedfellows coalition of the New Deal.
Southern elites were infamously racist, and the re-emergence of racial civil rights on the national
agenda understandably alienated them from the party of white supremacy they had built. In this
chapter, however, I focus on the other wing of the party, the cities outside the South, where race
was also a deeply divisive issue, and the source of great contention, but where local circumstances
and institutions fostered durable support for racial liberalism in national politics.
5.1 Racial Realignment
The 1960s is sometimes identified as the key moment of political change over race, but in truth
it is more of a midpoint, because the process of Democratic decay took place over decades. The
southern and urban wings of the party were never natural ideological allies, on race or much
else, and signs of southern frustration with urban Democrats were apparent even before the New
Deal elections of the 1930s consolidated Democratic strength in the cities. In 1928, several south-
ern states “defected” from the Democratic column for the first time since the Civil War, when
the party chose an urbanite, Alfred E. Smith, the Catholic former mayor of New York City, as its
presidential nominee. This was a conflict as much over city-country differences as about section.5
The Dixiecrat revolt of 1948, in which Strom Thurmond led a southern protest against Truman’s
civil rights platform, followed 20 years later, and a more durable departure by Southerners from
the Democrats took place in the 1960s, as the heart of the South went for Goldwater, and then for
Wallace, Nixon, and Reagan. Today, the South is the baseline of the Republican strategy to win the
White House.
In Congressional seats, the southern transition to the GOP began later, with some erosion of
5Key (1955b) identifies 1928 as a “critical” election in his early contribution to realignment theory, and Andersen
(1979) also includes it in her key period of urban party transformation. In addition to (or perhaps as a corollary of) being
Catholic, Smith was also a proponent of prohibition repeal, long an issue that divided rural and urban constituencies,
not just offended the South (Buenker (1973).
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Proportion of House Southerners in Democratic Party







Figure 5.1: Share of Southern House seats held by Democrats, post-Civil War congresses. (Census
Regional Definition)
southern “solidity” taking place in the 1960s, but it was not until the 1990s that a majority of
southern members of Congress were Republicans (See Figure 5.1). Today, there are fewer South-
ern Democrats in the House than at any point since the end of Reconstruction.6 The existence of
this intraparty cleavage is well-known, but the party’s internal conflicts were not only sectional—
the New Deal coalition included some of the strangest bedfellows imaginable. In the Democratic
electoral base, white southerners were joined principally by polyphonous industrial cities, where
organized labor, African Americans, and newly mobilized ethnic whites had deeply felt conflicts
of their own at the mass level. Among urban Democratic elites, the decades-long rivalry between
machine-style party organizations and their local opponents (often self-described as reformers)
continued, now sometimes manifest at the national level, as in the 1932 nomination battle be-
tween New Yorkers Franklin Roosevelt and Al Smith.7 Because the partisan electoral realignment
unfolded slowly and unevenly across decades, it is not entirely clear precisely when the realign-
ment “took place” and scholars are still debating its mechanics.8 There is considerable scholarly
6And most of those who remain come from minority-majority districts, reflecting the region’s continuing extreme
racial polarization.
7Dorsett (1977), Buenker (1973), Mayhew (1986)
8The strongest versions of realignment theory identify critical elections as moments of rapid, generational change in
political alliances.Key (1955a), Burnam (1970), Mayhew (2002) If we allow for a more fragmented or syncopated process
of national political change, rather than one in which an outdated system fractures sharply and re-forms durably and
coherently, a softer version of realignment theory can help us understand the more gradual shift that was initiated by
CHAPTER 5. CITIES AND RACE 169
consensus as to why it occurred, however: race. The conflicts in America and within the Demo-
cratic Party over the Civil Rights movement made obvious the incoherence of a political alliance
whose most stalwart elements included both the beneficiaries of the southern racial order and
African Americans.
The classic narrative of how race undid the previous national alignment focuses on key, visible
moments around 1960 and after. In their account of “issue evolution” and partisan realignment,
Carmines and Stimson (1989) focus on the role of contingency and elite political choice in describ-
ing how Republicans came to embrace racial conservatism. In this telling, the critical moment is
the Republicans’ presidential nomination of Barry Goldwater, a non-southerner who opposed the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 by articulating a racial conservatism based on non-interference by federal
authorities in local matters. Goldwater wooed the South (if no other states) with this strategy,
and subsequent Republican candidates have had national success building on it.9 Carmines and
Stimson see this move by the GOP as a reversal—prior to this moment, they contend, the Repub-
licans were still the “Party of Lincoln,” and on aggregate the more liberal of the two parties on
racial issues—and thus this account of political change focuses chiefly on strategic decisions made
at that historical moment by Republican leaders seeking to escape permanent minority status by
driving a racial wedge into the Democratic Party.
A more recent literature has revived the closer investigation of the intraparty dynamics that
led to the Democratic schism, however, and complicated the story of how the parties were ori-
ented toward controversial racial issues during this epoch.10 While Carmines and Stimson focus
on the two parties in aggregate for evidence of realignment and party positioning on race, and
see the partisan evolution of race as highly contingent, the alternative approach disaggregates the
Democratic Party during the long New Deal and sees more long-term forces at work, shaping
party decisions and dispositions well before 1964. Scholarship in this area identifies an essentially
tripartite system throughout the era, with the southern and non-southern Democrats deeply di-
the New Deal alignment and not fully mature until seventy years later. This shift was the growth of the urban-rural
divide as a powerful organizing principal in national politics and political ideology.
9See, for example, Edsall and D. (1991).
10Eric Schickler and Ira Katznelson, working separately with several coauthors, have been central in this growing
literature. See, for instance, Feinstein and Schickler (2008), Schickler, Pearson and Feinstein (2010),Katznelson and
Kryder (1993), Katznelson and Farhang (2005), Katznelson and Mulroy (2012).
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vided and operating as separate blocs on many crucial issues. 11
One side of this tripartite account of congressional politics focuses on the development of
racial conservatism as a political force, well before the 1960s. A conservative coalition consisting
of southern Democrats and Republicans emerged as early as the 1930s, and became more frequent
in appearance and successful in its opposition to progressive legislation during World War II and
in the postwar era.12 While the southern “defections” from the developing suite of non-southern
Democratic positions were most dramatic on explicitly racial issues such as anti-lynching legisla-
tion, the conservative coalition also stymied a range of policy initiatives held dear by the urban
wing of the party, including those having to do with housing, urban redevelopment, labor conflict,
and political economy.13 Racial conflict and the divergence of the partisan wings were present and
important much earlier, and spread to a broadening set of ostensibly non-racial policy areas.14.
This alternative account provides a background for Carmines and Stimson’s critical moment
around 1960, when national Republicans explicitly embraced racial conservatism as a core issue.
When we see race at the roots of the recurrent conservative coalition, it changes our understand-
ing of the apparent dramatic reversals of the 1960s. The proper evolutionary metaphor for the
racial realignment may not be punctuated equilibrium (with an emphasis on rapid, unpredictable
bursts of change) but of more gradual, less dramatic “Darwinian” change. Looking more closely
at the dynamics of race over the long New Deal era leaves a far less important role for contingency
and elite strategy in the 1960s.15
11The conservative coalition between southerners and Republicans was no secret at the time, and has been used to ex-
plain other policy outcomes as well (see Sitkoff (1978), Mollenkopf (1983), but placing this constellation of congressional
alliances at the heart of the realignment story is a relatively recent analytical connection.
12Sitkoff (1978)
13Biles (2011), Mollenkopf (1983), Katznelson and Farhang (2005)
14Katznelson and Mulroy (2012)
15Feinstein and Schickler (2008)
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5.1.1 Urban Strange Bedfellows
The recurrent conservative coalition in Congress was crucial for the later national partisan re-
alignment, but a focus on Southern racial pathology only goes halfway to explaining how race
could transform American politics during this era. After all, the importance of the existing racial
order to southern whites was no secret, and throughout the Long New Deal these Southern
Democrats viewed many issues through a racial lens, altering or rejecting proposed policies that
even hinted at a threat to their regional racial order, and national party elites worked hard to
keep race from collapsing the coalition.16 This racial conservatism was not a change, of course—
southern Democrats had worked since the Revolutionary War to strengthen white supremacy, and
to insulate its southern version from federal intervention, and they had been particularly success-
ful in the late 19th and early 20th century. After the Southern “redemption” after Reconstruction,
race and civil rights had been remade into a regional issue, and was basically absent from the
congressional agenda for the first three decades of the 20th century, when the general trend was
to reinforce white supremacy, or at least ignore its ugliest regional manifestations.17
For national Democratic elites, then, the decision to embrace racial liberalism was far from auto-
matic or hasty. The position Southerners held within the Democratic Party, especially in Congress,
and their intransigence on race, made any policies or agenda that would undermine white supremacy
both difficult to enact and politically risky. The push to change that demands explanation is how
the exponents of racial egalitarianism could become a compelling enough political force that the
northern wing of the Democratic Party would embark down the road to civil rights, consciously
alienating a large part of their governing coalition in a strategic move that seems unpromising in
a majoritarian system.
The rise of racial liberalism during this time has been explored mainly as a function of dedi-
16Katznelson (2005), Lieberman (2001)
17Katznelson (2012), Smith and King (2005), Woodward (1955)) Beyond the usually-noted black-white racial divide,
specifically Anglo-Saxon white supremacy specifically was a prominent theme in discussions of immigration and do-
mestic policy as well, and a core theme in the age’s scientific understanding of humanity and society. See, eg. Ngai
(N.d.), ?
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cated activists and partisan constituents fighting for anti-racist goals against long odds.18 But
the strategic moves to embrace racial liberalism and foreseeably alienate the south should not
seem so simply a function of constituency pressure, because another main thread of political sci-
ence, engaged with local urban politics, holds that even outside the south the core elements of
the Democratic alliance were hardly what we would call antiracist. While “union leaders, African
Americans, ADA liberals, and Jews” were important members of the coalition, it is not obvious
that this collection of liberal ideologues is the group that “northern Democrats most depended
upon for votes and activist support” in the party’s key urban strongholds,19 because these very
same cities, and the most important Democratic organizations within them, were often the site
of strong racial hierarchies themselves. New York and Chicago, pre-eminent within the hierar-
chy of cities and Democratic organizations during this era for their importance in winning seats
in Congress and two vital swing states, were places where such “programmatic liberals” were
important members of the Democratic Party, but they were hardly dominant in the local organi-
zations crucial to electoral victory.
In addition to these important groups, there were other important (ie, numerous and/or or-
ganizationally powerful) members of the coalition, even outside the south, who were not natural
members of the pro-civil rights coalition. Rank-and-file union members themselves were loyal
partisans, but throughout the midcentury era the weight of the evidence is that they were at least
split on race, if not generally hostile to racial egalitarianism.20 For instance, in the 1952 Ameri-
can National Elections Study, only 25 percent of white, non-southern union members supported
federal fair employment legislation, a central element of the civil rights agenda at that moment.21
Overlapping significantly with, but not identical to, union members in northern cities were the
legions of “ethnic” whites, a massive group that probably made up a plurality of the nonsouthern
urban Democratic electorate and were the most important constituency mobilized for the massive
18See, for example, Sitkoff (1978), Sugrue (2008)
19Schickler, Pearson and Feinstein (2010), p. 688
20Frymer (2007), Nelson (2001),Boyle (1998)
21Author’s tabulation of responses to 1952 ANES variable V520047. This is roughly consistent with preliminary anal-
yses of polling from a decade earlier, when white non-southern FDR supporters were split on federal fair employment
(41 percent in favor, 39 percent opposed) while white non-southern Republicans were strongly opposed, 27 percent in
favor, 59 percent opposed. See Schickler (2009), p.50.
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Democratic gains of 1932-1936.22 These groups were mobilized for the Democrats, but they were
never noted for their racial progressivism, as veteran Chicago reporter Mike Royko argued in the
quote at the beginning of this chapter; indeed, to the extent that they shared common identity, it
was often articulated in terms of the fact that they were not black, and eligible for the privileges of
white status in the United States at that time.23 In countless instances, members of or subsets of
this heterogeneous group were the antagonists in the racial conflict that periodically beset almost
all cities throughout this era, and over time their bloc loyalty to the Democrats would erode.24
If the mass of the urban Democratic base was not mobilized for racial liberalism, not all non-
southern Democratic elites should be counted as staunch ideological supporters of racial comity,
either. At the local intersection between the electorate and institutional politics in many impor-
tant Democratic cities sat traditional party organizations, the “bosses” and their political kith.
While they may have been past their prime in local politics, this was the heyday of urban tradi-
tional party organization in the nation: never before or since have so many city representatives
come from such organizations.25 These autonomous organizational leaders, famous for being al-
most by definition non-programmatic about much of anything, were not typically dependent on
African Americans or ideological racial liberals for their position; their relationships with such
groups were varied and complex.26 By their liberal contemporaries and in hindsight, the tradi-
tional parties were often judged conservative, corrupt, and unresponsive.27 While some of these
party chieftains reached out to African Americans as they arrived in massive numbers during the
waves of the Great Migration, these moves were usually interpreted as pragmatic (not part of an
antiracist ideological agenda) political moves. The often tribal nature of big-city politics did not
leave much room or resources for new coalition members, and politicians accustomed to trading
in material goods were understandably averse to wading into divisive “cultural” issues like race,
22Andersen (1979)
23Roediger (2005). It was perhaps ironic that this white identity for these descendents of “new stock” immigrants
was forged at least in part by the ambitious statism of New Deal programs, filtered through the racialized Southern
lens.
24Sugrue (1996), Biles (1995)
25See Figure 3.4, Chapter 3.
26Mayhew (1986), Keiser (1997)
27Buenker (1973)
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which cannot be quite as easily negotiated or apportioned as can city jobs or similarly material
benefits.28 More often than full incorporation, African Americans were subordinated within or
excluded from local political organizations, a major exception to the tradition of new-group incor-
poration chronicled by optimistic pluralist urbanists such as in Dahl (1961).29 And at times these
local partisans certainly practiced politics with “a sharp racial edge.”30 All of this racial conflict is
in keeping with the prevalent theory of racial “threat,” which holds that relations between groups
will tend to get worse when a new group arrives, grows, and competes for status or resources with
previous residents.31 Given this tendency to division and racial domination on the streets and in
city hall, the decision to support racial liberalism in national politics was not an obvious one, and
we might expect city Democrats to be as likely to oppose racial liberalism as to support it.
The potential foundations of support for racially liberal policies by non-Southern Democrats
in Congress were further complicated by urban spatial demography. The most straightforward
explanation for non-southern Democrats’ resilient support for civil rights legislation might be a
direct electoral connection between racial liberalism and black constituents. On controversial is-
sues, when legislative parties are split, constituent pressure and the pursuit of re-election are often
cited as important predictors of a representative’s behavior.32 On racial issues during this era, we
might expect civil rights liberalism by non-southern representatives to emerge as a response to
African American constituents. Indeed, the Great Migration saw the black populations in north-
ern cities increase quickly, and areas like the South Side of Chicago and Harlem eventually gained
black representatives in Congress, who were leaders in bringing civil rights issues to the fore.
Other black representatives followed in the early 1960s.
Today we think of “urban” districts generally as naturally sympathetic to minority groups’
concerns because these districts usually include disproportionate numbers of voters from such
groups. But this was not the case before the 1960s. Throughout the eras of Great Migration (and
28Erie (1988), Snowiss (1966), Keiser (1997)
29Pinderhughes (1987)
30Sugrue (1996)
31Indeed, this period provided some of the best evidence and examples upon which this theory is based.Sugrue
(1996),Roediger (2005)
32Mayhew (1974)
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after), exclusionary and discriminatory housing policies and realty practices created high levels of
residential segregation, concentrating almost all the new black arrivals in particular areas, usually
the places with the oldest and worst housing stock.33 These patterns of racial separation meant
that most city congressional districts—even those in cities with relatively large, rapidly grow-
ing African American populations—remained almost entirely white. For representatives of these
districts, whose constituents would have little reason to clamor for racial justice, the electoral con-
nection was not so clear.
To better understand this pattern, consider the stark and very important example of Chicago
in 1945, just as race was ascending the national agenda. Chicago had been the first city to send
an African American to Congress, the Republican Oscar DePriest in 1927. By the 1940s, Chicago’s
black South Side had become a Democratic stronghold in local and national politics. William L.
Dawson, himself a convert to the party of Roosevelt, was the only black member of congress, and
sat at the head of a strong local sub-organization, holding senior positions in congress and in the
local party leadership. Migration, policy, and practice made Chicago the most segregated large
city in America, and almost all of the city’s black residents lived in or near the First Congressional
district.34 Figure 5.2 shows the percent black at the census tract level in 1940 in Chicago, with lines
demarcating Congressional district boundaries for the 58th through 80th Congresses.35 The dark
area on the map just south of downtown represents an area of extreme concentration of African
Americans; though only about 11 percent of all Chicagoans were black, more than three out of four
in this area were. In most of the rest of the city, where this map shows white, the local population
was less than one percent black. This residential concentration was transmitted to the political
system, as we can see in Figure 5.3 at right. When we aggregate from the tract level to the district
33Massey and Denton (1993) is a definitive chronicle of these demographic patterns across many American cities. See
also Rae (2003) for a fluent institutional account.
34Massey and Denton (1993)
35Illinois Congressional district boundaries were unchanged from 1903 to 1949. Schickler et al (2010) use data from
Adler (2012) to estimate congressional-district level demography. However, Adler’s otherwise very valuable demo-
graphic measures are based on county-level data, and therefore do not account for spatial variation across districts
within the same county. Thus in that data, the percent black for all ten Chicago districts is the Cook County average,
about 11 percent. This is problematic especially during the urban interlude, when population was highly concentrated
within central cities—so many congressional districts were within the same county—but unevenly distributed along
racial and class dimensions within those cities. Using census-tract level data from the National Historic Geographic
Information Systems website, www.nhgis.org, we can get better estimates of the demography of these city districts.
Details on this process are found in Appendix 2.
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level, we can see that in terms of representation, Chicago was starkly divided in its political as
well as social demographics (Note that the color scale of this map is different than the tract-level
map). The First Congressional District (between the Ninth and the Second on the lakefront) was
majority black; the Third was five percent black; and the Fifth was twelve percent black. In none of
the other seven Chicago districts did the percent black surpass five percent, and in several it was
less than one percent. Thus residential segregation created several intradistrict racial dynamics: a
majority-black district, with a black representative; a few districts with significant and increasing
black populations but white representatives; and five essentially all-white districts. Other large
cities, including New York and Los Angeles, showed similar residential patterns during this era,
though most did not have a majority-black district until much later.
This pattern of demography meant that the internal pressures for racial liberalism that might
create an electoral connection were likely very uneven across these districts. In the heavily black
first, we would expect pressure for civil rights to be quite strong, and by most indications it was
(so strong that Dawson was typically attacked from the left for not being assertive enough on
racial issues). In the marginally black districts surrounding the First, however, pressures might
cut both ways. Significant (but far from numerically dominant) black populations pressuring for
progressive racial policies might be offset by “threatened” whites within the same areas.36 Though
the racial strife associated with school desegregation and large-scale riots of the 1960s are more
famous, earlier eras were emphatically not eras of racial peace. These are the areas most famous
for turf defense by white residents, where Langston Hughes was beaten up for walking down the
wrong street and where a young Richard J. Daley cut his political and organizational chops as a
president of the Hamburgs street gang, who were largely responsible for the escalation of an infa-
mous 1919 race riot on the South Side.37 At the time depicted in these maps, “from 1944 to 1946,
incidents of arson, bombings, and vandalism occurred at forty-six residences newly occupied by
black residents” as whites defended the areas around Chicago’s “Black Belt.”38 In the all-white
districts of the North Side, there was certainly little grassroots pressure for racial liberalism. Rep-
36The Fifth also had a significant Hispanic population at this time, for which reliable Census measures are not avail-
able in 1940.
37Biles (1995) p.21-22,Royko (1971)
38Biles (1995) p.10
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Figure 5.3: Chicago, Percent black in congres-
sional districts, 1945 Residential segregation led
to political segregation: few congressmen had
many black constituents.
resentatives of these white areas did not have any black constituents to respond to, and the best
evidence (along with conventional wisdom and later experience) indicates that their white ethnic
constituents were not particularly liberal on matters of race, with racial antipathy continually on
display over decades as African Americans moved into new neighborhoods or made other gains
against a resistant white majority.39
As time went by, local racial strife intensified in these places, and at times virulent “racial con-
servatism” would be on display at the local level wherever the newest threatened urban “border”
areas were, as well as in the all-white bastions. The best opinion data available from this time does
not show strong support for liberalism by these city residents on the most contentious racial issues
39Keiser (1997), Royko (1971)
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of the day. The ANES poll cited above found weak support for fair employment legislation among
white union members in 1952. Though Schickler (2012) finds stronger support among Democratic
voters than among Republicans, especially in cities, it is unclear how important civil rights were
to these individuals, and the level of support is far from overwhelming in any case. Outside
the south, majorities were for anti-lynching legislation, but non-southern white Democrats were
split on fair employment and other issues more directly relevant to northern communities, and
expressed frankly racist views on social contact with African Americans.40 In short, these con-
stituencies were not natural allies, a fact that local politicians were aware of and which the GOP
would later exploit.41 Even among local liberal activists within the local Democratic Party at the
time, racial justice does not seem to have been a priority, as they preferred to focus on less divisive
issues and attack the machine’s organizational structure.42
While Chicago’s racial segregation was particularly stark, the general pattern of political sep-
aration was present at the congressional district level in most large cities in the 1940s. In New
York City, 7 out of 28 districts were more than 5 percent black, and none with a majority until the
mid-1940s; the other three quarters of districts were less than five percent black. In Philadelphia
and Detroit, the pattern was less stark, but black populations were still concentrated. Four out
of six Philadelphia districts had black populations between 10 and 25 percent black, though none
with a majority; the other two were less than 5 percent. Detroit’s distribution was more even, with
3 districts (out of six total) with more than 5 percent black and none with more than 25, but the
other 3 were less than five percent black. The pattern was recurrent throughout the large cities
that made up the heart of the New Deal coalition: even in cities with a relatively large city-wide
black population, racial residential segregation meant that most city congressional districts were
essentially all-white.
40Schickler (2012)
41Biles (1995), ch. 3-5
42Wilson (1962)
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5.1.2 Urbanicity, City Delegations, and Cohesive Racial Liberalism
Given these different patternings of likely constituent pressure from these urban districts, we
might expect some division in the way these places were represented in national politics. The
different racial compositions and preferences of these city districts were not reflected in national
racial politics, however. To the contrary, these cities, so divided on race at home, represented
themselves as cohesively liberal on race in national politics, and were more liberal even than other
non-Southern Democrats.43
Rather than (or alongside) a straightforward electoral connection, the bases of which are hard
to find, the distinctive character of cities and city political institutions may have been an important
factor to the growth of racial liberalism during this era, fostering unity in political representation
despite division in social relations. One dimension of urbanicity, heterogeneity, has in the Ameri-
can experience entailed a refreshed diversity of groups from all over the country and world within
the dense political space of our cities. These cities have not been without racial or ethnic strife,
but the simple fact of diversity within a common political community has meant that cities have
been forced to find ways to deal with this phenomenon, and institutions of horizontal integration
have been important vehicles for mediating and mitigating group conflict. During the half century
before and including the New Deal, traditional party organizations served an important political
function of incorporating new groups into a citywide order, and creating a political space, flawed
though it may have been, in which conflicts might be resolved.44
By the time of the urban interlude, in almost all cities the Democrats had become the party in
which such culturally pluralist political group incorporation took place, if it were to take place at
all, while the Republicans had tended to reinforce their ties to forces of Anglo-Saxon homogeneity
and dominant-culture assimilation, showcased in showdowns over temperance and immigration
in the 1920s.45 Leaders and members of these local parties, often members of the same “ethnic
white” groups frequently noted for their racial conservatism, played key roles in promoting racial
43Schickler, Pearson and Feinstein (2010)
44Dahl (1961)
45Buenker (1973), but see Dahl (1961) for a notable counterexample of Republican incorporation of Italian-Americans
as a competitive response to Irish control of the local Democratic Party.
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liberalism in national debate, and were resolute in their behavioral support for civil rights during
this era. In doing so, they seemed to be promoting not so much the perspective of their districts
(where support for racial liberalism would be rather weak, and not worth the sacrifices), but at-
tending to a citywide position (under which African Americans were valuable coalitional partners
in citywide politics, and in which norms of pluralism help sustain social order in a dense, hetero-
geneous local society). By again disaggregating the Democratic Party—first by section, as the
revisionists of the racial realignment have done, and then again by place character—we can gain
insights not only on the dynamics of this political change, but also on the effects of cities and their
institutions in national politics.
5.2 “Urbanizing” Race
Urban Democrats’ support for racial liberalism, and their apparent strategy to pursue it in na-
tional politics, resembles the “urbanizing” strategy theorized by Burns et al. (2009). Knowing they
would be opposed by their copartisans from the South on an issue that would obviously divide
the party, they needed to persuade their disinterested sectional allies that race was an urban issue
and that there was an urban position on this issue, and that non-urban representatives should
defer to that urban perspective.
The support for racial liberalism among urban representatives, especially urban Democrats,
during this era, is evident on multiple fronts, including roll-call behavior and discourse. First,
the expressed justifications for racial liberalism—for supporting issues of central importance to
African Americans, but not to other key elements of the Democratic coalition—take on an urban
tone during this era. This rhetorical shift promoted a distinctive vision of American society and
politics that was pluralist and multicultural, which was rooted in the urban experience character-
ized by high levels of group heterogeneity. As such, racial liberalism was framed as an issue rel-
evant for many groups (not just African Americans), who were themselves largely city-dwellers.
State action and regulation of behavior, again an urban disposition, was proposed as an important
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spur to progress in this area. Second, urban representatives, especially from places with the kinds
of party organizations that have been the common vehicle for groups’ political incorporation, were
more likely to support these racially liberal policies throughout the urban interlude. Even though
race was controversial at home, these places—especially those with strong institutions of horizon-
tal integration—represented themselves as unified, making racial liberalism an urban position in
national politics.
5.2.1 Urban conceptions of racial liberalism, 1920-1963
Over the course of the urban interlude, race became associated with cities in political discourse.
That racial issues were not particularly “urban” before this time is understandable, because un-
til this historical era African Americans (the typical referent group when dealing with national
“racial” questions) lived mainly in the South, and mainly in rural areas. With the arrival of mil-
lions of African Americans to cities outside the South in the first half of the 20th century, however,
binary racial conflict took on local importance in these places as well, even though African Amer-
icans still constituted a relatively small proportion of the local population in most cities. As black
Americans became a significant presence in urban places, the arguments made in defense of racial
liberalism took on an urban character that was not present in earlier discussions of the issue. To
illustrate how the defense and advance of the liberal position developed, we can turn to the record
of congressional hearings on race during the urban interlude, with attention to statements made
by members of congress—especially those from cities. These hearings can provide richer context
for the ideas behind more discrete actions such as roll call votes. Because they require extra ef-
fort (to appear, but also typically to prepare a statement), participation in hearings can be a sign
of members’ priorities. And the give-and-take structure of these meetings can reveal attitudes
by congresspersons toward others who hold views they agree or disagree with, and can afford
opportunities for candid, spontaneous exchange. Unlike flor debate, hearings also include par-
ticipants from civil society (representatives of various groups or private citizens), and this adds
further information as well.
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There were many hearings on explicitly racial issues during this time period, an indication that
such issues, and which particular policy proposals, were salient enough to draw national atten-
tion. At first, civil rights hearings were about anti-lynching legislation; later they focused on the
poll tax, fair employment, and broader civil rights legislation as well. With increasing force and
in increasing numbers, urban representatives articulated a support for the racially liberal position
on proposed legislation rooted in urban concerns and urban experience.
At a glance, we can see that participation in these hearings during the New Deal was often
the domain of Southern and city Democrats. These hearings represent instances when partic-
ipation seems to have been particularly meaningful, as relatively few representatives chose to
participate.46 In these hearings, members expressed their support for or opposition to civil rights
legislation in prepared or spontaneous statements. Members appearing before the committee typ-
ically made their position quite explicit; if they were not interested in taking a position, they did
not need to appear. Table 5.1 tallies testimonies for or against civil rights legislation by members of
the House over 1926-1949, well before the “switch” identified by Carmines and Stimson (1989).47
We can see that the conservative position was almost invariably taken by southerners (almost all
of whom were Democrats). The liberal position on these issues was disproportionately urban (a
majority in each category, though city representatives were never a majority of chamber members
overall even outside the South), and disproportionately city Democrats during this era. This is
consistent with Feinstein and Schickler (2008)’s observation that the conversation on race seems
to have been between two factions of the Democratic Party, with the Republicans more apt to
maintain the silent status quo. While this table includes only members of the House and how they
represented their districts, these hearings of course included many more witnesses who were not
members of congress as well. Especially on Fair Employment, the issue that would most directly
affect places outside the South and which had the longest list of total witnesses, the overwhelming
majority of these witnesses were liberal urbanites.
A closer reading reveals that even these numbers mask the extent to which urban New Deal-
46As opposed to the hearings for omnibus civil rights legislation in the late 1950s, when dozens of members appeared.
47Further codings forward and backward are in progress, and the pattern continues, though more non-urban Repub-
licans appear in support of the legislation in the late 1950s.
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Who testifies? MCs at hearings on race, 1926-1949
Subgroup FEP Polltax Lynching Overall
Conservative position 6 13 12 31
Southern Dem 5 13 12 30
Liberal position 19 11 24 54
City 16 8 15 39
City Dem 15 6 12 33
Total 25 24 36 84
Table 5.1: Number of MCs testifying in hearings about race from 1926-1949. Substance of testi-
monies typically along sectional lines. Nearly all non-congressional testimonies from urbanites.
ers were assertively engaged with southerners on these issues. The modern thread of national
race and civil rights legislation began with anti-lynching legislation that would be considered re-
peatedly but never passed into law over the ensuing decades. The original bill was introduced
by Leonidas Dyer, a St. Louis Republican whose district included many African Americans and
which was the site of a major race riot in 1919. In the 1920s, several members of Congress appeared
before hearings in support of anti-lynching legislation. Most were from cities outside the South,
and they were mostly Republicans: Dyer, from St. Louis; Frederick Dallinger and Peter Tague,
from Boston/Cambridge; Merrill Moores, from Indianapolis. Most support for anti-lynching leg-
islation at this point was articulated in terms of a universalist understanding of rights and African
Americans’ worthiness of full rights and citizenship. In a typical argument in favor of the anti-
lynching law, Sen. William B. McKinley (R-IL)48 argued in 1926 that
“Although he [the African American] has been in possession of (political and civil
rights) for relatively so short a time he has shown himself to be worthy of them. As a
free man he has always been amenable to reason and persuasion; as a citizen he has
uniformly been a patriot, and as a voter he has consistently aligned himself with the
intelligence, the efficiency, the administrative ability, and the forces that stand for order
and property. What can be said of any other group of our fellow citizens?” 49
This argument, which appeals to abstract principles of citizenship in defense of African Amer-
ican rights and full protection by the state, does not make reference to a lived environment in
48At this point, the Illinois Republican Party had probably incorporated black voters more fully than any other orga-
nization in the country, especially in Mayor William Thompson’s Chicago coalition, which relied heavily on the black
bloc. It was the first organization to send a black member to Congress in the post-Reconstruction era.
49“To Prevent and Punish the Crime of Lynching,” Hearing before Subcom on S. 121, Senate Committee on Judiciary,
Feb.16, 1926. p.4 [HRG-1926-SJS-0003]
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which rights or citizenship may be exercised. Similarly, at a 1921 hearing about the Ku Klux Klan,
Bostonian Peter Tague argued (after a trip through the South) that
”the rights of citizens throughout that section of the country. . . had been violated, and
they had not been protected in those rights which are allowed and given to them under
the Constitution of the United States.” 50
Arguments about rights, citizenship, and the constitution can be made without reference to place,
and they might reasonably resonate in similar ways even among audiences of very different back-
grounds and with different lived experiences. Another set of arguments was developing in par-
allel, however. This set of arguments includes several elements rooted in the experiences of city
life and would resonate more powerfully with audiences in cities. These arguments focussed on
group-based pluralism, government as regulator of social forces, and the relationship between
social peace and economic production, and they were distinctively urban in their framing. By
making arguments that stake out racial liberalism as the urban position on an urban issue, city
representatives were pursuing a particularly effective “urbanizing” strategy for convincing co-
partisans to come along on a potentially divisive issue.51 In this case, the copartisans in question
may have been non-southern, non-urban Democrats, most of whom had little skin in the civil
rights game (representing neither the African American proponents nor the demonstrative white
supremacists of the South), who they wanted to pull to their side in this intraparty struggle over
race. The racial division present in the streets at home was downplayed in the way cities repre-
sented themselves in Congress, and a set of distinctively urban justifications for racial liberalism
were made.
First, this perspective entails recognition of the plurality of groups, and the importance of
group identity as opposed to a strictly liberal individualism of rights. This argument involved the
use of analogies with other groups with experiences common to African Americans even thought
they were not the real target of the legislation under consideration. Thus attacks on lynching and
the Southern racial order included references to other groups—particularly religious minorities
50“Ku-Klux Klan”, Hearing before House Committee on Rules, Oct.11, 1921. p.3-6. [HRG-1921-RUH-0001]
51Burns et al. (2009)
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such as Jews and Catholics—who were generally less exposed to lynching but who might find
common cause with African Americans because they faced common prejudices from the white
Anglo-Saxon Protestant mainstream. Thus as early as 1921, Thomas Ryan (R-NY, NYC, later a
Democrat) argued against the Klan that
Any organization that is anti-Catholic, anti-Negro, anti-Jew, and against the foreign
element in this country, which comprises over 25 per cent of the voting strength of the
country, is really a menace to the community.52
Ryan includes Catholics and Jews in the same list as African Americans, even though at this point
these groups had relatively little in common besides their relatively marginal status within Amer-
ican society. While Tague’s argument above might resonate with a conservative because of its
reverence for the Constitution and individual rights, Ryan’s would have been more controversial
outside of the polyglot cities. After all, for those who successfully sought to restrict immigration
from Southern and Eastern Europe (and elsewhere) at exactly this time, including the Klan it-
self, the transformation of American demography afoot through immigration was itself a primary
“menace to the community.” Ryan is thus articulating a particular vision of community, ostensibly
one that includes distinct groups.
Reference to other “different” groups would become a recurrent theme in the urban argument
for fair employment in the 1940s. Arguing for FEP, Adolph Sabath (D-IL, Chicago) noted that
While the Jews, colored, and foreign born are the most numerous, minority groups
in wide variety exist in sections, states and cities throughout the country. All are the
victims of unjustified local prejudice, oftentimes of actual discrimination.53
Thomas Scanlon (D-PA, Pittsburgh), a career union official, had earlier introduced his FEP legisla-
tion by declaring that
Bad as it is, descrimination against a man because he belongs to a union is not nearly
52[HRG-1921-RUH-0001]
53“Federal Fair Employment Practice Act,” Hearing before Special Subcom on Fair Employment Standards Act,
House Committee on Education and Labor, May 10-12, 1949, p.88 HRG-1949-EDL-0005
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as evil as discrimination because a man is a Negro, a Jew, a Catholic, or because his
ancestors came from another country.54
Later in that hearing, Arthur Klein (D-NY, Manhattan) had the following friendly exchange with
William L. Dawson (D-IL, Chicago), who had also authored the bill.
Klein: I agree that the Negroes today are the outstanding victims of economic persecu-
tion, but you will admit. . . there are other minorities as well who are also subjected to
the same sort of thing.
Dawson: I do, but I feel that when the day comes that we are broad enough to encom-
pass the Negro within the confines of the Constitution all other minority problems will
be solved.
Klein: I agree with you wholeheartedly. I simply wanted to point out that all other
minorities would probably gain from an act such as this.55
A decade later, Victor Anfuso (D-Brooklyn) also emphasized pluralism (as opposed to straightfor-
ward racial justice) as Americanism when defending broad civil rights legislation.
Our country is comprised of people who come from all races, religious beliefs, and
national origins. All of them have made important contributions toward the develop-
ment of the US as a great Nation and toward shaping its destiny. . . I do not believe in
the superiority of one race or one nationality group over another. As soon as we en-
courage second-class citizenship, we open the door for discrimination and bigotry.56
Each of these city representatives, coming from a local traditional party organization, and each
having local black allies (but very few black constituents themselves), articulate a view of racial
liberalism that is multicultural, inclusive, and tied to the experiences of non-black marginalized
groups concentrated in the cities. These statements seemed aimed at audiences that may be am-
bivalent about racial equality but who might identify themselves as the object of similar discrimi-
nation. Of course, the permanent national FEPC was not instituted despite these urbanites’ efforts,
54“To Prohibit Discrimination in Employment.” Hearing before House Committee on Labor, June 1, 1944. HRG-1944-
LAH-0002, p.13
55“To Prohibit Discrimination in Employment.” Hearing before House Committee on Labor, June 1, 1944. HRG-1944-
LAH-0002, p.25
56“Civil Rights,” Hearing before House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcomm. No. 2. July 14-24, 1955. HRG-1955-
HJH-0007, p. 206
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so in the 1960s, as omnibus civil rights bills were under consideration, Chicago represented itself
in Congress much the same way it had when Rep. Sabath and Mayor Kelly headed up the lo-
cal Democrats. At a hearing held in Chicago on discrimination in employment, Mayor Daley
appeared on behalf of the law, arguing that
Chicago is a melting pot city, as you know. Chicago was built by the people of many
lands, of every race, creed, color, and ethnic origin. . . Negroes are not the only seg-
ment of our population that has benefited from the city’s [fair employment] policy, for
nationality and religious groups benefit when the employer adopts fair employment
practices.57
Roman Pucinski (D-IL, Chicago) added that in Chicago
8 out of 10 workers suffer some form of discrimination. . . therefore this committee is
trying to look at this problem along a four-front approach, rather than just the one area
of racial discrimination, tragic and lamentable as racial discrimination may be.58
In this articulation of anti-discrimination, potentially controversial legislation benefiting African
Americans is again understood to benefit religious and national-origin minorities as well. Daley
seems additionally concerned about workers over 40 as well, further expanding the class of poten-
tial beneficiaries of such a policy. This urban understanding of difference, in which almost every-
one is importantly “different,” and the cities’ historical experiences in dealing with new groups,
made racial liberalism the city position on these issues and softened the potential downside for
taking what might have been riskier positions if articulated as strictly black-white racial issues.
In addition to highlighting their cities’ experiences with diversity, urban representatives cited
previous successful experiences with federal intervention as evidence that such intervention was
desirable and could be effective in areas where local officials were unable or unwilling to act. Pro-
hibition aside, support for social regulation was a distinctly urban position; ruralites and south-
erners were wary of such adventures, but analogies to other areas of regulatory intervention and
57“Equal Employment Opportunity,” Hearing before Special Subcom on Labor, House Committee on Education and
Labor. HRG-1961-EDL-0029, p.3
58HRG-1961-EDL-0029, p.19
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the power of legislation to shape behavior and change minds were often made by city representa-
tives, ostensibly because they found them persuasive. Dyer argued back in 1920 that
Congress has exercised its rights in enacting legislation with reference to child labor
in the various states [and] intoxicating liquors. If congress has felt its duty to do these
things, why should it not also assume jurisdiction and enact laws to protect the lives
of citizens of the United States against lynch law and mob violence? Are the right of
property, or what a citizen shall drink, or the ages and conditions under which children
shall work, any more important to the Nation than life itself?” 59
For Dyer, federal passage and enforcement of lynching laws was appropriate because corrupt or
inept local and state officials were either unable or unwilling to do so, just as federal intervention
to regulate other social practices was important.60 Similar arguments were made by later urban-
ites on the efficacy of government action to reduce prejudice itself. Anti-lynching legislation had
become the provenance of congressional Democrats by 1934, when Senators Robert Wagner (D-
NYC) and Edward Costigan (D-CO, Denver) introduced legislation similar to the Dyer Bill. Just as
important as federal action, these urbanites held, was an official position taken against lynching,
to help establish new norms on race. Wagner argued that
Legislation alone cannot quench the fires of intolerance and hate. But the speedy pas-
sage of the federal antilynching bill will rally and sustain all the forces of enlight-
enment in the US and nowhere more than in the areas where right-thinking people
have been hoping and pleading for reinforcement in their courageous battle against
the scourge of lynching in their midst.61
A similar argument was later extended from lynching to employment discrimination. In 1949,
Sabath (D-IL, Chicago) argued that the conservative argument that education could serve as a
substitute for FEP laws “fallacious”:
Prejudice of course cannot be eliminated by legislative act or edict, but discrimination–
the outward social manifestation of prejudice—can be corrected by legislation and per-
59“Segregation and Antilynching,” Hearing before House Committee on Judiciary, Jan. 15, 1920, p.17 [HRG-1920-
HJH-0004]
60Though in hindsight, federal regulation of consumption of intoxicating liquors was not a great success.
61“Punishment for the Crime of Lynching,” Hearing before Subcom on S. 24, Senate Committee on Judiciary, Feb. 14,
1935, p. 15 [HRG-1935-SJS-0001]
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haps only by legislation. . . Although a constantly increasing percentage of the adult
population is the product of (education), both prejudice and discrimination are very
much in evidence. FEP legislation does work.62
Five years later, the young Peter Rodino (D-Newark) made a similar case for civil rights legislation:
It has been argued that civil rights cannot be legislated, that their preservation and
extension are essentially a moral problem that only education, not law, can cope with.
This can hardly satisfy the many thousands, even millions, of Americans who live in
the shadows of second-class citizenship. . . for example,it is certainly true that many
people find their rights sharply curtailed by laws. There is surely no reason why we
cannot do something by law to combat these evils. Secondly, civil rights are often in-
fringed upon or jeopardized by antisocial actions which can be curbed by law. Finally,
the enactment of civil-rights legislation can engender the idea and atmosphere of free-
dom in which the rights of men can grow and prosper.63
His colleague Victor Anfuso (D-Brooklyn) from across the Hudson added an argument focusing
on the power of legislation to change social norms and ratify social practice:
Law is an effective instrument for changing social conditions and law acts as a power-
ful factor in preventing discrimination. It fosters the conviction that discrimination is
wrong by fixing standards which are respected by the majority of the people. Because
people as a rule are law-abiding, their behavior tends to create customs which are in
harmony with the law.64
Again, city representatives, coming from traditional party organizations, representing cities, but
not necessarily districts, with sizeable black populations, voiced faith in the power of state inter-
ventions to alter norms in favor of pluralism. These arguments also explicitly added to the earlier
emphasis on universal rights, but the link to changing norms in society was equally important.
Most Southerners, in arguing against civil rights legislation, said they were wary of such leg-
islation generally and preferred education as the key to the gradual elimination of prejudice and
racial conflict. But this was not an exclusively Southern position; it was also a rural one. Clare
62“Federal Fair Employment Practice Act,” Hearing before Special Subcom on Fair Employment Standards Act,
House Committee on Education and Labor, May 10-12, 1949, p.88 HRG-1949-EDL-0005
63“Civil Rights,” Hearing before House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcomm. No. 2. July 14-24, 1955. HRG-1955-
HJH-0007, p. 204
64ibid, p. 206
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Hoffman (R-MI), representing a largely rural district, was less than sanguine about the prospects
for legislation as social transformer—not only because he doubted the power of the legislation,
but because he opposed its goals as well.
In truth and in fact, while the avowed purpose of the [FEP] bill is to end discrimina-
tion, give equality of opportunity in employment, another objective is to bring about,
though Federal legislation, a social intermingling (and some advocate intermarriage)
among the races. . . Everyone should be treated fairly and equally and have equal op-
portunity. But I do not believe in agitators or self-appointed apostles of righteous-
ness. . . taking over the proposition. I have seen so little discrimination in my commu-
nity that it is difficult for me to realize that some of the statements made by advocates
of this sort of legislation are factual.65
Hoffman went on to call for stricter oversight of segregation. These positions by a rural northerner
are particularly striking because of the reversal they entail—Hoffman himself had introduced FEP
legislation during the war, but now declared it could not be effective. Discussions of this issue
revealed important differences (or at least professed differences) between the city Democrats’ and
the conservative coalition’s attitudes about the possibility for social change through legislation;
the urban approach was active and involved, while the opponents of the legislation, cynically or
not, argued that lawmaking was an inappropriate tool for changing social attitudes.
Finally, the urban perspective on the relationship between racial liberalism (or at least non-
discrimination) and the basic good of public order was different from that voiced by southerners
and ruralists. Hoffman was worried that “indiscriminate bathing” on Michigan beaches by black
visitors from Chicago would lead to trouble,66 and used this as an argument against broader re-
forms of race relations such as FEP. Southerners emphasized the importance of segregation for
maintaining social peace, as Charles Bennett (D-FL) argued in 1949:
They are not perfect, but I personally feel that race relationships are better in the South
than they are anywhere else in the country. I believe that the people get along better
there. You will find a lesser percentage of race riots, less hard feeling, and less mis-
understanding in the section of the country where I live than anywhere else in the
65“Federal Fair Employment Practice Act,” Hearing before Special Subcom on Fair Employment Standards Act,
House Committee on Education and Labor, May 10-12, 1949, p. 12-18 [HRG-1949-EDL-0005]
66Not a wild hypothesis, even given Chicago’s own history.
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country. . . I think colored people have pride of race. It does not mean that they look
down on the white people; it means that they prefer to be among themselves as general
rule. They like to associate among themselves.67
Such arguments, even when we see through their claims of African Americans’ satisfaction with
the existing state of affairs, reveal a speaker’s basic belief that public order was actually more com-
patible the prevailing arrangements of racial domination—that the Southern status quo, as it had
been developed since Reconstruction, could be maintained. In urban spaces, with their continual
upheaval and dense populations, this was not an argument to be taken seriously. There, deep
discontent was understood as tantamount to a time bomb, and when riots did occur, they were far
more costly than would be the case in a less densely populated area. Accordingly, state regulation
of group behavior and enforcement of non-discrimination was seen as necessary for keeping social
peace, not for upending it. Representatives from cities’ own local FEP boards (several cities and
states, including Chicago and New York State, had implemented their own permanent boards for
addressing discrimination in employment by 1949) advocated on behalf of a national law, adding
to the previous arguments the idea that FEP was an important measure to keep the “powder keg”
of race from exploding in their cities. James Sheldon, chair of the New York Metropolitan Council
on Fair Employment Practice argued that
If people were permitted to discriminate against others because of their skin color or re-
ligioun in a city like New York, the whole structure of life would soon break down. . . In
an urban area like that for which I speak here, it is more than desirable, it is basically
necessary that government should provide safeguards so that all Americans may enjoy
equal opportunities regardless of their race or their religious beliefs. 68
Clarence Anderson, the Executive Secretary of Detroit’s Metropolitan Detroit FEP Council, was
even more direct:
We [in Detroit] get the jitters. We feel that we are sitting on a powder keg. Our race riot
of last summer is still fresh in our memories. . . . Whatever measure of racial harmony
67“Federal Fair Employment Practice Act,” Hearing of House Committee on Education and Labor, Special Subcom
on Fair Employment Standards Act, May 10, 1949. HRG-1949-EDL-0005, p.44
68“Fair Employment Practices Act,” Hearing of Senate Committee on Education and Labor, Aug 30, 1944. HRG-1944-
EDS-0004, p. 122
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we enjoy today in our industrial racial relationships in Detroit is largely attributable
to the work of the present FEPC. . . more important than mere civil society and union
cooperation.69
These two may have overstated the importance of their own organizations, but their perspective
was clear, and clearly urban: state regulations against discrimination, and institutions to oversee
their enforcement, help resolve intergroup conflicts. And the previous statements by elected rep-
resentatives of these cities arguing for the desirability of such legislation fits with this perspective.
This resolution is much more important in urban areas, where violence is more severe, and more
costly. Coming up with ways to deal with an inexorably changing status quo, rather than trying
to reinforce a more static one, reveals another urban tendency on race.
Finally, one important “non-observation” should be noted. In the national legislature, urban
racial conservatism was absent. The record of hearings about civil rights during this era reveals
no city representative from outside the south opposing the liberal position on the issue in ques-
tion, though many of their constituents were at least ambivalent about the important changes
afoot in national race relations. These representatives, and their local allies, articulated a position
that would manage racial conflict by likening African Americans, at least rhetorically, to other
newcomer groups and would seek to establish and sustain institutions to manage potentially ex-
plosive social conflict. They also redefined racial issues in ways that were directly relevant to
urban life—focusing on the plurality of groups, on the usefulness of new rules for changing social
norms, and of the grave danger of not finding ways to manage the inevitable change (as opposed
to trying to resist social change, or relying strictly on privately or individually evolving attitudes
to deal with changes that do arise). This liberalism became the core of the city position on racial
issues during this era, which would be reflected in their voting on controversial issues, and in the
later “Blue” alignment dominated by city representatives.
69ibid, p. 87
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5.3 Urbanicity and Roll Call Voting
If city representatives were urbanizing the liberal position on race, we would expect them to be
cohesive on these issues, despite the obvious conflicts they experienced at home. That was true in
the discursive forum of the congressional hearing. Turning to blunter forms of behavior, analysis
of roll call voting shows that urban division was similarly absent, and city representatives were co-
hesively liberal on these issues. In the broadest terms, we can see that city representatives tended
to be more liberal than their non-urban counterparts on racial or sectional issues during this era.
One common measure of congressional ideology is the DW NOMINATE scores developed by
Poole and Rosenthal (1997). These scores incorporate information from all Congressional roll calls
and estimate legislators’ overall ideology. For much of American history, Congressional ideology
and conflict seems to revolve around a single partisan dimension, which Poole and Rosenthal
describe as having to do with ”the role of government in the economy”, or statism. At times, how-
ever, their NOMINATE technique reveals a second dimension of conflict upon which legislators
seem to organize some of their voting behavior. This dimension, they argue, has to do with race
and region, and it operates most frequently when race is a salient issue in national politics. The
long New Deal was just such a moment: the recurrent split within the Democratic Party between
southerners and the rest fed a second dimension in congressional conflict. Looking closely at the
relationship between these NOMINATE scores and urbanity, however, reveals that they are not
“just” race and region: urban representatives were on average much more liberal on this dimen-
sion than non-urban representatives.
Figure 5.4 illustrates this reality. DW-NOMINATE scores range from -1 (”Liberal”) to 1 (”Con-
servative”) for different groups using the USR scores. We can see immediately that urban repre-
sentatives are more liberal on this measure, even when we exclude the South. Especially early in
the period when the second dimension is most powerful (the late 1930s to late 1970s), urban repre-
sentatives were on average more liberal than their non-urban counterparts. Later in the period, it
seems that the dimension captures more purely regional differences, but non-southern urbanites
were well below the other groups from 1930-1960. Again, Democrats always constituted a strong
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Figure 5.4: Group means on DW-NOMINATE 2nd-Dimension scores, 1930-1970. In the chamber
as a whole, and outside the South, city representatives were more liberal on average.
majority of this group during this time.
This gap persists, or even grows, when we account for partisan affiliation and other factors.
Table 5.3 shows results of a linear regression of NOMINATE 2nd-Dimension scores over the long
New Deal. While being a Southerner or a Democrat is associated with an increase in the mea-
sure (ie, a tendency to align with the conservative side of this dimension), representing an urban
constituency makes one far more likely to support the liberal position. On average, urban repre-
sentatives are about .15 to the left of a suburban representative from the same section and party
(about a third of a standard deviation), and .25 to the left of rural representatives on this measure.
Urbanicity is thus associated with broad-brush racial liberalism on this measure, even when we
account for party and section.
Because these NOMINATE scores incorporate information from virtually all votes, however,
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Table 5.2: Linear regression of DW-NOMINATE second-dimension scores





Table 5.3: Linear regression of DW-NOMINATE 2nd Dimension scores, 1930-1970. City repre-
sentatives were on average more liberal than suburban or rural representatives. (*p < .01, N=6313,
R-squared=.70)
they are noisy, and substantive judgments about the content of the ideological dimensions they
describe are inductive and a posteriori. To focus more precisely on the relationship between urban-
icity and support for civil rights liberalism in roll call voting, we can examine particular roll call
votes from this era that were substantively about civil rights and analyze representatives’ behav-
ior on these votes. 70
Using the substantive issue codes from the AIP, we can identify roll call votes about Civil
Rights in the House of Representatives over time. Over the course of the Long New Deal, from
1933 to 1963, there were 35 votes about African American Civil Rights in the House (See Table 5.4).
Most of these votes related to proposed legislation about lynching, fair employment, and general
Civil Rights. Using data from these votes, we can investigate how different groups of legislators
voted, what factors were associated with support for racial liberalism, and add to the evolving
picture of how race came to rise on the agenda during this era.
One straightforward way to determine the “liberal” position on these civil rights bills is to es-
timate the position of the African American community, who were the driving force behind them
and were understood to be the chief beneficiaries.71 To this end, we can identify what position
70Two different teams have approached the substantive coding of roll call votes, the American Institutions
Project (Described in Katznelson and Lapinski (2007)) and the Policy Agendas Project (Baumgartner and Jones, see
http://www.policyagendas.org/). Though the Policy Agendas Project only provides codes for the postwar era, the
two coding schemes generally agree on which roll calls can be identified as having to do with civil rights for Con-
gresses they both code. Because the AIP dataset covers the entire long New Deal era, votes it identifies as about
”African American Civil Rights” are used for the subsequent analyses; because they identify largely the same votes for
the relevant category, using the data from the Policy Agendas project yields very similar analytical results for the era
covered by that data.
71Of course, ”African Americans” were not a monolith during this era, and several important groups often disagreed
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Civil Rights Roll Calls, Long New Deal
Year* # of votes Subject(s)
1937 4 Anti-lynching
1939 2 Anti-lynching
1945 3 School Integration
1949 11 Fair Employment
1951 1 **
1957 6 Civil Rights Commission, Act
1959 7 Civil Rights Commission, Act
1961 1 Civil Rights Commission
Total 35
Table 5.4: Number of House roll call votes about Civil Rights for African Americans, by Congress.
*Year Congress began. **Unclear from AIP data what civil rights dimension of this appropriations
roll call was. (Source: AIP data)
was taken by the majority of African American members of congress on the votes themselves as
a shorthand for the “black” or “pro-civil rights” position on the particular roll call. For the urban
interlude, this black position on Civil Rights is quite easily identified, because there were so few
black members of Congress.72 Throughout the era under investigation, whenever there is more
than one black member voting on the same roll call, they agree, indicating that there is some con-
sensus on the black position. Before 1927, of course, there were no black members of Congress.
There were also few votes on black civil rights during this time, but for votes that pre-date De-
Priest’s appointment, I identify the position taken by a majority of Southern Democrats on these
Civil Rights issues (explicitly, the Southern positions were opposition to a memorial for Frederick
Douglass and opposition to federal intervention in lynching cases). The opposite of this Southern
position is assumed to be the African American position. Having identified the position taken by
black members as the “liberal” position, we can evaluate the tendencies of other groups of Repre-
sentatives to agree with that position.
Figure 5.5 describes the average support for racial liberalism by different blocs of legislators,
on the broad philosophy of whether and how the black community should integrate with the dominant white polity.
On the issues that reached the national agenda, however, and in congressional testimony on these issues, it is reasonable
to identify a fairly broad consensus among African Americans in national politics.
72The Illinois First district was for nearly two decades the only constituency in the country with a black representative
in Congress. The first was Oscar DePriest, a Republican, and later Arthur Mitchell and William L. Dawson, both
Democrats. In the 1940s, Adam Clayton Powell (D-NY) joined Dawson in Congress to create a black caucus of two
for the next decade. These two had different profiles, but did not disagree on any of the roll call votes examined
here; both also tended to agree with major advocacy groups on national racial policy, strengthening the argument that
their position on these votes reflected the generic “black” position, rather than an idiosyncratic district-level preference
(Wilson 1960).
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and from these two graphs we can see changes over time. In each figure, the proportion of a group
of legislators agreeing with the black members’ position is plotted over time. Each point repre-
sents the proportion from that group taking the liberal position on a given roll call (any African
American members are dropped from the analysis). The lines represent the smoothed average
for the bloc. First, we can see that by the mid-1940s non-Southern Democrats were indeed more
likely than Republicans to support racial liberalism, though each of these groups were far more
likely to vote liberally than southern Democrats. The sets of votes from before 1937 are included
in this analysis to show where the parties were coming from: in 1899 and 1920, Republicans were
nearly unanimous in their support for the black position on civil rights votes (these particular
votes are to approve a memorial for Frederick Douglass in 1899 and a series of votes on the Dyer
Anti-lynching bill in 1921). By the 1930s, they still tended to support this liberal position on av-
erage, but the average Republican support for civil rights declined slowly beginning in the 1940s
and then rapidly in the late 1950s. There are some instances in which Republicans were quite
divided on these issues. Southern Democrats were consistent in their opposition to racial liberal-
ism, though their solidity ebbed over time. By the 1960s almost one in five southern Democrats
was taking the liberal position on civil rights. The tripartite story does reveal a large change
among non-southern Democrats, however. Inconsistent but fairly evenly split in their voting on
the Dyer bill, this group was fairly solidly in favor of the black position on civil rights votes by
the time anti-lynching legislation returned to the agenda in 1937, and they were more consistent
than Republicans in their support for racial liberalism from the 1940s on. Even more telling, how-
ever, is who was leading this group, and seemingly powering the progressive racial agenda of
the time. In the righthand figure, the top/blue line shows that non-southern urban Democrats
were essentially unanimous in their support of racial liberalism throughout the New Deal, while
non-southern non-urban Democrats were almost as supportive as their urban copartisans by the
end of the period, but certainly split early on. Their support was always more tenuous and at
certain moments subject to deep division, as we can see from the two outlier points after 1960.
Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, however, it certainly appears that urban Democrats are the most
consistently in agreement with the African American position on these racial issues. This is con-
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Figure 5.5: Proportions of legislators supporting liberal position on House civil rights votes,
1900-1963: At left, while Republicans and Democrats were opposed on civil rights votes in 1900,
nonsouthern Democrats had changed their position by the late 1930s and were more likely that
Republicans to support civil rights by the mid-1940s. At Right: Among non-southern Democrats,
city representatives were more likely to support civil rights earlier, and they were more supportive
later.
sistent with a previous finding that support for racial liberalism in Congress was associated with
urbanicity, though the disaggregation of the non-southern Democrats is clearer here.73
This relatively strong support for racial liberalism among non-southern Democrats stems not
only from urban representatives, but especially from urban representatives who came from places
with strong institutions of horizontal integration, especially those local organizations that most
fully incorporated African Americans. Chicago and New York (and later, Philadelphia, Detroit,
and Los Angeles) were the homes of local Democratic Parties that included their growing African
American voting blocs fully enough that they sent black representatives to Congress. From even
before the New Deal, local politicians in these cities had courted black voters, who were often
quite cohesive as a group and at times may have been pivotal in city- and statewide elections
73Schickler, Pearson and Feinstein (2010)
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(Keiser 1997). In Chicago especially, black political leaders were seen as a key part of electoral
strategy for both Republicans and Democrats until the mid-1940s.74 Participation in local govern-
ing coalitions meant that African Americans had a place at the table, albeit typically a “junior”
position. Nonetheless, being part of a local organization that included African Americans meant
that even representatives from all-white constituencies had black local partners and were at least
somewhat reliant on black votes for the maintenance of their organization’s power, which in turn
had effects on their own access to resources and position.
Was urbanicity associated with racial liberalism? Were representatives from strong local par-
ties more supportive of racial liberalism? Were representatives with city delegation partners who
were black more likely to support racial liberalism? In this section, I use a multivariate regression
model to test hypotheses about the effects of cities and city delegations while simultaneously ac-
counting for the common alternative explanations—that support for racial liberalism is explained
by region, party, and constituency composition. If local institutions and organizations nudge rep-
resentatives to support racial liberalism, then the presence of these factors—in this case, traditional
party organizations and black partners in a city delegation—should be positively correlated with
taking the liberal position on racial issues, even beyond the other explanatory factors.
The analysis includes the following data and variables (and the results are listed in Table 5.5).
The dependent variable is the same as used in Figure 5.5, a binary indicator of agreement with
the “African American” position on civil rights votes. Again, the African American congressper-
sons, whose votes were used to construct the dependent variable, are excluded from the analysis,
so this analysis estimates the relationships between white representatives’ support for racially
liberal positions and several key explanatory variables. We are particularly interested in the vari-
ables measuring political factors associated with the representative’s home jurisdiction. First, the
ordinal USR score is included. I expect high urbanicity scores to be associated with racial liber-
alism in representation, in keeping with the results above and the implications of urbanicity for
elite preferences outlined in Chapter 2. In addition to this district-level attribute, two measures of
characteristics of city delegations are included. The first is an indicator for whether a white repre-
74Gosnell (1937), Keiser (1997)
CHAPTER 5. CITIES AND RACE 200
sentative is part of a city delegation with a black local copartisan. For instance, a white Democrat
from Chicago would have a 1 on this measure after the election of Arthur Mitchell in 1935, while
a Republican from Chicago would have a 1 from 1928-1935, when Oscar DePriest represented the
first district. Representatives not from cities, from cities without a black member, or from locally
partisan cities with a black member in the other party, get scores of zero on this measure. If having
a black member fosters racially liberal voting in the rest of a city delegation, the coefficient on this
measure should be positive.
The city delegation measure of IHIs included is a measure of local party strength, a key in-
stitutional variable associated with fostering cohesion in city delegations. As in Chapter 4, this
measure of organizational IHI strength is adapted from David Mayhew’s (1986) “traditional party
organization” scores, which measure the strength of local party organization in controlling nomi-
nations at midcentury. 75 Because Democrats had local partners (African Americans and racially
liberal unions such as the CIO) pushing for civil rights and because the Democrats themselves
were much more closely associated with traditional party organizations by this time in almost
all parts of the country, I also hypothesize that the relationship between traditional party organi-
zations will be stronger among Democrats than Republicans, so I include a variable interacting
partisanship and local party organization (TPO*Dem).76 The relationship between local organiza-
tion and racial liberalism should be stronger for Democrats than for Republicans if this hypothesis
is correct.
In addition to these variables associated with urbanicity and local political organization, I
include alternative explanations that we know to be importantly associated with positions ulti-
mately taken on race during this era. Section is a key variable, so I include an indicator for whether
75TPO scores are shifted to range from 0 to 4, instead of Mayhew’s 1 to 5. Mayhew’s scores were given at the state
level, but he includes information about localities within the states to justify his judgements. In most states, his score
is based on information about city organizations, so in states where no reference is made to traditional organizations
existing outside of cities, I infer that Mayhew’s score should be applied to the cities he describes, and I reduce the TPO
score for districts representing portions of that state that do not include a city mentioned by Mayhew as having a strong
organization by a half. The magnitude of this reduction is somewhat arbitrary, but is meant to reflect his observation
that traditional parties were strongest in the cities, but parties outside of cities in these states typically bore “family
resemblance” to each other (Mayhew 1986, p.23).
76Buenker (1973) also notes that traditional organizations, especially those Irish-led parties that incorporated the
“new stock” immigrants, were predominantly in the Democratic fold, p. 11., so Republicans from TPO states may not
have had actually ties to such organizations.
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a representative is from outside the South.77 The emerging literature indicates that nonsouthern
Democrats were taking the lead on these issues, so I include an indicator for non-southern Demo-
crat.
Finally, support for civil rights may be prompted by large African American populations in
a member’s district—the “electoral connection” hypothesis. Though the population patterns de-
scribed above meant that there were relatively few districts where African Americans were a large
share of the voting population (and some of those are excluded from this analysis because they
had black representatives), this is still an important potential explanation for racial liberalism, so
I include an estimate of the share of the Voting-Eligible Population that was black. Available data
from Adler (2012) provide good measures of the proportion of the population identified as black
at the congressional district level for all districts that encompass at least one entire county go-
ing back to the 78th Congress.78 For city districts which are subdivisions of a county, however, a
finer-grained measure is necessary because of residential segregation, so I develop measures for
these districts using the GIS technique outlined earlier in this chapter and in Appendix 2. Data
for this variable at low levels of aggregation is limited to decennial census years in cities with
Census tracts (only select counties had them in these years–fortunately these include most cities
with more than one congressional district), so I estimate each of these districts’ black population
based on the data from the 1940 Census.79 For districts in the South, where the vast majority of
African Americans could not vote during this time, the percent of the electorate that was black is
zeroed out; it is clear that southern representatives were not responsive to this group, even the few
who could vote, given their records and the exclusionary all-white primary instituted in many of
these states during this time. I expect the coefficient on percent black to be positive if pressure
from black constituents prompts responsiveness and racial liberalism. Conversely, a negative co-
efficient may indicate some evidence of racial threat, as in Key (1949).
All of the votes on civil rights during this formative era are pooled in this analysis. Sepa-
77Following Katznelson and Mulroy (2012), this analysis employs a 17-state definition of the South, which uses “Jim
Crow”-style legal segregation rather than secession as the indicator of Southernness. The results are robust to other
definitions of seciton.
78For the few votes in this analysis before the 78th congress, I simply apply Adler’s value for the 78th backward for
now.
79Again, while still imperfect, these estimates are an important improvement on available data.
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rately, analyses excluding anti-lynching legislation votes, which did not really have important
implications in northern cities, yielded substantively similar results to those presented below; the
patterns of voting were common to all subsets of the civil rights agenda in congress. The model
presented below is estimated using fixed effects for each roll call to account for general fluctua-
tions in support for the liberal position on particular votes, and robust standard errors are grouped
by legislator because some individuals voted on many of these roll calls, making for some partic-
ularly non-independent observations.
Logit regression: Agreement with African American position on civil rights
Variable (#categories) Coeff. (Robust SE) Mfx
Urbanicity(7) .14** (0.039) .020
Blackpartner(2) *** ** –
TPO*Dem(5) .99** (0.20) (Fig. 5.6)
TPO(5) -.10 (0.13) –
Non-South Dem(2) 3.23** (.46) .29
Dem(2) -2.31** (.43) -.31
BlackVEP(%) 13.13** (4.80) 1.91
Union(%) 8.18** (1.19) 1.19
South17(2) -1.09** (0.46) -.17
East .686* (.37) .090
Midwest -.13 (.29) –
Table 5.5: Civil Rights Liberalism, 1933-1963. City representatives and those with a black partner
in their city delegation were more likely to support civil rights. Local black partnership was perfect
predictor of support, those observations dropped from this model. Exclusion of the variable does
not reduce the magnitude or significance of the other predictors of interest. (*p < .05, **p < .01
N=8868, Psuedo-R-squared=.57. Estimated with an intercept and robust standard errors, clustered
by legislator. )
These results support the key hypotheses about urbanicity and city delegations. First, urban-
icity was positively and significantly associated with racial liberalism during the long New Deal.
A representative from a city district was on average about 6 percent more likely to support the
racially liberal position than an otherwise similar representative from a suburban district, and 12
percent more than a representative from a rural district. Representatives with a local black partner
were uniformly in support of the racially liberal position; having a black partner appears to reach
the level of sufficiency as characteristic of those supportive of civil rights liberalism during this
time. Again, for much of this time this indicator would only apply to Democrats from Chicago
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Figure 5.6: Racial liberalism by TPO (Interaction interpretation). While Republicans from high-
TPO states were no more likely to support the racially liberal position during the Long New Deal,
Democrats from strong party organizations were more than 18 percent more likely to take such a
position than their copartisans from places with weak local parties.
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Figure 5.7: Average City Delegation Cohesion on Civil Rights Votes. City delegations with
strong IHIs were more cohesive on civil rights issues.
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and New York, two central elements of the Democratic urban order. But these two pillars of the
Democratic party, riven by race at home, were completely cohesive on civil rights during the urban
interlude. The relationship between local party organization and racial liberalism is more compli-
cated to interpret, but the expectations above are supported by the data. Figure 5.6 illustrates
how likely Democrats and Republicans from different local partisan contexts differed in their sup-
port for racially liberal positions on these roll calls. Moving across the horizontal axis, local party
strength increases from left to right. The lines on the graph represent the predicted probabil-
ity of support for the racially liberal position for members of each party.80 Among Republicans,
the relationship between local party organization and racial liberalism is weak, and statistically
insignificant. Among Democrats, however, the relationship is quite strong: a Democrat from a
strong local party (ie, TPO=4, on this shifted scale) was approximately 14 percent more likely to
support the racially liberal position than one from a place without parties (ie, TPO=0), even when
we account for other factors.81 This result supports the theory that the relationship between local
party organization and racial liberalism was stronger among Democrats, because of the party’s
more enduring relationship with that organizational form, and because their African American
coalitional partners were the principal proponents for racial liberalism during this era.82 These
racial issues were the heart of the intraparty conflict; they define the second dimension of political
conflict in the House.83 But cities themselves, despite the potential for division posed at home by
rapid influx of African Americans, were very likely to support the racially liberal position on these
issues, even as they threatened to destroy the basis for their national alliance with the South. This
was especially true of those Democrats coming from cities with strong partisan institutions. These
cities’ politicians, even if they did not represent African Americans themselves, were politically
linked at home and in the nation to those who did, and as the products of strong parties they may
have been more sensitive to the demands of their broader subnational party organization—those
80The other variables in the model were held at their mode, median, or mean values, as appropriate, to represent an
otherwise statistically “typical” member.
81The 95 percent confidence intervals (not pictured) do not overlap, indicating that we can be confident that this
relationship does indeed exist among Democrats. Predicted values generated with Stata praccum procedure, following
Long and Freese (2006), Section 9.4.
82Schickler, Pearson and Feinstein (2010)
83Poole and Rosenthal (1997)
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who needed black votes at a citywide or state level.
How did these statistical relationships actually play out in Congress? A companion analysis of
city delegations shows a similar relationship between party structure and cohesion on civil rights
issues in congress. As in Figure 4.3 in Chapter 4, 5.7 shows the cohesion on civil rights votes for
the four largest city delegations from the 1930s-1960s. Just as on the set of all domestic roll call
votes, the cities with strong IHIs were more cohesive on civil rights. Los Angeles, with its weak
local partisan institutions, was the first to show signs of fracture as race claimed the national spot-
light in the early 1960s, and when all cities showed division later on, Los Angeles was the most
deeply divided on civil rights.84
5.4 Discussion
The results of the roll call analyses above support the growing consensus that non-southern Democrats
were indeed the party of racial liberalism throughout the urban interlude, despite the obvious
threat that such a position would pose to the strength of their national coalition, but that their
national alliance with staunchly conservative southerners made this harder to see. Local factors,
however, were also important even when we account for section and party, as we can see from the
multivariate regression analysis above. First, having a local black copartisan made representatives
completely reliable on race; such representatives supported the liberal position every time, even
though their constituents (likely all white) held much more conflicted views on such matters.
By the same token, Democrats from places with strong local party organizations were more
likely to support racial liberalism, ostensibly responding to pressures from within their party—
from across town or from up the chain of command. Democrats whose districts were more atom-
istic, less connected to other constituencies through organizational IHIs, were less likely to support
the racially liberal position. These findings provide support for the broadest theoretical claim of
84Of course, on civil rights votes today, all of these cities are again cohesive and liberal; but this seems unsurprising
given how much demographics have changed—none of them is a majority white city any longer, after decades of white
flight, and in-migration by African Americans and new arrivals from abroad. Today, “urban” is a euphemism for “not
white” in some contexts. But in 1970, all four of these cities were still majority white, and more to the point over half of
their districts were still overwhemingly white.
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city delegation theory, that local institutional factors color national representation, fostering politi-
cal cohesion despite social fracture. In the case of race, city representatives were cohesively liberal,
beyond what might be predicted based on district characteristics or simple national partisan affil-
iation.
Other findings of this regression analysis may be worth noting here. First, while Schickler,
Pearson and Feinstein (2010) find no support for an electoral connection between local black pop-
ulation and support for racial liberalism, the inclusion of refined measures of district-level black
population for city districts gives a different result: a representative’s support for racial liberal-
ism was indeed related to his or her district’s racial demography. This difference in results merits
further investigation. In keeping with previous findings, union membership (though measured
imprecisely, at the state level) does also seem to be an important determinant of representatives’
votes, providing support for a possible alternative or complementary mechanism (with the party
IHI) forging a cohesive liberal bloc on these issues.
Previous accounts of the dissolving Democratic party have spotted a break between southern
and non-southern Democrats on race building over the course of the urban interlude. The im-
portant insights from these analyses have shown that the range of issues upon which two wings
split grew over time, as Southerners interpreted a growing swath of substantive policy areas as
potentially threatening to their racial agenda and repeatedly sided with Republicans to form a
conservative coalition on a number of priorities for non-southern Democrats.85 At the same time,
the non-southern Democrats began to shift to the left on racial issues, providing stronger sup-
port for civil rights policies relative to their local Republican rivals. At the state level, Democrats
outside the South began to position themselves as more supportive of Civil Rights than their in-
trastate Republican rivals.86 In Congress, non-southern Democrats, especially those from cities,
became the most likely and consistent advocates of civil rights by the mid-1940s, while Republi-
cans adopted an ambiguous posture or worked to weaken civil rights provisions when they did
85Katznelson and Mulroy (2012), Biles (2011)
86Feinstein and Schickler (2008)
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arise on the agenda.87
Taking full stock of the deep roots of the positions taken by the two major parties on race in
the mid-1960s forces an important re-evaluation of what is driving politics and partisan change.
Carmines and Stimson argue that national party elites have a great deal of discretion to adopt
new positions in forging coalitions and recasting new conflicts in national politics in the search for
political success. Schickler et al (2010), on the other hand, looking more closely at non-southern
Democrats, argue for a causal role for coalitional partners—they credit progressive labor unions
and African Americans, but many other groups within the New Deal coalition outside the South
were no doubt important. The real action in this account is not among national elites associated
with presidential campaigns but with the party’s middle level: activists and civil society groups
closely associated with the party, who articulate a program and mobilize the mass base. From this
perspective, the “ultimate break-up of the New Deal coalition was built into the structure of the
alignment that emerged during Roosevelt’s administration,” not contingent on reactions to events
in the early 1960s.88
This important claim—that the key building blocks of the Democratic Party outside the South
were strong proponents of racial egalitarianism during this critical era, and that this commit-
ment ultimately undermined the broader coalition—fits a broader narrative in which southern
pathology is marginalized over time and non-southern racial egalitarianism is naturally ascen-
dant. Schickler et al (2010) argue that, having achieved a majority within the Democratic Party,
programmatic liberals could fight southern racism and and embrace racial as well as economic
liberalism. This is characteristic of the Manichaean understanding of race in American political
history, pitting recalcitrant white supremacists against idealistic “transformative egalitarians.”89
When we look closely at those non-southern coalitional partners of the Democratic alliance—
many of whom were not naturally predisposed to civil rights liberalism and are often criticized
for racist practice in other contexts—we should pause and see that the story is more complicated.
Were the political forces associated with the rise of 20th century racial liberalism all ideologi-
87Schickler, Pearson and Feinstein (2010)
88Schickler, Pearson and Feinstein (2010)
89Smith and King (2005)
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cally committed to “transformative egalitarian” racial policies? At the local level, the bedfellows
were just as strange as they were in the national alliance, with racial domination a frequent and
apt descriptor of political organizations at the city level. But representatives of these cities, espe-
cially those from cities with strong traditional party organizations (and in these congresses such
representatives were themselves generally the products of those local organizations), were con-
sistently liberal on race in national politics, even when they themselves had essentially no black
constituents, and the constituents and organizations with which they did have formal ties had
mixed records on race at best. The same institutional players seem to have been simultaneously
on different “sides” on race at different levels of politics, if the idea of two “sides” is to be under-
stood in its strongest sense.
This cohesive racial liberalism from representatives of constituencies and organizations that
were not dedicated to racial egalitarianism— who were often in direct conflict with the black
newcomers in their cities—muddies the water on our understanding of racial orders in American
politics and the “Tocquevillian” picture of an naturally ascendant, ideological anti-racism becomes
much less compelling. There is no doubt that idealist, activist groups played a crucial role in
keeping elite attention on these issues, but organizational dynamics seem to have contributed as
well, keeping representatives from cities with strong IHIs (which would link the representative
of apathetic, ambivalent, or hostile whites with crosstown members of the same organization or
political community) more closely attuned to a citywide position of racial liberalism. From a nor-
mative perspective, this is encouraging for those who would promote the rights of unpopular
numeric minorities, for such institutional links may help provide support for such changes with-
out reliance on saints or altruists. The programmatic anti-racists played a key role, but their power
was worked through institutions that were not themselves programmatically anti-racist, merely
politically pragmatic and united as a city bloc.
The most dramatic events of the racial realignment took place in the mid-1960s and beyond:
Goldwater’s embrace of racial conservatism, the GOP’s Southern Strategy, the backlash to central-
city riots, and the beginnings of the transition of the white southern electorate to the GOP that was
more or less complete by the 1990s. The groundwork for this change, however, was laid much ear-
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lier, when racially liberal representatives from cities articulated a new, distinctively urban position
on the racial issues of the day. When Hatton Sumners tried to defend lynching as a kind of tradi-
tional frontier democracy (as quoted at the beginning of this chapter), he was making an argument
that would not have been accepted in a city. In cities, such spontaneous, popular violence some-
times did erupt, often in defense of the established racial order. But under conditions of urbanicity,
such acts were seen from above as a significant threat to the community’s well-being, not a defense
of it. John Rooney, young mainstay of the Brooklyn Democratic Organization, said seemingly in
reply (though 15 years later) that few would bewail the passing of the frontier days. In an Amer-
ica seemingly obsessed with the mythologies of the rugged frontiersman, such a statement entails
at least a little controversy. In that instance, he was arguing on behalf of fair employment legis-
lation, which (like city Democrats’ efforts at anti-lynching measures) would fall before Southern
obstruction in Congress. Rooney argued that the interdependence of modern urban life made the
institutions and practices of the frontier obsolete, that it was time to embrace the city perspective,
including the pluralism and rules it entailed. In this respect, he voiced a city position, on a city
issue, in support of members of his city delegation.
Rooney and his colleagues from similar local traditional organizations that were the heart of
the urban political order, and of the New Deal Democratic Party, brought a new style and idea of
community to national politics. Their continued cohesion in the face of potentially divisive issues
like race (which are thought to undermine support for “economic” liberalism) was crucial for the
development of “double liberalism.” By welcoming many groups, the “new stock” politicians of
the cities’ Democratic organizations built a cultural tradition and political brand of group accom-
modation and bargaining that was expansive enough to include the African Americans as well—
and their socialization to prioritize local ties and organization made their commitment to group
pluralism strong enough to withstand the racist pushback within their national party (and within
their cities). It was from this traditional-party impulse toward identity-based appeals, logrolling,
and concern for the local that the urban political order now known as “Blue America” was born.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion: Notes for an Urban Political
Order
“New York City. . . where more than seven million people live in peace, and enjoy the
benefits of democracy.”
-WNYC Radio 1930s-era station identification
“Let me say. . . that I know very little about New York, and if I never know any more I
will be just as happy.”
-Rep. Graham Barden (D-NC),
Chairman of House Committee on Education and Labor1
1Congressional Record, April 24, 1952, p. 4382. Quoted in Mayhew (1966)
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From the North Side of Chicago, home of the Gold Coast, the Miracle Mile and a famously ver-
tiginous skyline, it is a short drive down Lake Shore Drive to get onto Interstate 57, heading south
through the largely poor, largely African American South Side. Nine hours later you will head
into the broad plains of the Mississippi Delta, horizon to horizon, home to many of the richest and
poorest Americans during the middle of the 19th Century. Generations of Americans travelled
this route in the 20th Century’s Great Migrations, but in the opposite direction: from South to
North, from agricultural semi-feudalism to industrial urban inequality, from flat fields to vertical
towers.
This path down the middle of the country is also an axis upon which America’s racial politics
have turned. Five of the six African Americans ever to serve in the U.S. Senate have come from
either Mississippi or Chicago, although a century of political exclusion interrupted their seatings.
In 1963, as racial tumult beset the South and just a year before LBJ’s signing of the Civil Rights Act,
these very different places had much in common politically. Mississippi was represented by five
white Democrats in the House of Representatives (no one other than white Democrats had been
elected, or voted, really, in Mississippi in the 20th century). Chicago’s North Side, part of a strong
local machine organization for a generation, also sent five delegates to the House, also all white
Democrats. Each was a consistent, archetypal element of the New Deal Democratic coalition—
the urban machine and the South—and both places had profited from this relationship with the
national government, bringing home pork and having outsize influence on many policies from
positions of seniority.
In both places, moreover, a clear racial hierarchy was in place. In Mississippi, white supremacy
was sustained by law and private violence. The story of the strongest bastion of Jim Crow is well-
known. In Chicago, America’s most racially segregated large city, hierarchy was more subtle, and
less obviously violent, but still real. The hegemonic local Democratic organization practiced a
politics “with a sharp racial edge,” marginalizing black political forces or co-opting their leaders
as lieutenants of the dominant city-wide order.2 Everyday white Chicagoans were not focused on
building post-racial utopia, either: for the Chicago reporter and columnist Mike Royko, the “only
2Sugrue (1996), Keiser (1997), pp.44-64, Biles (1995), ch. 4.
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genuine difference between a southern white and a Chicago white was in their accent.”3 En-
trenched patterns of racial segregation were strengthened first by neighborhood vigilantes, then
by law and regulation (such as redlining), and later by discrimination and strong cultural norms.4
However, the early 1960s was the last moment that these places were both, for all intents and
purposes, stable white polities within the Democratic fold. The way that racial politics played
out in these two kinds of places is perhaps the most important political development in the 20th
century United States. In both Chicago and in Mississippi, an essentially all-white electorate was
transformed from the outside into one in which there were many African Americans. In Chicago,
as in other northern cities, the Great Migrations of the first half of the twentieth century brought
hundreds of thousands of black immigrants to the city from the South. From 1910 to 1940 to 1970,
Chicago went from 0 percent black to 8 percent, to about 33 percent. By the 1970s, there were
about four times as many black Chicagoans as there were total residents in all of Mississippi’s
cities combined.
In Mississippi, court cases and voting rights legislation reintroduced African Americans rather
more swiftly into that state’s formal political processes as Jim Crow institutions were dismantled,
so the electorate became about 35 percent black quite quickly (up from close to zero). The reac-
tion by white Mississippians—almost all of whom (at least those who had participated) had been
Democrats—was partisan exit. What had been a one-party Democratic state became a Republican
stronghold. Over the next five decades, Mississippi would become one of the reddest states in
America, with 56 percent of all Mississippians (and 88 percent of all white Mississippians, a group
that voted almost unanimously for Democratic candidates throughout the century between the
Civil War and Civil Rights Act) voting for John McCain in 2008.
Chicago would also see decades of local racial tumult, with recurrent conflict between groups
of citizens and deep contention among elites. But unlike Mississippi, the city continued to repre-
sent itself as staunchly Democratic, and liberal, in national politics. In 2008, Barack Obama won
Chicago’s Cook County by more than a million votes, winning three votes for each one cast for
3Royko (1971), p. 139
4Sugrue (1996), Keiser (1997), Pinderhughes (1987), Erie (1988), Massey and Denton (1993)
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McCain.5 This continued liberal representation of the city, despite the divisive potential of race,
was partly attributable to the fact that Chicago’s representatives were from a city, but also partly
attributable to the fact that Chicago’s representatives were from the same city; the local institutions
of a common political community and strong local party organization made Chicago’s represen-
tatives more likely to agree on all issues, especially those most relevant to the city. For Chicago’s
(and other cities’) delegation in national politics, race wound up looking like other issues, and the
institutions that kept diverse coalitions together weathered the storm.
6.1 Urbanicity and Two-dimensional liberalism
The powerful New Deal coalition built upon the always tenuous alliance between representatives
of urban and Southern constituencies has vanished completely, famously riven by racial conflict,
accelerating in the 1960s with the struggles and successes of the civil rights movement. Elite po-
litical conflict in twentieth century America turned primarily on two substantive axes—statism
and race—and in the contemporary polity these dimensions of conflict overlap: in Congress, con-
servatism on one tends to coincide with conservatism on the other to an extent unprecedented in
the modern era.6 While urban and Southern representatives were once able to reach an accord
on the first dimension but divided on the second, they are now very divided on both. Today in
Congress—the distillation of these places as political communities within the nation—Mississippi
and the rest of the South are mostly doubly conservative, while Chicago and most large cities
are doubly liberal.7 Double liberalism on political economy and intergroup politics has come to
sweep other issues into its portfolio, such that elite positions have also become sorted on a host of
seemingly unrelated issues such as those about Christian values and abortion, with partisans in
5Each of these 2008 figures is from CNN exit poll data. The margin was almost certainly higher in Chicago proper,
as suburban portions of Cook County are more Republican than the city itself.
6Poole and Rosenthal (1998); McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006)
7Mississippi now has only four seats in the house, and its representatives are doubly conservative except for Rep.
Bennie Thompson (D), who represents a majority-African American district that includes Jackson. The state is more
consistently Republican in Presidential politics than in Congressional seats, but the transition among other southern
states as well has made the South into a Republican stronghold.
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the electorate sorting close behind.8
What is less clear is why issues as potentially unrelated as tax rates, labor regulation, racial
equality, immigration, and abortion have become linked in American politics. The connections
between the party positions on these issues are not logically necessary, and alternative sets of po-
sitions could be just as easily defended based on the principles elaborated by libertarianism, com-
munitarianism, dogmatic Catholicism, or some other ideology. But the extant liberal-conservative
divide—with a “Blue” pole favoring statist intervention in markets, the centralization of power, a
social safety net, the pursuit of social equality for various minority groups, and social permissive-
ness countered by a “Red” pole espousing the virtues of markets, lower taxes and generally re-
strained government (especially at the national level), and the promotion of traditional/Christian
social mores and increasingly conservative in its position on race—has hardened and spread over
the past decades. If we think about the relationship between place character and some of these
issues, however, the role of urbanicity in helping to shape political conflict is compelling.
The epigrams above, revealing American attitudes about New York City, are representative of
an important conversation about the place of cities in the American experience. In these pages, I
have argued that place character, and the distinctive governance challenges of urban communities,
are at the heart of contemporary modern political polarization because place character is related to
governance—related to the shape and character of the state, and the ways that groups are treated
in politics. The doubly liberal set of positions taken up by representatives of “Blue” America is
a distinctly urban set of positions, an idea alluded to in the popular discourse on the Red-Blue
divide but usually attributed to state or regional culture. No doubt the ideas, particular histo-
ries, climate, and contingencies of states and regions matter for citizens’ political consciousness;
however, material conditions and lived experience on a human scale—the kinds of built environ-
ments we navigate, the varieties of persons we interact with, and the manner in which these things
change, or not—are also important shapers of worldview and political outlook. Statism and group
pluralism, the hallmarks of double liberalism, are more important features for sustaining order in
urban political communities than they are in other contexts. Traditional “American” values, as
8Shapiro and Bafumi (2009)
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elaborated by Thomas Jefferson and his allies in the republic’s early days, were firmly rooted in
the soil of an agrarian civilization and predicated upon the continual expansion of the nation’s ter-
ritory. The massive transformation of the Industrial Revolution, and the associated development
and growth of urban forms gave rise to a host of new governance demands and institutions devel-
oped to deal with them. These solutions for urban life were transferred into national politics with
the Democratic Party’s progressive liberal wing in the New Deal. Thus the main commitments of
the long New Deal—statist intervention in the economy through regulation, redistribution, and
public goods provision; the recognition, tolerance, and accommodation of group difference; and
state-institutional adjustment to new social conditions generally—are urban commitments, made
national by the Democratic Party’s new urban bloc-of-blocs in the 1930s, even as their local polities
were episodically riven by deep racial, class, and social conflicts. This is the spirit conveyed by the
WNYC station announcement above, which is still used to describe a certain kind of community
to which the urban bloc aspired. These commitments made a marriage of convenience with the
South—which often preferred not to “know any more” about such communities—less and less
convenient as time wore on. Local development patterns, and local political institutions and ar-
rangements, not simply demography, constituent ideology, or Southern pathology, played a key
role in these divergent outcomes of Chicago and Mississippi. The contemporary full flowering of
the Blue-Red, urban-rural ideological and partisan cleavage has deep roots in the New Deal.
This study describes the urban-rural cleavage and how it has contributed to our current state
of polarization. It identifies the roots of today’s “Red-Blue” moment within the Democratic Party
of the New Deal, in an urban wing that “moved first” in developing distinctive policy goals and
norms that would foreseeably overwhelm the national alliance with a Southern wing that never
fully supported the statism or group pluralism that were the defining elements of the progressive
liberal order. In doing so, the project contributes to our understanding of an historical puzzle at the
heart of the New Deal’s dissolution, positing that cities and local political institutions, by foster-
ing cohesive representation in support of positions that would enhance a city’s organic “health,”
played a perhaps unexpected role in bringing issues of racial equity to the national legislative
agenda. This change was the basis for the mutually reinforcing dimensions of conflict we have
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today.
These many complex subjects—the political dynamics of the New Deal, the development of
liberalism, the conversion of the white South from Solid Democratic to Red Republican, the in-
creasing polarization of contemporary American politics—are obviously important and they have
received an appropriately large amount of scholarly attention. This study aims to link these im-
portant subjects by attention to urbanicity and the manner in which cities represent themselves in
the broader polity. Cities and their leaders reshaped the content of American politics to meet their
special, urgent governance demands, which are best managed at a supralocal level. These de-
mands, which include significant interventions in economic behavior and adjustment to changing
social conditions, including the inclusion of new groups, fostered the development of progressive
liberalism, an approach to politics developed at the local level and later in national politics as well.
Despite the many challenges of diversity, cities represented themselves as unified in national pol-
itics.
6.2 Re-“Urbanizing” American Politics?
Over the course of the urban interlude, faith in the capacity of progressive liberal policies to ad-
dress the challenges of modernity was high, and the mood for cities was of a general optimism
for the future. Of course, the intervening decades eroded that optimism and tempered the power
of city forces in national politics. Structural changes to the economy (especially the decline of
Fordist manufacturing) and population shifts to the suburbs and Sunbelt left many urban centers
hollowed out. It is not uncommon for Rust Belt cities to be half as large as they once were, and
the communities that remain sometimes struggle to provide even the most basic forms of order;
contemporary Detroit is the most shocking example of this phenomenon. Some of the largest
cities have now regained their midcentury populations in absolute terms, but relative to their
metropolitan areas and the nation as a whole they are much smaller. New York City once sent
26 representatives to congress; today, that number is down to eleven, even though the city itself
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is still home to “more than seven million people,” as WYNC bragged in the 1930s.9 The city can
no longer claim to be the part that stands in for the whole of American society. At the same time,
fewer city representatives come from places with strong local party traditions (and these parties
have mostly become weaker where they do persist). The potential for forging unity presented
by institutions of horizontal integration has diminished over time, because fewer representatives
come from places with strong local parties, and those places have fewer representatives than they
used to.
Politically, the maturation of the urbanicity divide and the consolidation of the (white) Repub-
lican South mean that the pivotal political force in American politics is clearly suburban.10 The
political implications of this fact, which Gainsborough (2001) identifies as the “suburbanization”
of American politics, are still being negotiated. Cities were always the strongest force in support
of market interventions and “big government,” because such policies are important for making
cities work. In the 1930s, they formed an alliance to pursue these policies at the national level.
But they needed allies to forge a majority, and those allies would occupy a pivotal position in na-
tional politics. Under the initial alliance of the New Deal, cities could pursue a logroll with their
pivotal rural allies, many of whom represented particularly poor, underdeveloped parts of the
country. Thus, because the cities wanted relief, the South was made habitable. But they could not
logroll the kinds of social regulation required to keep cities peaceful and productive, on labor and
race. The cities’ new coalitional partners, as the urbanicity cleavage has matured, have become
the “next most urban” places: suburban areas.11 While settlement patterns are shifting to change
the demography of the suburbs in favor of populations that may be more Democratic than they
once were, the local political organization of these places is not. In some sense the point of suburbs
is their high level of political fragmentation, but as more Americans live in such small places this
may continue to undermine the possibilities for national liberalism on “first dimension” policies,
a fact that needs to be considered in ongoing policy debates and outcomes.12 On the other hand,
9The city’s population is actually more than 8 million as of the latest Census.
10During the Long New Deal, the pivotal political force was typically the Southern Democratic bloc. See Katznelson
and Mulroy (2012).
11As well as rural areas with large minority populations, and places where smaller “ex-cities” are close enough to be
represented together.
12Gainsborough (2001)
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the frank racism of the Old South is no longer acceptable to these new pivotal communities, but
with continued residential segregation patterns, and no institutions of horizontal integration to
bind heterogeneous constituencies together, the prospects for “sharing” seem more dismal, and
the problems for public goods provision in diverse contexts may become more severe. Thus the
suburbanization of American politics, especially at an historical moment when immigration is
increasing salient, may entail not only the policy and political centrality of relatively affluent, rela-
tively white suburban communities, but also a heightening of the fragmentation of identities and
weakening of integrative institutions—institutions that allow us to get over the factors that make
us less likely to share with people who are different, and foster reinvestment in national and re-
gional public goods.13
From a policy or political perspective, three promising possibilities for reducing political frag-
mentation and reinvigorating the power of local IHIs seem apparent, though none seem partic-
ularly likely to occur in the short term. The first is to redraw the meaningful lines of political
division. Taking the metropolitan area as the functional social and economic unit, many scholars
and planners have promoted a metropolitan political agenda.14 Such an agenda aims to strengthen
institutions for making planning and resource allocation decisions at a regional level, incorporat-
ing both central city and suburbs and effectively expanding the actors included within an impor-
tant jurisdictional IHI. If regional governance is essentially nonexistent, representational cohesion
may be as well. Coordinating across municipal boundaries, getting municipalities to cede their
“sovereignty” to a broader authority (likely to be dominated by the central city) seems difficult,
but the pursuit of rational solutions to our problems continues.
A second possibility is to shift not the lines but the people. The sprawling population patterns
that have accelerated over the past century as American life has been organized at automobile-
scale has pushed us far beyond the boundaries of central cities, past the lines that once collected
many, many Americans in the same local polities.15 This sprawl has been encouraged by technol-
ogy and preferences, but also by the state policies that intersect with them. Municipal fragmenta-
13Habyarimana et al. (2009), Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999)
14Orfield (1997), Dreier, Mollenkopf and Swanstrom (2004)
15Many Americans still live in these central cities, of course, but relatively more and more live outside of these lines
than was the case in the urban interlude.
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tion has been a side effect and accelerant of the phenomenon.16 Among sprawl-financing policies
we might include publicly-funded road-based transportation networks, low taxes on energy (es-
pecially gasoline) relative to comparable countries, and subsidies for home ownership (loans were
more easily available and property costs lower for purchases outside the central city), and a sys-
tem of primarily local financing for public schools, among others.17
In planning and policymaking circles sprawl is seen as a cause of all ills, so fighting it is of-
ten seen as a sort of panacea. Changes to the calculations involved in how people make their
residency decisions are possible insofar as those calculations are driven or shaped by policies. If
people lived closer together, there are reasons to believe many personal and social ills would be
diminished, from greenhouse gas pollution to income inequality to obesity. Of course, other prob-
lems might fill the void—everyone knows that living in a densely populated space can have its
serious aggravations. But if membership in the same political community fosters common inter-
est, at least among elites, then reducing sprawl may actually foster something like liberalism, by
strengthening institutions that help to overcome the “diversity problems” we face that complicate
sharing and statism.
6.3 Cities on the Hill
The biblical image of a shining “City upon a Hill” has often been employed to describe or justify
America’s status as an exceptional nation. The phrase was a favorite of Ronald Reagan’s, who
employed it frequently over decades. In his televised farewell address, Reagan devoted several
paragraphs to describing the city upon a hill of his mind as
a tall, proud city built on rocks stronger than oceans, windswept, God-blessed, and
teeming with people of all kinds living in harmony and peace; a city with free ports
that hummed with commerce and creativity. And if there had to be city walls, the walls
16A side effect because people’s decisions to move, even if they choosing to move out of the central city, may not be
about municipal fragmentation per se. Because suburbs usually have density-prohibiting zoning laws, the shift to these
areas has accelerated sprawl, because land “fills up” faster, in a legal sense, when it cannot be developed as intensely.
17Dreier, Mollenkopf and Swanstrom (2004) , pp.111-125; Rae (2003), Frank (2007)
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had doors and the doors were open to anyone with the will and the heart to get here.
That’s how I saw it, and see it still.18
This imaginary city has been adopted as a touchstone of Reagan’s legacy, and the idea of the
United States as a model community is closely linked with the concept of “American exceptional-
ism,” which has come to approximate extreme patriotism in its common usage, and is most com-
monly associated with conservative causes and the Republican Party. In this study, however, I turn
to a relatively exceptional period in American history, when cities had important successes on the
Hill—Capitol Hill—and self-consciously promoted an example of politics and society markedly
different from that of today’s Party of Reagan. The cities sponsored the New Deal political order,
characterized by a multidimensional progressive liberalism that orients one pole of American pol-
itics today. This monograph describes the development of that political order, and theorizes what
made it possible.
But the idea of American exceptionalism itself is rooted in the paradox that prompted Werner
Sombart to ask why there was “no socialism in the United States” in 1906.19 This alleged absence
demanded explanation, from a Marxian perspective, because of Americas advanced capitalist de-
velopment. From a further remove, we can see other important exceptional features of the United
States that relate to Sombart’s question. As Lieberman (2009) notes, the United States has always
seemed to have a deep unease with cities and the kind of citizens and society they engender.
This has certainly been manifest in our national mythology, but also in our political institutions,
which have always privileged place over people.20 The result has been a general weakness on
the part of cities in national politics that is “exceptional” by international standards.21 In other
modern democracies, a larger share of the population lives in large cities, and there is often a sin-
gle metropolis that dominates the cultural, economic, and political life of the nation. Not so in
the United States. However, there have been moments where cities have had their say in national
18Ronald Wilson Reagan Farewell Address, Jan 11, 1989. Available at http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3418
19Sombart (1976). See Foner (1984) for a critical review of many answers to Sombart’s prompt.
20The improvements to the rules of representation of the 1960s notwithstanding, the Senate (and to a lesser extent
the electoral college) continues to ignore the political principle of equality in representation, in keeping with its consti-
tutional mandate.
21Lieberman (2009), p. 27.
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affairs. The urban interlude was one of these exceptional (for America) “moments of urban tri-
umph” in which a cross-city political alliance moved the needle of American politics significantly
to the left.22 This alliance, anchored by a diverse urban coalition that included large numbers of
“white ethnics,” unions, and African Americans, promoted and passed the major social welfare
legislation that would prove to be as close to “socialism” or workers-party leadership that the U.S.
would see to date.
But this “urban triumph” and the political forces that gave it muscle present a potential theo-
retical puzzle for Sombart and his interlocutors. Many plausible explanations for this absence have
been proffered in the century since Sombart’s question, and among the most frequently recurring
have been variations on the theme of division within the working class, as “the complex web of
backgrounds from which the American proletariat emerged is often seen as rendering unity along
class lines all but impossible.”23 Such a perspective argues that group diversity—particularly di-
versity in salient identities that cannot be easily changed—undermines the potential for what we
think of as liberal politics, or socialism, in Sombart’s vocabulary.24 Diversities of background and
interest are particularly heightened in cities, where all sorts of differences are both magnified and
compressed within physical space, and where principles of toleration and democracy are tested
most seriously.25 As we might expect, city politics have never been easy or consensual, especially
at the local level. But the broader truth is that significant national moves to the left, for several gen-
erations now, have been powered by these hodgepodge alliances from such heterogeneous places.
Today, a “liberalism” that is “supposed” to be undermined by diversity seems in some ways to be
driven by it, the party of the diverse cities supports social welfare provision to individuals, more
substantial public goods provision, the imposition of rules to govern large institutions, and gener-
ally inclusive norms for managing the pluralism that is unavoidable in our contemporary polity.
Even if they do not win all the time, if the most diverse places are the most ardent supporters of
22Even if they did not move it as far as Sombart might have expected or hoped. Lieberman (2009), p.19; Ethington
and Levitus (2009).
23Foner (1984), p.66-70.
24A permutation of this argument in modern political economy refers to the difficulty of coordinating across ethnic-
group lines for maintenance of collective action and the provision of public goods as in Alesina, Baqir and Easterly
(1999) and Habyarimana et al. (2009).
25Katznelson (2009)
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such a politics, this prompts a re-examination of how diversity affects the politics of statism and
group relations, perhaps with attention to how social and political experiences that differ by place
character have real, important effects far from where they are developed.
The assignation of a “city on a hill” to the American experiment is typically attributed to John
Winthrop, a Puritan minister who was in Reagan’s words “an early freedom man.”26 But free-
dom as Reagan typically meant it—individual unencumbrance by the state—was not a theme in
Winthrop’s text. The Puritans, after all, were not noted for their commitment to individual free-
dom.
In his now-famous “Defense of Christian Charity” of 1630, Winthrop likened the new Puri-
tan colony in Boston to a city on a hill, as their American experiment’s success or failure would
be closely followed by those back in England, and ostensibly attributed to the righteousness and
faithfulness with which the Puritans followed their holy path. Winthrop was himself alluding to
the Sermon on the Mount, in which Jesus exhorts his followers to lead exemplary lives of good
works as a model for others.27 The exemplary conduct of those in Jesus’s hilltop “city” would be
marked by Christian love and reciprocal obligation under the guiding advice of the Golden Rule,
and a selflessness worthy of sainthood. For Winthrop, the path to be followed by the Puritans,
was not one of openness or individual liberty; rather, he conceived of their mission as one which
could only be pursued in a closely knit community in which individual desires were subordinated
to the common good of the community. Winthrop emphasizes these ties of mutual obligation:
we must be knit together, in this work, as one man. We must entertain each other in
brotherly affection. We must be willing to abridge ourselves of our superfluities, for
the supply of other’s necessities. . . For we must consider that we shall be as a city upon
a hill. The eyes of all people are upon us.28
26Reagan (1989), though the path from Winthrop to Reagan led through some 19th- and 20th-century interpretive
shifts of emphasis, and 20th century readers seem to have found vastly more importance in Winthrop’s text than any
17th-century Puritans did. In fact, there is no evidence that anyone ever heard or read the “sermon” in Winthrop’s day.
Reagan added the “shine” to the city. See Peterson (forthcoming)
27Matthew 5:14-16 (KJV): “Ye are the light of the world. A city that is set on an hill cannot be hid. Neither do men
light a candle, and put it under a bushel, but on a candlestick; and it giveth light unto all that are in the house. Let your
light so shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in heaven.”
28Winthrop (1630), Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society (Boston, 1838, 3rd Series, 7:31-48. Hanover
Historical Texts Project, http://history.hanover.edu/texts/winthmod.html. Archaic spellings modernized by author.
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Winthrop preached unity in pursuit of the common cause presented by external threats, and urged
exemplary conduct in the name of Christian love and charity, but mainly in the name of their com-
munity’s survival. He couched this approach in the context of apparent concern about why within
the band of colonists “some must be rich, some poor, some high and eminent in power and dig-
nity; others mean and in submission.” Theorizing how a diverse community (his emphasis is
on differences of wealth and status among the group of settlers) can remain unified (especially
against outsiders), Winthrop argues that “diversity” of wealth was a good to all, because under
such conditions “every man might have need of others, and from hence they might be all knit
more nearly together in the Bonds of brotherly affection.” It was his worry that the success of
the colony was far from assured, given the many perils of the New World.29 It was his hope that
divisions could be overcome in the name of common cause, in the interest of the city itself.
We do not need to venture into Ronald Reagan’s imagination to see American communities
self-consciously seeking to lead the world and exemplify a new, distinctive vision of political
community. This study explores the distinctive character and substance of city representation
in national politics—how the cities represent themselves on Capitol Hill. Actual cities have lived
up to Winthrop’s aspiration better than political scientists might predict: in the face of diversity
and crisis, they became quite cohesive in establishing and developing an urban political order
that would come to define one of the main poles of American politics, first in conflicts within the
Democratic Party and then between the national parties.
Just as Winthrop’s Pilgrims were faced with an external threat that was to bind them together
despite their differences, so too did the urban political order create a cohesive bloc out of disparate
parts when faced with the extreme crises of modern capitalism during the Depression and the sub-
sequent era of suburbanization and capital flight. Within- and across-city unity was forged even
though the cities themselves had long faced (and continued to face) the deep threat of internal
disorder, as economic and cultural heterogeneity made consensus more difficult and raised the
stakes of politics. These internal struggles did not go away, but in national politics they were sub-
ordinated to common interest against the structural threats to cities presented by the 20th century.
29Peterson (forthcoming)
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The member cities of the urban political order faced deeper divisions—in terms of class, re-
gion, race, religion, and national origin—than Winthrop would have been able to imagine. These
polyglot communities fostered an approach to politics that grappled with difference and recog-
nized it (even if only symbolically at times) while seeking to bring these new members into an
existing political framework and preserve the health of their cities. The result was an imperfect
but inclusive compromise, which was not made on equal terms for all groups but which nonethe-
less allowed for progress to be made even as local conflicts remained deep and dire.
This is how city leaders saw themselves during this era. When WNYC announced that its lis-
tening audience were members of a community where “more than 7 million people live in peace
and enjoy the benefits of democracy,” and when Chicago’s Anton Cermak described his ascen-
dant Democratic machine as “a house for all peoples,” they were attempting both description and
inspiration. The progressive liberalism developed in these cities and supported by their represen-
tatives in national politics re-shaped America’s self-presentation in the world. These cities sought
to spread their brand of politics—doubly liberal, pluralist in cultural and political approach, with
faith in limited statist intervention as a way to soften capitalism’s rough edges and strengthen the
bonds of membership in the national community—to the nation, and eventually to the world in
the aftermath of World War II. They met with mixed successes, of course, but their political project
shifted national domestic politics, nudging the doubly conservative South away and strengthen-
ing the power of the urbanicity cleavage over time.
These city leaders, speaking in the moment of metropolitan metonymy, sought to apply a pol-
itics developed in cities to a nation that had seldom been comfortable with urban life, and would
soon have reason to be extremely concerned with the dramatic urban crises the 1960s. They were
speaking in the center of the national political conversation, on Capitol Hill, referring not only
to the grand ongoing experiment of domestic city democracy but also to a world beset by differ-
ent visions of how to deal with the crisis of modernity. Illiberal models were ascendant in many
places, but leaders in American cities advanced a set of policies and political commitments that
took democracy as a premise. In a world of constant threats and increasingly global economic
insecurity, the City Upon the Hill—the American political solution to economic modernity, and
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As described briefly in Chapter 3, the quantitative analyses in this study are based on an original
dataset of measures indicating the place-character of congressional districts, or USR scores. These
USR scores differ from the urbanicity scores used by Mayhew (1966) and Wolman and Marnicki
(2005) because they are available across a wider stretch of time (because they do not rely upon
the availability of district-level Census data, which has been the standard approach in previous
studies) and because they begin with the premise that urbanites are members of large political
communities. For each of these reasons, the USR codes are more theoretically useful for study of
the urban-rural divide over time.
A.1 Previous Approaches: Census-driven
Previous analyses of city representatives’ power or behavior in the House have begun with district-
level census data to identify districts. Mayhew, in his pioneering study of cross-cutting pressures
on legislators from different kinds of places, uses a census-based approach, combined with an
accounting of percentage in the district who rented their homes. He relies on a Congressional
Quarterly from 1962, and then applies the measures for those congresses forward and backward
over his time period. He is thus restricted to a relatively few postwar congresses based on data
availability.
Wolman and Marnicki (2005) (hereafter “W-M”) adopt a similar approach, but because they
wrote in 1998 they are able to include more congresses over time. They begin with census data
for the congresses just after the decennial census and reallocation of seats (1963, 1973, 1983, 1993).
This data allows them to determine the proportion of a district’s residents living in central cities,
the proportion living outside of central cities but in metropolitan-area counties, and those living
in counties outside metropolitan areas. If a majority of the district’s residents fell into one of these
categories, they coded the district urban, suburban, or non-metropolitan, respectively. Districts
that did not have a majority from one place-type were coded as “mixed.”1
1Caraley (1976) apparently adopts the same approach for Congresses in 1968 and 1973.
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Each of these census-based analyses identifies districts by place-character for their analyses,
but there are several shortcomings of these approaches. The most obvious is the time constraint:
because these approaches rely on available census data, they are restricted to a few congresses.
This limits the scope of questions they can ask. For a study concerned with the changing place of
cities in American political development, a few recent congresses, even over three decades, limits
the things we might see. Another approach, less dependent on the availability of (relatively lim-
ited, before 1960) census data, would be helpful.
Beyond this main time-limitation, each selection process includes potentially limiting choices
in categorizing city districts. Mayhew is not concerned with the full range of urbanicity: his
analysis is primarily concerned with city representatives, so he labels representatives on a binary
measure, either city, or non-city. City representatives are those with very few non-metropolitan
residents and lots of renters. This purposefully excludes representatives from areas of cities with
relatively high rates of homeownership, prioritizing land tenure over political membership in con-
ceptualization of what counts as urban. In practice, this means including districts from smaller,
perhaps more working-class, places where there are lots of renters, and excluding more affluent
areas of some cities, often nearer to the edge of the city/suburban border. Because size is a key
characteristic of urbanicity, membership in the large political community of the center city (and
thus inclusion in its institutions of horizontal integration) is meaningful, so over the long run the
opposite choice seems more appropriate for identifying city districts. Relying on political bound-
aries, rather than proportion of rentals, may be more appropriate over time as well, if the rental
rate varies significantly over time or across cities.
W-M’s selection and coding does rely primarily on municipal boundaries in determining whether
a district is primarily city, suburban, or non-metropolitan. Their approach is limited in two ways,
however. First, they do not attempt to characterize “mixed” districts, those without a majority
from one of the three place-types. It is likely that for most of these some judgement can be made
about the balance, for instance a predominantly urban-suburban mix, or a predominantly rural-
suburban mix. Their approach is unnecessarily pure, and leaves out potentially useful information
from this “in-between” category. More than 50 seats in each of their congresses go essentially un-
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categorized.
Second, and probably less importantly in practice, it does not distinguish between large and
small cities, even though central cities can in practice be quite small, and not fit our intuitions of
what a “city” is. For most districts, this is not a problem, because a small city’s population will not
make up a majority of a congressional district, but if a district contains several small cities, and is
drawn in an idiosyncratic way, it might; again, membership in a common political community is
meaningful in this study, so distinguishing districts in which most members live in the same city
from those in which they come from different local political communities is useful.
A.2 USR codes: Size-driven
For this study, I attempt to develop measures of district place character that are consistent and
applicable over time, that are sensitive to the full spectrum of place-character (not just binary),
and that resulted in outcomes that fit well with our intuitions of what a city is. Because urban
forms have changed so much over time, focussing on rental rates or other lifestyle characteristics
may not be flexible enough. Instead, I adopt the approach taken in Lieberman (2009), which gives
priority to place size relative to the nation in determining what a city is, and measures the urban-
icity of a congressional district based on its spatial relationship with such cities. This approach has
the advantages of being consistent over historical time and not privileging one kind of city over
another, apart from the large over the small.
The USR measures are developed as follows. I begin with Lieberman’s (2009) list of cities with
more than .1 percent of the national population in a given decennial census (hereafter referred to
as “large cities”). This standard was identified in Lieberman as a useful definition for cross-time
comparisons. It enjoys face validity insofar as the list of cities fits an intuition of which kinds of
places should be included in a set of cities, and the character of the places is allowed to vary over
time. More rigorously, .1 percent is just shy of one-half of one congressional district under con-
ditions of equal apportionment, so such places would be theoretically be able to exert significant
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control over at least one congressional district.2 There were 59 places from 29 states in the U.S.
that met this size standard in 2000 (used here as a proxy for 2008). The set of cities in this list has
become more varied geographically over time, as illustrated by the maps in Chapter 3, Figure 3.1.
From a concentration in the North and East, the set of cities has spread South and West, and the
number of cities in the set has increased over time.
A.2.1 USR codes: scoring procedures
With Lieberman’s list in hand, each congressional district is assigned a series of scores based on
its position in time and space relative to that list. The first (USRnum) is an indicator of whether a
district has significant spatial overlap with a city on the list for that decade. If a district overlaps
a current city, it is given a score of “City.” If it overlaps with a large city that was on the list but
has dropped off the list within two decades, it is labeled as a “Former City.” This is because such
communities will no doubt retain some of their political importance, even if their relative (or abso-
lute) size has declined, and to distinguish such formerly city districts from those which have never
been part of a big city. If it overlaps with a city that joins the list in the next decade, it is labelled
“Future City” to mark cities that are growing and may have actually reached the threshhold but
have not been remeasured by the Census yet. Districts which do not overlap with a city or former
city are given a “Noncity” label.
Each district is also given a more qualitative measure describing the character of their dis-
trict. These scores were developed by carefully examining each district’s geographic extent and
evaluating its mix of place characters. For recent congresses, GIS maps of the districts are readily
available, and can be overlaid on a large city’s boundaries to determine to what extent the dis-
trict is enclosed within the large city. Older congresses were scored using maps available in the
2In a 435-member congress, under conditions of equal representation, each district should have about .22 percent of
the national population (though in fact there is some variation between districts, even after the enshrinement of one
person-one vote as a principle for representation). Thus a more rigorous standard for a population threshold would be
.11. In practice, this distinction does not matter: in the 20th century, there are no cities that were included by the .10
threshhold that would not have been using the .11.
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congressional atlas series, and congresses before 1983 were scored using maps and district de-
scriptions from Martis and et al. (1982), an invaluable source. Districts that were entirely within a
city from Lieberman’s list are coded as “U”, wholly suburban districts are coded as “S”, and those
that do not overlap with a large city (or its suburbs) coded “R.” Coding mixed districts is less
straightforward. While W-M lump many of these into a single category and effectively discard
them, USR codes attempt to give a more informative qualitative description of where a district
falls on the place-character continuum. A district that is primarily within a large city but also
includes significant suburban areas is coded “U/S.” A district that is predominantly suburban
but also includes some significant portion of a large city is coded “S/U,” and so on. Once these
qualitative USR codes are given, districts are also given a quantiative measure on an ordinal USR
scale ranging from 1 (Noncity/Rural) to 7 (Entirely city/Urban) with predominantly suburban or
mixed districts falling in between. It is this ordinal variable (USRord), or a three category simpli-
fication of it, that is included in most of the regression and quantitative analyses in the empirical
chapters.3
In addition to USR scores ranging from Urban to Rural, “City” districts are given a further
qualitative coding reflecting the shape of the district. Every ten years, we are reminded that
re-drawing the boundaries of Congressional districts is an important strategic game played by
politicians at the local and state level; much of the action in this game seems to lie near the edge
of the city. In developing USR scores for each district, it became apparent that a few types of city
districts recur, and the actual geographic form of a district may have dramatic implications for its
partisan status.
Four basic ideal types of urban districts are often drawn. Though particular districts may not
fall clearly or perfectly into one of these categories, for the most part the judgements of type are
fairly straightforward. Adding this qualitative layer beyond the simple urban-suburban-rural tri-
chotomy will be useful in future analyses of city districts, though they are not used much in the
foregoing chapters. Once a district has been identified as “urban” or “mixed urban,” I assign it
3In the empirical chapters 3 through 5, USRord is included as an explanatory variable in regression analyses. For
graphical clarity, Figures with a tripartite Urban/Suburban/Rural distinction (“USR3”) are developed using a recod-
ing of USRord in which scores greater than 5 are coded “urban”, scores lower than 3 “rural”, and scores in between
“suburban.”
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a categorical type indicator, USRtype, ranging from 1 to 4. These types are illustrated in Figure
A.1. In each of the subfigures, an abstracted metropolitan area is divided into rural, suburban,
and urban (central city) components. District lines drawn by state legislatures may reflect these
different kinds of place characters or they may combine different kinds of places. Here are brief
descriptions of the city district types:
• Type 1: Core. Core districts are those districts that are nested within a city, or coterminus
with the city’s boundaries. Most core districts are one among several within a large city—
New York’s districts, which almost all run along city boundaries and are nested within the
city, are the paradigmatic examples.
• Type 2: Metropolitan. These districts are mixed Urban and Suburban (and sometimes rural
as well), encompassing all of the central city and at least a substantial portion of the suburban
and/or rural hinterland. Many small cities, and many malapportioned districts before Baker
v. Carr fall into this category.
• Type 3: Sliced. These districts combine urban residents with suburban and/or rural resi-
dents, typically in a way that makes the city look like a pie that has been sliced up. If a city
is large enough to merit more than one district, this is often a main alternative to creating
districts that are more internally homogeneous with respect to urbanicity. Many districts
that resulted from the forced redistricting following Baker look like this, as do many of the
districts that result from court enforcement of the Voting Rights Act.
• Type 4: Spillover. These “remainder” districts combine urbanites with residents outside
the central city, most often because there is some area of the city left over, or geographically
anomalous, and cannot be fit into a more urban district. There are not many spillover dis-
tricts, and for a a district to qualify as type 4, it must be from a city that has at least one Core
district, to illustrate that the spillover is not just one of many pie slices.
These sub-types of city districts have not yet been thoroughly analyzed, beyond the figure in
Chapter 3.













Figure A.1: Illustrations of ideal urban district-types.










Figure A.2: Congressional Districts, Colorado, 2003-2013.
Finally, during the coding process the large city with which the district is associated (as a city
or suburban district) is noted, and in the case of very large cities, the part of the city represented is
also noted (for instance, the South Side of Chicago, the San Fernando Valley in Los Angeles, or the
neighborhood of Manhattan in New York City). Recording the city allows for city delegation-level
analyses as well as analyses of metropolitan-area and suburban delegations, as in Chapter 3, and
as a handy referent when identifying the constituencies of representatives in other contexts.
A.2.2 USR codes: examples
It may be useful to examine how this coding works with a few concrete examples. For instance,
Figure A.2 uses the very straightforward example of districts in Colorado from 2003-2012. The
first district traces the Denver city limits (marked by shading, though it’s hard to tell in this map
because the boundaries track each other so closely) unusually closely, and thus is coded as “City”
on USRnum, “U” on USR, “7” on USRord, and “1” on USRtype. Districts 2, 6, and 7 include
significant suburban and rural elements, and are each coded “Noncity” on USRnum, “S/R” on
USR, and “3” on USRord. Because they do not include any portion of a large city, they do not
receive a USRtype score.

















Figure A.3: Congressional Districts, Chicago area, 2003-2013.
Because congressional district boundaries usually do not track municipal boundaries at all,
and because cities are usually not almost perfectly sized for a congressional district, the scoring
usually involves more judgements than it does for Denver. Figure ?? illustrates how congressional
districts overlapped with the city of Chicago from 2003-2012. None of the districts is entirely
within the city boundaries (again indicated by the shaded area), though the territory of the gerry-
mandered Fourth is effectively inside Chicago. All of the other districts that overlap Chicago have
significant suburban components, and some are primarily suburban. Thus while the First, Second,
Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth are all coded “City” on USRnum, they vary between “U/S” and
“S/U” on USR, with USRord scores from 5 to 7, depending on the balance of the city/suburban
mix.
Such elaborate and complicated district-drawing schemes have become more common over
the past decades, as cities have been accorded fewer districts and lines must often be drawn with
considerations other than contiguity in mind. The phenomenon of suburban sprawl also compli-
cates these judgements. Before the 20th century, few cities had satellite communities that could
reasonably be called suburbs: Cambridge (MA), Brooklyn, and some of the neighborhoods that are
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now part of Philadelphia were a few notable exceptions.4 For most cities, suburbanization became
noticeable politically around the 1930 census, when there come to be medium-sized congressional
districts outside the central city’s boundaries. This is when I begin coding more suburban districts
for many cities. Of course, in practice many of these included city, suburban, and rural compo-
nents, sometimes older cities like Lowell (MA) become functional suburbs, sometimes suburbs
like Brooklyn get incorporated into their central cities, and it is often very difficult to tell where
the development line between “suburban” and “rural” ends for both historic and contemporary
congresses. I have done my best to code these accurately, using historical streetmaps where avail-
able and knowledge of the development patterns of these cities and states. For most districts,
however, geographic extent serves as a good indicator of population density, given the assump-
tion of relatively equal district sizes mandated by law since the 1960s, and the fact that central
cities are almost always more densely populated than their suburbs (if not necessarily as densely
populated as other cities and their suburbs) helps in coding the suburban and mixed districts.
A.3 Conflicts: Comparing USR and census-driven measures
As a test of concept and measurement validity, it is worthwhile to compare the USR scores with
the previous standards where possible. Below I compare the USR codes to those developed using
census measures of central city, suburban, and rural populations in Wolman and Marnicki (2005)
and Mayhew (1966).
From this table we can see a few things. First, the USR total is the same as Mayhew for the
1950s. This is very encouraging, though we know that the two methods include slightly different
sets of representatives because of the use of rental housing as a selection criteria in Mayhew’s
set. Compared with W-M, the aggregate figures for the USR categories roughly track those based
on the census-based approach when we account for the fact that USR3 forces mixed districts into
one of the three categories. Distributing the 66 “mixed” districts from 1963 in the Wolman and
4Though before merging with New York, Brooklyn itself was a large enough city to be included in the dataset.
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Source Year City Suburban Rural Mixed Notes
Mayhew 1950s 140 City v Non-city
USR 1953 140 63 227 USR3
W-M 1963 94 94 181 66
USR 1963 143 88 205 USR3
Wolman Marckini 1973 103 131 131 70
USR 1973 135 132 168 USR3
W-M 1983 88 191 93 63
USR 1983 122 158 153 USR3
Wolman Marckini 1993 84 214 83 54
USR 1993 141 144 148 USR3
W-M 2007 92 235 71 62 Estimated
USR 2007 140 152 143 USR3
Table A.1: Comparing USR Scores with Census-based scores. Source: USR, Wolman and Marnicki
(2005), Mayhew (1966), 2007 American Community Survey
Marckini table and the categories would be fairly closely matched in that year. There do seem
to be sizeable systematic differences, however: the USR scores tend to have many more rural
districts, and fewer suburban districts, than W-M, even when we assume that their mixed districts
could be forced into one of the categories. But how different are the two systems of categorization,
and what is driving this difference? I looked closer by applying W-M’s coding system to the
110th Congress, and comparing it district-by-district to the 7-category ordinal USR scores for that
congress. The cross-tabulation is presented below in Table A.2.
USRord
W-M Category R RS SR S SU USR US U Total
Nonmetropolitan 56 0 10 0 0 1 0 0 67
Suburban 50 0 47 65 12 20 26 0 220
Urban 3 1 1 0 1 11 42 29 88
Mixed 41 0 8 0 0 9 2 0 60
Total 150 1 66 65 13 41 70 29 435
Table A.2: Comparing USR Scores with the W-M method, 110th CongressSource: USR, U.S. Census
From this table, we can see the implications of using the different systems of identifying city
districts and measuring district-level place character and a potential source of conflict for the USR
scores. While most of the districts on which the W-M method is decisive in the 110th lie on or near
the correct diagonal (from top-left to lower-right, in the top three rows), indicating that the USR
score is in agreement with W-M’s data for most districts, there is one major area where the scores
disagree: the USR’s use of only large cities as central cities makes them likely to score districts as
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rural even if they do in fact include large suburban or “urban” populations from small cities that
do not account for .1 percent of the population. There are 50 districts labelled as Rural in the USR but
as Suburban using the W-M method, 41 more that they would find to be mixed, and 3 more that
W-M would call urban but that USR calls Rural (or, really, “non-city”). This is troubling at first
shot.
Looking closer, however, these are all districts that include small cities and/or their suburbs:
cities such as Pensacola (FL), Erie (PA), and Rockford (IL) are among the largest cities in these dis-
tricts, while most of them are more like the South Carolina 5th district, which runs along the border
with Georgia and includes a few very small central cities in one loosely connected metropolitan
area complex.
This closer look reveals that researchers should not adopt the Census Bureau’s definition of
central city uncritically for all analyses, because it does not have a high threshold for what is con-
sidered a metropolitan area. The Census definition of a central city is tied to that of a metropolitan
area:
The general concept of a metropolitan area (MA) is one of a large population nucleus,
together with adjacent communities that have a high degree of economic and social
integration with that nucleus. Some MAs are defined around two or more nuclei . . . An
MA must contain either a place with a minimum population of 50,000 or a U.S. Census
Bureau-defined urbanized area and a total MA population of at least 100,000 (75,000 in
New England). . . In each metropolitan statistical area and consolidated metropolitan
statistical area, the largest place and, in some cases, additional places are designated
as central cities under the official standards.5
Our contemporary settlement patterns blur the lines between populated and unpopulated areas,
and also between city and suburb. Over 262 million people (just over 85 percent of the na-
tional population) live in the 525 metropolitan areas identified by the the census definition of a
metropolitan area.6 A category of “city” that broad may be useful in differentiating and catego-
rizing zones of economic activity, but it is not appropriate for assessing the strength of cities in
national politics, because not all “central cities” are really cities—the Census definition does not
5Census Geographic Definitions, www.census.gov/geo/www/geo defn.html#MA
6An additional 8 million live in the 152 additional “micropolitan” areas; it is unclear how these are treated by W-M.
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sufficiently attend to size as a key component of urbanicity. These smaller places may be relative
centers of local activity, but there are real differences in kind and degree that obviously differen-
tiate them from places like New York, Chicago, which have been on the Lieberman list for a long
time, but also from even smaller cities that have dropped out of the large city category such as
Syracuse (NY) or Providence (RI). A list of cities that includes Anderson (SC), Pascagoula (MS),
and Benton Harbor (MI) is too inclusive for a study of cities in national politics, and misses the
importance of size as a dimension of urbanicity. And while the residential character of some of
these districts that include the smaller cities and their surrounding areas may include develop-
ments like those in the suburbs of the larger cities, they are not the same political dynamics of
the ideal-type metropolitan area—one large polity (large enough to merit representation in the
nation) surrounded by many smaller ones, bound by economic activity but separated by political
geography.
These districts, by and large, are best understood as consisting of small towns and their fringe
areas; their inclusion as suburbs and cities in W-M and the census is an artifact of a census category,
the central city, that is outdated (because the threshold size for central cities was decided when
the national population was much smaller) and mostly intended to track economic and social vari-
ables, not political ones. The disparity between the W-M data and the USR ultimately hinges on
one’s answer to the question: can you have suburbs without a city? These are not classically rural
communities, but most Americans are no longer cowboys or farmers in any case. These commu-
nities are sparsely populated areas far from a major city. I have adopted the vocabulary of rurality,
which fits most of them even using W-M’s categories, but their label of “non-metropolitan” may
be just as appropriate—even if they are in census metropolitan areas. Once we look more closely
at the districts with apparently too-low USR scores and see that they really are not associated with
major cities, the utility of the USR scores becomes clearer, as they attend to the changes in place
character representation over time.
Beyond this issue of suburban rurality, the USR approach has other potential issues as well, of
which I have been conscious throughout the coding, and I have tried to minimize their potential
distorting effects. The method is more subjective at the margins than a blind reliance on outside
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census figures, and might be potentially distorted by a coder’s differential knowledge about dif-
ferent places or their subjective interpretations of the maps. For instance, if a coder knew more
about developmental patterns in some cities than in others, he or she might be able to more pre-
cisely gauge the balance between urban and suburban character in those places. These errors can
be minimized with attention to history and cartography, and subjective interpretations are mit-
igated to a great extent by the use of textual legal descriptions of districts in addition to maps.
However, the advantage afforded by not being limited to recent congresses for which census data
are available, and which may distort what we mean by city representation in any case, is consid-
erable, and outweighs this pitfall for historical analyses.
Second, this definition of “city,” remains essentially neutral beyond a population threshold. It
may therefore be appropriately exclusive of some small cities, and allow the kinds of communities
that count as cities to evolve over time, but it also excludes some places that may be considered
more “urban” by certain conventional understandings of the term than those in the set. For in-
stance, Gary, IN, is never included in the set; though it seems to have a self-conceptions as a city,
its built environment is recognizably “urban,” and it has been the subject of at least one important
study of urban politics,7 it was never big enough to merit inclusion as a city large enough to repre-
sent itself in national politics. Santa Ana (CA) and Mesa (AZ) are included after 2000, on the other
hand, even though they are basically large suburbs of sprawling late-20th century cities. Indeed,
one could quite reasonably argue that Gary is a more “urban” community than even Phoenix,
even though the latter includes almost 20 times as many members. That is basically Mayhew’s
approach. But this is as much a function of American social and economic development as a prob-
lem with social scientific classification, and fixes on a perhaps nostalgic or outdated conception of
what a “city” is or should be. Any list of major cities over time has to adjust for changing patterns
of development, and using size as an ultimate yardstick seems the best way to do this. This is
an acknowledged conceptual hazard of the USR method of classification, and analyses bear it in
mind.
7Crenson (1971)
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Appendix B
City District Demography
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Legislative behavior is a function of intracameral and extracameral influences, though politi-
cal scientists may not all agree on their relative importance. Intracameral influences include con-
gressional parties, institutional incentives such as rules, committee assignments, and prestige.1
Extracameral influences include some mix of personal preferences and ideology and constituency
preferences and pressure.2 In evaluating the role of constituency pressure in shaping legislative
behavior, district-level demography is an important source of information—this is often used as
helpful heuristic for identifying which legislators might be concerned with particular issues, or
may be faced with cross-cutting pressures.3 In analyses of the Senate and contemporary House
of Representatives this is straightforward, as there are a wide range of readily available measures
at the state level from the Census and the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social
Research (ICPSR). Because this study is particularly concerned with place character, and most
variation on this dimension takes place within states, the House is the more interesting chamber.
House district-level demography is trickier, because it is a less-used unit of analysis than states
or counties. For the most recent congresses, the Census bureau has tabulated good measures on
a number of variables at the district level, and these are available on the census website. For
older Congresses a researcher must rely on the somewhat idiosyncratic collections made by other
scholars for their own purposes. Some of these are readily available, and have become invalu-
able public goods. For Congresses 87-104 (1961-1997), Census data have been gathered by Lublin
(1997), as well as by Adler (2012), who goes back even further, to 1943.4
Analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 in this study focus on the urban interlude/Long New Deal, in-
cluding the 1930s, as a time period of important political change, and these older congresses are
trickier, because Census data are not available at the district level. Mayhew (1966) uses Congres-
sional Quarterly data from 1962 to conduct his study of city districts, combined with the Congres-
sional District Data Book released by the Census bureau in 1961.5 He then traces these districts
1Mayhew (1966), Aldrich (2011)
2Mayhew (1966), Mayhew (1974), Krehbiel (1998)
3Mayhew (1966)
4On their own, in data that do not seem to be available, Wolman and Marnicki (2005) generated district-level mea-
sures of place character using Census data going back to 1963.
5p. 60
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backward across fifteen years to identify the city districts in his study of 1947-1961. But his study
of housing issues does not take any demography apart from homeownership into account, and
includes no other demographics. Adler (2012) has created a very valuable dataset going back fur-
ther, to 1943, using county-level measures to create congressional-district measures. This dataset
includes such variables as percent African American, union households (at the state level), and
percent blue-collar, an important resource, but for a study of city districts over the Long New Deal
it is insufficient in two respects. First, 1943 is not quite far enough back to study the 1930s. We
could apply values from the early 1940s to the 1930s and be reasonably confident that they would
be related, but the 1940s was a particularly “mobile” period for many Americans, especially black
Americans leaving the South for the cities of the North during wartime mobilization, in what we
know as the Second Great Migration. So especially on race, measures from the mid-1940s are
likely significantly higher than those from the 1930s. This may be true on other measures as well.
Second, and more important from an analytical perspective, because Adler’s data is based on
county-level measures, aggregated to make congressional districts, it works very well for rural
districts but not city districts. Using this approach, Adler’s recipe states that “Urban counties that
contained multiple congressional districts were divided geographically and demographically ac-
cording to the respective number of districts.”6 This means that for city districts within the same
county, the county-wide measures are applied to each district (or divided equally, in the case of
raw totals). This is as good as one can do with county-level data, but in densely populated places
with high levels of spatial segregation (true of all major American cities during this period), this
approach will mask cross-district heterogeneity, making it look as though populations are spread
evenly across districts within a city delegation when they are not. This is especially important
in racial segregation, which was stark, because equalizing the percent African American across
districts gives a potentially misleading impression. For instance, in Adler’s data it would appear
that every district in Chicago had about 10 percent African American voters; in such a circum-
stance, every congressman might have the same incentive to respond to that black population’s
demands for reelection or renomination. In fact, as we saw in Figures 2 and 3 in Chapter 5, only
6Adler (2012)
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2 or 3 Chicago congressmen (out of 10) had significant black constituencies at this time because
of residential segregation patterns. This pattern is well-known, but usually not accounted for in
congressional studies.7
In this study, because I am particularly interested in racial dynamics and congressional repre-
sentation, it is important to rule out the direct electoral connection between African American con-
stituencies and city congressmen who do not represent them. I thus need more accurate measures
of racial populations at the district level, not the county level. Fortunately, there are geographic
techniques that can help us get better estimates of congressional districts below the county level
for some cities in some congresses even before the 1960s. Analyses in chapters 4 and 5 use pre-
liminary measures that reflect the true demographic heterogeneity of these districts during the
1930s-1950s. I develop the measures using the following techniques.
B.1 Building district-level estimates in large cities
To create more accurate district-level demographics for city districts, we must build from lower
levels of aggregation, not infer demographic evenness from the top-down. This is the approach
Adler employs to construct rural district measures from their constituent parts (counties). To con-
struct city districts from county data is akin to constructing all districts from state data: better
than a completely naive estimate, but blind to within-area heterogeneity.8 Census tracts are an
appropriate sub-city level of aggregation for this: much smaller than congressional districts, and
most fall within district lines. So I build my estimates of city district demography from the bottom
up using tracts.
Today, the entire country is divided into census tracts, but this was not always the case. When
the tract was first introduced as an analytical unit in 1910, counties in only nine city areas were
divided into tracts: New York City, Chicago, Boston, Baltimore, Cleveland, Philadelphia, Pitts-
7For example, Schickler, Pearson and Feinstein (2010) seem to use Adler’s data without adjusting for this, including
using the race variable, though they do not make any strong claims based on this analysis.
8Except in states with only one district, where it would work fine.
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burgh, Milwaukee, and St. Louis.9 By 1930, 24 counties in 14 states had been tracted, by 1940, 74
counties in 29 states, and so on. Of course, not all of these counties need to be disaggregated into
tracts to get better congressional district measures. Some, like Syracuse or Omaha, were too small
to be divided into more than one district. Others, like Nashville or Memphis, were probably large
enough for multiple districts but because of unequal districting (a practice most egregious in, but
not exclusive to, the South) did not get them and were within a single congressional district. For
each of these kinds of cities and their districts, Adler’s method works better. The districts for
which Adler’s measures need improvement can be identified by the fact that they have equivalent
measures for variables that are very unlikely to actually be equivalent: the number of black resi-
dents or blue collar workers, etc. These are the districts for which more sensitive measures need
to be developed.
The remainder of this appendix describes how I developed the more accurate district-level
measures, using the example of race in Chicago districts from the 79th Congress (1945-1947). To
fix these measures, I first identify the districts that are given the same county-level “top-down”
measures. All districts from the same state and congress which share equivalent measures of per-
cent African American and median family income with at least one other district are considered
candidates for revision. This indicates that they were assigned a county-wide value by Adler’s
technique. In the 79th Congress, there were 71 such districts, representing 13 cities in 10 states
that were “split” among two or more congressional districts.10 After identifying these districts as
candidates for the bottom-up measures, the goal is to take advantage of GIS techniques to create
a spatial match, combining information from census tracts that fall within a single congressional
district. For this, we need census tract data, which can be found at the National Historical GIS
9Here I say “city areas” because the metropolitan area was then not yet in use as a unit of aggregate measure-
ment. The Census divided certain counties that included or were included in these cities into tracts for these early
decennial periods. Not until 1970 was the preponderance of the nation’s territory assigned census tracts. See chart at
https://assets.nhgis.org/Tract-availability.pdf for availability of tract-level data.
10The “split” cities were New York City, Buffalo, Baltimore, Chicago, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh,
Milwaukee, Detroit, Saint Louis, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. A closer look includes Boston in this list, bringing the
total to 73 districts; its two predominantly Bostonian congressional districts also include other counties. These were the
cities with at least 2 congressional districts within their county borders.
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(NHGIS).11 The closest census to the 79th Congress is the 1940 decennial census.12 The Census
data from NHGIS includes numeric and spatial components. The NHGIS data from Chicago,
1940 are shown in Figure B.1. When we map Chicago’s census tracts from 1940, we can see that
there are thousands of tracts across the city, at left. Adding in numerical data on race, we can see
that black Chicagoans were heavily concentrated on the near South and near West Sides during
this time. This is illustrated by the tract-level percent black subfigure, at right in B.1. The darker
the shaded area on the map, the higher the percent black in that tract. Notice that almost every
tract on the North Side is completely white (on the map and demographically), indicating that it
was less than 1 percent black at this point, not 10 percent, as we would be led to believe if the
county-wide average was used everywhere.
These census tract data are helpful, and from this we can tell that congressional district-level
percent black will not be even across the ten Chicago congressional districts. To make more pre-
cise estimates, however, we need to construct maps of the districts, overlay them on top of the
demographic data, and aggregate up from the census tracts to create district-level measures. For
this, we need descriptions of what the congressional districts look like.
For recent congresses, the Census has GIS shapefiles that could be overlaid onto census tracts.13
For older congresses, constructed these districts in ESRI’s ArcMap software by hand using written
and hand drawn descriptions from multiple sources. The canonical text of historical congressional
geography is Martis and et al. (1982), an historical atlas of congressional districts going back to the
first congress through the early 1980s. This text includes both images of congressional districts, in-
cluding helpful insets for densely populated areas, and verbal legal descriptions in its Appendix.
I use both of these as initial resources to construct shapefile maps of congressional districts for the
“split” cities listed above. In the case of Chicago (as with other cities), legal congressional district
boundaries often refer to streets or local political jurisdiction. Thus while the legal descriptions
11https://www.nhgis.org/
12For now, information from the closest decennial census is used for the measures. In the future, linear interpolations
between censuses will be estimated. These decennial estimates are still far preferable to the existing data.
13Though we have good congressional-district data for these, so such a procedure is not necessary









Figure B.1: Left: Chicago census tracts 1940 Census. Right: Percent black in Census Tracts,
Chicago, 1940. The Northside and outlying areas were almost entirely white, while tracts on the
South and near West Side were over 75 percent black.
of rural districts are usually lists of counties (the Illinois 17th in the 79th Congress is defined as
“Ford, Livingston, Logan, McLean, Woodford” counties), city districts are usually slightly more
complicated. William Dawson’s First district was defined as
City of Chicago [wards 1, 2, 3 (that part east of the center line of Stewart Ave.), 4 (that
part lying east of the center line of Halsted St.), 6 (that part north of the center line of
43rd St.)]
Thus to draw the map of Chicago districts we need information about both streets and aldermanic
districts.14 Street information is available from the Census TIGER/Line Shapefiles page.15 For
14Thankfully (from a mapping, if not democratic, perspective), Chicago did not alter its Congressional district map
between the 58th and 80th congress, instead adding at-large seats when the state’s growing population merited it more
representation. Chicago’s aldermanic ward boundaries changed more frequently, every ten years.
15hrefhttp://www.census.gov/geo/www/tiger/tgrshp2011/tgrshp2011.htmlhttp://www.census.gov/geo/www/tiger/tgrshp2011/tgrshp2011.html
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Chicago, the very helpful Web site “A Look At Cook” has historical ward boundary maps.16.
Figure B.2 shows excerpts from the historical ward map and street map (with the First District
outlined in bold/Red) Thus from Martis’s descriptions, and the available geographical referents,



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure B.2: Left: Chicago aldermanic wards, 1940. (Source: A Look At Cook) Right: Street map of
South Side, with 1940 First District. Drawn from Martis and et al. (1982) and ward map at left.
Source: US Census TIGER/Line Shapefiles
Having drawn the congressional districts using the historical descriptions, we are now ready
to merge the census tract data into district-level estimates of the relevant variables. The safest way
16For 1940 boundaries, see http://www.alookatcook.com/1940/hypermap.html
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Figure B.3: Centroids in and around Illinois First District, 1940.
to do this without double-counting (census tracts do not perfectly line up with congressional dis-
tricts) is to assign each tract to the congressional district in which its centroid lies.17 The centroids
for tracts in and around the Illinois First district are shown in Figure B.3. The Census tract variable
for black is conveniently already in count form (as opposed to percentage, which would require
an extra step before aggregating to the district level), so using the Spatial Join tool in ArcMap we
can sum the number of African Americans in census tracts whose centroids lie within each dis-
trict. Other attributes, such as number of blue-collar workers and total population, are summed
as well.
The end result of the spatial join is a map that resembles Figure 3 from Chapter 5, with the
pattern of census tract-level segregation from Figure B.1 amplified at the level of congressional
districts. For the South Side, the pattern is shown up close in Figure B.4.
When we zoom out to see the pattern across all of Chicago, the concentration is even starker
17The centroid is the geographical center of a shape.








Figure B.4: Left: Chicago South Side Districts, Percent black in census tracts, 1940 Census. Right:
Chicago South Side Districts, Percent black in congressional districts, 1940 Census.
(this is a re-presentation of Figure 3 in chapter 5). Finally, here are the spatial patterns for New
York, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles in the 79th Congress. The color scale is the same across cities
(but NOT quite the same between tract and congressional district), so we can see how residential
segregation aggregates into representational unevenness. For each city the figure at left is census
tract-level percent black, with bold red lines outlining city congressional districts. At right are
the congressional districts, shaded according to the percent black. In each city, the Adler “top-
down” data attributes the same value of percent black to each district in the city (or county, in the
case of New York City, which includes all five counties); with that data, each entire city would
be some shade of light grey—though the cities themselves would vary (Los Angeles would be
lower than the others shown here). In each place, black residence was uneven, and there were a
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number of representatives with virtually no black constituency, yet as shown in Chapter 5, these
representatives were consistently cohesive and liberal on civil rights issues in the run-up to the
1960s.



























Figure B.5: Left: Chicago, Percent black in census tracts, 1940 Census. African Americans were
heavily concentrated within cities like Chicago. Right: Chicago, Percent black in congressional
districts, 1940 Census. Residential segregation led to political segregation: few congressmen had
many black constituents.
States redraw their district boundaries sporadically, most often after the decennial census. For
long stretches in the early 20th century, many district boundaries went unchanged. When they
changed, I drew a new map for that area and recalculate the district-level measures.18 The new es-
timates for the “split” city districts are then re-inserted into the dataset for analysis, better (though
still imperfectly) reflecting the true district attributes, and ostensibly better estimates of this as-
pect of constituency pressure, at least according to our theories of how pressure might work if it
is related to numbers. Overall, these fixes are most relevant to the percent black in city districts,
18This process is still in progress for all congresses before 1940 and for some districts after; estimates based on the
closest approximation in time and space are used for districts that have not been completed at this writing.










Figure B.6: New York City (and surrounding ur-































Figure B.7: New York City, Percent black in con-
gressional districts, 1940 Census.
which is typically the most unevenly spaced variable in these analyses (as well as the most theo-
retically important for the analysis in Chapter 5). The cities affected are New York City, Chicago,
Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Boston, Cleveland, Baltimore, Buffalo, Detroit, Cincinnati,
San Francisco, St. Louis, and Milwaukee. I applied this fix to measures for the city districts in
congresses ranging from the 75th (1937-1939) to 86th (1959-1961) Congresses, those that pre-dated
Lublin’s more accurate district-based census data.

























Figure B.9: Los Angeles, Percent black in con-









Figure B.10: Philadelphia, Percent black in cen-















Figure B.11: Philadelphia, Percent black in con-
gressional districts, 1940 Census.
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Appendix C
Senate USR Scores
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The analyses in this study focus on the House of Representatives. This is the typical approach
adopted to study city representatives in national legislative politics, and with good reason: it is
much more difficult to tell a priori whether a Senator “represents” a city (compared to a House
member). The fundamental unit of representation in the Senate is the state, and the allotment
of per-capita Senate representation is famously imbalanced, but usually this is considered at the
state level. For instance, today the 720,000 Alaskans have as many senators as the 19.4 million res-
idents of New York State. But if we think about cities as distinctive political communities within
the nation, and within their states, there is even greater potential for representational imbalance
within this chamber. For instance, there is no formal allocation of senate representation for New
York City’s 8.2 million residents; they must vie with others within their state to have their views
represented in this body. In the context of a strong place character divide, present in New York for
decades and under which non-city forces are aligned against big cities, this kind of arrangement
may be very dire indeed for the representation of cities in the Senate, because there have been so
few statewide city majorities.1 Given the distribution of seats and population, it is realistic that
the Senate might be entirely composed of those indifferent or hostile to cities.
In reality, there do seem to be some Senators that we might consider to be a part of the city
institutional order, but there are no studies I am aware of that try to estimate a priori which Sena-
tors are likely to be attentive to city concerns, or to look closely at the role of cities in the Senate.
Nevertheless, with these challenges in mind it may still be useful to try to estimate city represen-
tation and power in the Senate. In this section, I briefly estimate the size and partisan character
of representation in the Senate over time, in a similar fashion to how the history of the House
was presented in Chapter 3. When I do, below, the patterns of temporal and partisan change that
emerge in the upper chamber are far less pronounced.
The first step is to assign the equivalent of statewide USR scores. This is more complicated
than House districts, because almost all states include significant city, suburban, and rural ele-
ments, so most states are mixed constituencies. Further, a state’s city population is likely to be
related to its suburban population in the 20th century, so the presence of a large city may not al-
1Today, the residents of large central cities—those present in Lieberman’s (2009) dataset—do not make up a majority
of residents in any state.
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ways mean strong net representation gains for that city.2 Identifying city senators when no state
median voters live in a large city might leave us with an empty set, but a closer look can give us
more realistic estimates of which Senators are likely to be attentive to city concerns in national
politics. For Lieberman (2009), representatives from states with large cities were candidates for
being part of a bloc representing city interests in national legislative politics. The USR scores de-
scribed above allow for a more fine-grained approach in the House, as within-state variation is an
important feature of the place-character divide. For Senators, however, who each represent their
entire state, Lieberman’s approach is a more appropriate starting point, and one I adopt here.
A state is considered a “city” state, and its Senators given a USR score of at least 1, if it con-
tains a city with more than .1 percent of the national population (those cities are identified in the
Lieberman (2009) dataset). USR scores for Senate increase as the following secondary conditions
are satisfied:
a) “City-state”: More than 1/2 of the state’s congressional districts are “city” districts (that is,
they have a USR of at least 6 out of 7)
b) “Party of cities”: Of the members of the House from that state, at least 1/4 are from a city, and
of those city representatives, at least 3/4 are from the same party as the Senator.
c) “State city caucus”: At least 1/2 of the state’s representatives from the same party as the
Senator are from cities
d) “Former city Rep”: The Senator is a former (or, less common, future) member of the House
representing a city district from the state.
If a Senator meets one or more of these secondary conditions, he or she is considered a “city” sen-
ator for the purposes of this analysis of city power in the Senate over time, and given a USR score
2As a result, statewide demographic measures of “urban” population, as in Adler’s (2008) dataset, are helpful but
fuzzy, as that variable includes both central cities and suburbs in the percent urban. The statewide USR scores presented
below are based mostly on the USR data from the House, rather than on direct census data. A further refinement that
incorporates historical census data is a future step, but one which will likely not change these results substantially.
This judgment is based on analyses incorporating direct demographics from recent censuses, which are more readily
available.
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Conditions for USR scoring, Senate (1867-2011
USR Score Description % Overall Maximum
0 No city in state 43 61
1 State has city 35 47
2 State has city, and 1 of above secondary conditions 11 21
3 State has city, and at least 2 of secondary conditions 11 19
Table C.1: Definitions for USR scoring, Senate. Senators are given USR scores based on a combi-
nation of state-level and personal factors. The third column indicates the percentage of Senators
in this category overall, and the fourth indicates the the maximum historical proportion of the
Senate in this category.
of 2 (out of 3). If more than 1 of the secondary conditions are met, the Senator gets a score of 3.
For the sake of clarity, the Figures and analyses in this section combine Senators with USR scores
of 2 or 3 into one category; we can think of these Senators, who represent states with large cities
and have strong personal and/or political ties to those cities, as “core” urban Senators. There is
less precision in these Senate measures, so Figure C.1 below is perhaps best interpreted as present-
ing a range of city power in the Senate over time: the high end of the lightly-shaded grey range
represents the maximal city representation, if all senators from states with cities were attentive to
big-city concerns. The low end is more restrictive, demanding that the senators meet at least one
of the conditions above, indicating actual political or personal attachment to the city in his or her
state.3 No doubt the actual power of the city institutional order lies somewhere in between.
Figure C.1 illustrates trends in city power in the Senate and the partisan distribution of differ-
ent kinds of Senators. The patterns are different from those in the House, as the partisan divide
does not seem to be as strong in this chamber. From the subfigure on the left, it is apparent that the
number of Senators with large cities in their states grew and then plateaued over the 20th century.
This is a function of the same pattern of city dispersion we saw in Figures 3.1 and 3.4. However,
this increase was not quite matched by the increase in Senators with actual political or personal
ties to their states’ cities (the darker shaded area on the bottom of the figure), those we might think
3If the place character divide is real, and it seems to be, then it is important to take into account the fact that the pres-
ence of a city within a state may cut both ways, and as the central city and suburban components reach demographic
parity the presence of a large city may not be as much of a political net gain for city forces. This seems particularly ap-
propriate at the state level, where rivalries between city and country are often most evenly matched. In such a context,
some Senators may be motivated by urban concerns and have their base in the city, while others may see the city as a
political force to oppose, and draw strength from non-city areas. The secondary conditions above attempt to deal with
this possibility, measuring indications of affinity for or political ties to the city.






























Figure C.1: Senators by USR categories and Party At left, overall city power in the Senate. The
white area is Senators who represent a state without a city. The light grey area represents Senators
with at least one city in their state, the dark grey area Senators with important connections to their
city. At right, the partisan breakdowns of the same categories over time. Source: USR data.
of as “core” urban Senators. In fact, the number of Senators with political links to cities has actu-
ally fallen since the 1960s. This may have an impact on the substance of policymaking; if fewer
Senators find their home-state allies in large cities, it may be more difficult for those interested in
city concerns to navigate the arcane folkways of that upper chamber.
Because the USR constituency-representative link is conceived of differently for the Sen-
ate (the scores, at least those in the higher two categories, are a mix of state demographics and
individual- and state-level political measures, so a state could move categories in a way that a
House district could not), some Senators’ placements on this scale may not perfectly reflect their
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responsiveness to city issues.4 With that in mind, we can nevertheless make a few observations.
In partisan terms, the pattern is similar to but weaker than that in the House over time: Sen-
ators who represent cities, at least those with observable ties to their cities, have become more
closely associated with the Democrats over time. The bottom of the figure gets bluer, while the
top gets redder, but less so than in the House. This began with the sharp shift in 1933, when Sena-
tors of all sorts, but especially those with ties to cities, became very blue. Almost all Senators with
a large city in their state were Democrats early in the New Deal, an almost complete reversal from
just a few cycles earlier, when city senators were largely (but not really distinctively) Republicans.
The shift to the GOP by non-city Senators was sharpest in the late 1970s through the early
1980s, at least a decade before the big shift in the House, which took place in the 1990s. One
might think that this drop-off in rural Democrats was related to the partisan transformation of the
South; this was a large part of the story in the House of the 1990s, when rural Southern districts
shifted toward the Republican column. In the Senate, however, the drop is attributable to a shift
to the GOP in the Mountain states. Most Southern states, after all, do have large cities (giving
their Senators a USR score of at least 1; among southern states, only Mississippi, Arkansas, and
South Carolina were city-less before 1990. Between them, only one seat shifted to the Republicans
during this time period, as John Eastland gave way to Thad Cochrane in Mississippi.) By contrast,
five Western states with no large cities, (Idaho, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, and Alaska) saw at least
one reliably Democratic seat become reliably Republican in the late 1970s or early 1980s.
Indeed, partisan affiliation of Senators from states with no large cities falls along regional lines.
The Democrats are mainly from the northeast and most are from “city remnant” states such as
Delaware, Rhode Island, and New Jersey which used to have large cities but no longer do. Repub-
licans are generally from the mountainous western states mentioned above.
While the extremes—Senators with no city to represent, and those with personal or political
4For instance, if the city representatives from a state were split between the parties, or if the Senator was an urban-
studies professor from a land-grant college with no apparent institutional ties to the city, the secondary conditions
would not pick up their ties to the city; alternatively, if a ruralist from within a state with a city won office as an intra-
party rival of city forces within the state, running against them, these conditions would not account for that anti-city
animus. Alternatively, a Democratic Senator would be more likely to fall into the high-urbanicity category because the
city districts in his or her state would likely be Democratic, given the historical changes in the House. An “equivalent”
Republican Senator would likely fall into the central category, even if he or she was somehow elected with city support.
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ties to the large cities in their state—have come to fit more neatly into the urban-rural partisan di-
vide, the contested middle set of Senators with a city in their state but who do not meet one of the
secondary conditions outlined above have been more volatile in their partisan affiliation. Though
the overall trend seems to favor the Republicans, this group has been more subject to swings, and
more evenly divided by party, than the strongly city Senators. As in the House, the “middle”
category on the urbanicity continuum is the most contested, though their actual constituencies
may not be and more homogeneously suburban than the bottom category. Looking closer, this
category includes most of the key “battleground” states that have been closely contested in recent
presidential elections: Florida, Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Missouri, North Car-
olina, Colorado, and Virginia. These are states where the cities do not hold the balance of power,
or where statewide outcomes (in terms of winning, not necessarily party vote percentages) are
highly variable.
